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Ethnicity and Citizenship: 
The Contemporary Legacy 
Kay Saunders and Roger Daniels 
Since the apparently sudden emergence of the "New 
World Order", heralded in January 1991 by the United 
States' dominated United Nations' multinational 
retallatoiy force aimed at Iraq as a consequence of its 
Invasion of Kuwait and prompted by the disintegration 
of the USSR later that year, a new and virulent form of 
nationalism has Ironically dominated International 
politics. This is not to contend that civil war, inspired 
largefy by ethnically driven loyalties and territorial 
ambitions Is In any way new. What Is now apparent is 
that these bitter internal conflicts where one ethnic 
group or tribe literally fights to the death to destroy its 
neighbours or Internal minorities has not been solely 
confined to Third World totalitarian regimes. Rather, 
they are now on the very doorstep of advanced liberal 
Western democracies, most particularly In the 
constituent states of the former Yugoslavia and the 
USSR. These localised Internecine battles, waged with 
a fervour that verges on a compulsive fanaticism where 
centuries-old grievances are used as the reason for 
genocide, have wider implications. 
For what they represent Is the expression of an 
ethnic solidarity which Involves the total disregard for 
the basic rights of fellow nationals, who are ethnically, 
linguistically or religiously dllferent, taken to its most 
extreme and lethal end. Whether It Is engagement in 
an external war or perhaps the search for national 
sovereignty after the dissolution of a diverse 
confederation, these crises produce processes that 
seek to identify, target. Incarcerate, internally exile, 
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deport or exterminate the "internal enemy" who, by 
virtue of ethnicity. Is regarded by the dominant 
community as forever alien and unlncorporable within 
the body politic. These patterns. In a more muted form, 
may be observed In Western liberal democracies like 
the United Kingdom. Canadci, Australia and the USA 
during periods of International warfare where some 
categories of enemy alien origin (thought not 
necessarily birth) are summarily detained, deprived of 
all their civil liberties and sometimes deported at the 
cessation of hostilities. Nazi Germany's policy of 
obliterating those not defined as "Ayran" represents 
the most extreme version of this process that at its 
core has common Ideological and mass psychological 
roots. The wars in the former Yugoslavia, both civil and 
amongst the newly recognised small nations, follow 
this latter pattern. The Holocaust has been partially 
reproduced but now called "ethnic cleansing". Despite 
concerted and repeated attempts of delegations from 
the European Community and the United Nations 
initially to address the military confrontations and the 
extermination of resident minorities like the Muslims 
in Bosnia, these have irretrievably failed. They will 
continue to fall because the logic of universal rights 
and territorial boundaries can never be implemented 
amongst belligerent participants who will literally fight 
to the death to preserve what they consider is their 
ethnic imperative and destiny. 
Although we propose that these assertions and 
defence of nationalism (which have at their heart the 
attempt to conflate ethnicity Avlth citizenship) may be 
seen along a continuum that contains multiple 
variations, no holistic explanation cem be identified to 
account for their emergence and operation. Indeed, as 
Ray Taras warns, making specific reference to the 
successor states of the USSR: 
No single theory can account for the historical path 
travelled in the early 1990s in the former Soviet Union by 
Baltic and Turkic peoples, Uniates and Buddhists. 
Ethnictty and Cittzenship tU 
Industrial sectors and communities of reindeer herders. 
Flndeselch social science needs to be wary of any form of 
determinism - hlstoriced, economist, nationalist, llber£d 
democratic. 1 
Yet, as Anthony Glddens explains In The Nation-State 
and Violence (1985), there is a dynamic interaction 
between the construction of national identity and the 
expansion and consolidation of state sovereignty.^ This 
construction of a specific national renaissance where 
the ambitions of particular ethnic communities to 
establish a legitimate "nation-in-itself' is a form of 
Insurgent and lethal nationalism.^ 
On the other hand, in defined nation-states like 
Australia or Canada which have not been territorially 
altered by external wars, and have been granted 
autonomy by a benign imperial power, patterns of 
ethnic Intimidations and persecution, waged in periods 
of extreme trauma like total war. albeit fought on some 
distant shore, do not take such extreme forms. Like 
the United States, they have however historically 
engaged In extended wars of genocide, effected 
Institutionalised prolonged Internal exile and coercive 
population transfers as well as perpetrated cultural 
obliteration by policies of assimilation; but these have 
been solely confined to the Indigenous peoples. The 
reserve system operated as de facto segregation 
systems whereby the Indigenous peoples were rounded 
up and forcibly detained. Their labour was 
systematically exploited by state agencies. In Australia 
reserve residents were not citizens enjoying the 
protection of the law. Though British subjects, they 
existed as powerless wards of the state, confined and 
constrained by special racial legislation. Without a Bill 
of Rights or a Constitution that ensured the rights to 
Individual liberty and civil freedoms, many Aboriginal 
people were dispossessed prisoners in their own land. 
As the National Inquiry into the Separation of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from 
their Families (1997) noted. Australia ratified the 1948 
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Genocide Convention but Its provisions were never 
Incorporated Into law. Until this Inquiry and the Mabo 
(1992) and Wlk (1996) decisions of the High Court, the 
whole issue of extermination, dispossession, forced 
removals of peoples to closed reserves simply on the 
basis of race, the removal of children fi'om their 
families, the total lack of fundamental civil rights had 
never been addressed by the federal goverrmient. These 
extreme patterns of ethnic conflict have been part of 
the process and consequences of colonial conquest. 
Subsequent immigrant populations, such as 
minorities of Japanese, who m the Second World War 
were regarded as dangerous fifth columnists whose 
loyalty to nation was suspect, were never subject to a 
degree of violence Inherent in these frontier patterns of 
destruction. What should ultimately be stressed when 
we evaluate patterns of ethnic rivalry and conflict is 
that apparently liberal setUer societies, which might at 
some abstract level regard themselves as exemplars of 
Western civilisation, have perpetuated, at some earlier 
moment in their history, prolonged ethnic genocide. 
Thus the policy of the USSR In the 1930s and 1940s 
which witnessed the attempted decimation of the 
Kazahks. Crimean Tartars and Karachays; the 
expulsion from their traditional homelands of the 
Clracclans; the internal exile of Chechens and Crimean 
Tartars as well as those of German derivation* all have 
resonance In countries like Australia. Canada and the 
United States. 
Political theorists like Mate Szabo. Andras 
K6r6senyl. Ferenc Mlszllvetz and Mlroslav KUSIQT^ 
might posit that former Soviet client satellites like 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia have attempted to 
emulate Western liberal democratic political 
formations in order to account for the stabihty of 
recent transition from tot£ilitarian to democratic 
systems. Yet. these theorists disregard patterns of 
suppression that have historically developed in these 
admired newly-emerging democracies. The dynamics of 
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particular expressions of nationalism, the quest for 
sovereignty and policies towards internal ethnic 
minorities may help explain these wider patterns of 
ethnic conflict regardless of the differentiation In the 
national cultures. So that, rather seeing particular 
countries being placed in a fixed order along a 
continuum, we should always remember that crises 
like war. whether civil or external, produce repression 
In specific Instances In even the most liberal nation. In 
the UK for the past twenty-five years, for example, the 
repressive deployment of the apparatus of the state 
including detention without due process, media 
censorship, exclusion orders alongside media 
representations of the Northern Irish as fanatical 
terrorists has apparenUy coexisted in a nation that 
regards itself as the mother of democracy. The British 
government has ultimately used extraordinary force. 
surveiUance of citizens and the Imposition of localised 
marital law as part of a campaign to destroy militant 
northern Irish nationalists and Ulster loyalists, who 
are perceived by many as ethnic terrorists. 
James Mayall in Nationalism and International 
Society (1991) comments that "ostensibly the world 
has been made safe for nationalism".® As various 
authors in a collection entiUed Nations and Politics in 
the Soviet Successor States (1993) all confirm, the 
Imposition of communist rule upon the twenty Internal 
Soviet states, a rule formulated and controlled in 
Moscow, witnessed the ruthless repression of local 
nationalism. But with the disintegration of the Soviet 
empire, both Internally and in client states in Eastern 
Europe, a virulent form of nationalism has emerged. In 
some countries like Poland and Latvia the emerging 
nationalism h£is not been characterised by violence.^ 
But this Is the exception to what now seems the rule. 
Eric Hobsbawn In his monumental study. Nations and 
Nationalism since 1780 (1990), though referring 
speclficalfy to the dissolution of European empires in 
the interwar years, argues persuasively that: 
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TTie logical ImplIcaUon of trying to create a continent 
neatly dvlded Into coherent territorial states each 
Inhabited by a separate ethnically and linguistically 
homogenous population was the mass expulsion or 
extermination of mlnoriUes. Such was and is the 
murderous reductio ad absurdum of nationalism in the 
territorial version.® 
Hobsbawn's commentary may readily be applied to 
other more recent political and territorial dissolutions. 
In the former Soviet republics, like Moldova for 
Instance, the Initial declaration of Independence, In 
this case in August 1991 when attempts were made to 
depose President Gorbachev, was soon followed by 
Inter-ethnlc tensions and rivalries. With nearly sixty 
five per cent of the population ethnic Romanian, there 
were calls to join territorially with Romania. These 
were largely rejected internally as the Romanian 
economy is backward and underdeveloped. The ethnic 
Russians who constitute some twelve per cent of the 
population were alarmed that, not only was Russian 
no longer the official language but they would lose all 
their privileges and status in the new order. Whilst the 
Gagauz constituted formerly only around three per 
cent of the population, the fiercely nationalist 
Romanian majority, within one month of the 
declaration of Independence, decreed this minority 
were not Moldovans - that they were Bulgarians who 
had only been transplanted to Moldova after the 
Russo-Turklsh war of 1806-1812. An official report 
confirmed that since historically they did not have 
their own territory, therefore these Gagauz were not, 
nor could be. true Moldavans.^ The New York Times of 
7 October 1990 highlighted the growing anti-semltism 
that was already occurring. Dania Fame concluded 
that ethnic violence has lead to fragmentation and 
territorial realignment. •" 
This new nationalism, wherein questions of the 
Individual's perceived loyalty to a particular state is 
chaUenged and often rejected primarily upon grounds 
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of ethnic origin and secondarily upon religious or 
linguistic criteria, has assumed endemic proportions 
in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans. Indeed what may be observed is a dangerous 
and malignant "new tribalism" where the bonds of 
ethnle^^ are regarded as paramount and override all 
other social and political relationships. The territory of 
the emerging na t ion-s ta te , especially where 
sovereignty is contested by rival neighbours who 
believe they have an equal historical emd symbolic 
claim to particular locations, is thereby constituted 
upon the premise of homogeneous ethnicity. Nowhere 
has the devastating effects of the imposition of this 
myttiomoteia^^ been witnessed so unambiguously as in 
the former Yugoslav state of Bosnia where a civil war 
has sought to destroy resident Muslims. Concurrentiy 
Bosnia has been engaged in protracted external wars 
against neighbouring nation-states as each lays claim 
to territory. Whilst Marshal Tito had recognised the 
importance of ethnic distinctiveness, he had 
nevertheless attempted to unite the six constituent 
nations into a supra-national myth of an "Illyrian" 
homeland and a shadoAvy "Yugoslavia" which united 
diverse peoples under common laws and bonds of 
citizenship.*^ 
The war in Kosovo, sparked specifically by Serbian 
aggressive intrusions into the province of Kosovo in 
January 1999. the subsequent failure of peace talks 
held in Paris the following month and the continued 
defiance of President Slobodan Milosovic. resulting in 
NATO attacks on Belgrade commencing on 25 March 
1999. represents another chapter of Balkan ethnie. 
Like the war against the Muslim Bosnians in 1992. 
this complex confrontation con ta ins all the 
characteristics of "ethnic cleansing". There was an 
historical claim to ethnic purity and territorial 
sovereignty. Kosovo was regarded by the Serbians as 
the "cradle of the Serbian nation", a concept emanating 
from the Battie of Kosovo in 1389 when the Ottomans 
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destroyed the remains of the Serbian "Empire". Kosovo 
became an independent state in 1871 though Its 
autonomy was fragile, being invaded during the 1912 
Balkan Wars by Serbia and Montenegro and again in 
1918. In 1963 Kosovo was declared an "autonomous 
province" within Serbia with its own schools, 
parliament and legal system. This was rescinded In 
1989 after Milosovic made an Inflammatory speech to 
mark the 600th anniversary of the BatUe of the Plains 
of Kosovo.'* 
As Mark Danner demonstrates, the five step process 
of 'ethnic cleansing* in Kosovo follows the pattern laid 
down in Bosnia: surrounding the targeted territory, 
executing political leaders, separating "fighting" men 
from old men, women and children, transporting and 
expelling them, and finally "liquidating" able bodied 
men in mass executions.'^ Michael Ignatieff further 
shows how our modem concept of universal human 
rights, emanating from an avowed intention of 
preventing another Holocaust, has proven totally 
useless In the face of determined ethnic wars in 
Rwanda and the Balkans.'® The military intervention of 
NATO, under the direction of the United States of 
America, did litUe to prevent mass murder and indeed 
inflamed and augmented Serbian resentment and 
aggression. Tens of thousands of people have been 
slaughtered; thousands more have been rendered 
homeless and stateless; both Kosovo and Serbia have 
been devastated economically. The underlying problem 
of territorial sovereignty aligned with ethnic purity has 
not been solved. In the final analysis it can never be; 
for ethnic purity does not and cannot exist anywhere 
in Europe. Thus the claims of Greater Serbia are built 
solely upon mjrthology. 
Clearly the former nations within Yugoslavia 
possessed a weak civic culture and were unable to 
develop wider concepts of inclusive citizenship where 
loyalty to the State must necessarily stand above 
adherence to the primacy of ethnic identification.'^ 
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Ernest Gellener gives a pessimistic prognosis about 
the outcomes of these attempts towards nation 
building because of the historical legacy that has 
determined that "national Identity" must necessarily, if 
it is to be accepted as legitimate, originate in a 
homogenous ethnic and cultural foundation.'® Mate 
Szabo also emphas i ses that these political 
transformations - in Eastern Europe where they may 
be seen in a more benign form, and the Balkans where 
they are assuming horrific patterns of genocide - all 
refy upon selective reconstructions of their peist as a 
fundament£il process to achieve a new sovereignty. 
Older often pre-lmperial traditions are invoked in the 
relenUess process of mythomoteur. Conflicts with 
rivals, challenges to neighbouring nation-states or 
ethnic minorities have all emerged with varj^ng 
degrees of coercion.'® 
Anthony D. Smith regards these processes as a 
necessary, if unfortunate preliminary, to the 
development of wider notions of citizenship with the 
nation-state. However this can only occur when fights 
for Independence have been transformed Into the 
legitimate sovereignty of a nation-state with defined 
intact boundaries. "Civil religion" can form out of 
shared myths, memories and symbols and In these 
societies Inclined towards Western concepts of the 
poUs where active citizenship is at a premium, this 
system can gradually evolve largely through "a 
universal system of education".^" But, as Szabo point 
out. the development of trade unions, political parties, 
coalitions and a comprehensive constitution emerging 
in Hungary which form the basis of stable political 
mobilisations of the new order, are entirely absent in 
the constituents of the former Yugoslavia. Here 
"nationalist-fundamenteilist" processes, stressing 
adherence to ethnicity rather than a broad rationally 
organised civic culture, dominate.^' 
With some degree of confidence we may assert that 
"ethnic cleansing" is unlikely to occur in Hungary if it 
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were suddenly engaged in an external war. But as 
stressed earlier, the treatment of ethnic minorities 
when a nation-state, albeit when one with liberal 
democratic traditions, in undergoing extreme stress 
like war, can move from benign to deleterious with 
some alacrity. The Gulf War provides a recent test 
case, although some caution must be exercised 
because it was of a short duration and component 
Allies were never engaged in a total war. But It does 
indicate that patterns of ethnic persecution erupt 
coterminiously with the declaration of war and as. 
hostilities Increase in intensity and duration, so too 
does community targetting of ethnic minorities. 
TTie Gulf War which officially broke out on 18 
January 1991 witnessed a reinvlgoration of ethnic 
hostilities with what at first glance might seen a 
surprising vehemence and alacrity. In Australia, Arabs 
and those of the Islamic faith - indeed all peoples 
perceived to have originated in the Middle East such 
as Jewish Australians - were identified as potentially 
"disloyal" to the nation and became the concerted 
target of individual and collective racial vllfficatlon and 
attack. Islamic women with their distinctive headgear 
were particularly singled out for verbal and physical 
abuse when they appejired in public.^^ The Rooty Hill 
Mosque located in an ethnically diverse working class 
area of Sydney was fire bombed on 24 January 1991. 
Synagogues were also vandalised.^' In the UK where 
there are around 750,0(X) Muslims, the majority whom 
emanate from the Indian subcontinent and are 
adherent of the moderate Sunni falth,^* the Gulf War 
witnessed similar patterns of persecution.^^ 
In both Australia eind the UK, Muslims generally 
and those of Iraqi origins specifically were at pains to 
stress their loyalty to their country of residence. 
Harzatmla Kazl. president of the Saddam Hussein 
Mosque in Birmingham stressed that: "We are all 
British Muslims. Our first allegiance is to our 
government".^^ In Australia Sheikh Fehnl of the 
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Preston Mosque In Melbourne Identified a continuing 
problem when he stated that "[Australia] has now 
become a multicultured society but they still don't 
understand It and react In a very low way",^ ^ Indeed 
multiculturallsm. despite Its bipartisan support as 
official Australian policy since 1972. may have a very 
thin existence in the largely British derived national 
psyche. Pride In British ethnicity was the cornerstone 
of Australian cultural and political life until the late 
1960s. As soon as Australia Is engaged in a war. even 
at a moderate supportive capacity, such as in 1991 the 
old assertions that only those of truly British 
extraction can be "trusted" resurface. 
As the 1991 Report of the National Inquiry into 
Racist Violence conducted by the Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunities Commission concluded. Arabs 
and Muslims were generally not Identified with 
"Australian values" and issues such as religious 
fundamentalism and ultra-conservative views towards 
the status of women, were cited as evidence of their 
desire for a separate cultural Identity outside of the 
mgdnstream democratic British-derived system. 
Moreover, even before the Gulf War. they even often 
regarded suspiciously a potential terrorist or religious 
fanatics especially after the Salman Rushdie affair. 
Persons of Arab descent, both in Britain and Australia, 
were accused of being inherentiy disloyal emd. indeed, 
could never be truly loyal to a particular nation-state. 
This readily conflated with ethnic origin which is in 
turn seen somehow to determine specific cultural 
beliefs. 
These assertions that defy rational scrutiny and 
Interrogation are not simply the prerogative of 
lUeducated underprivileged members of the dominant 
society. In England In April 1990 fourteen Iranians 
and one Iraqi were expelled under the "national 
security" rule. In the appccd of one of the Iranians, 
Lord Justice Donaldson refused to consider whether 
these particular individuals represented a real threat 
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to British national security. Arguing that "National 
security is the exclusive responsibility of the Executive 
and is par exceUerice an non-justiciable Issue", he 
continued that "those who are most effectively able to 
undermine national security are those who least 
appear to consUtute any risk to it'.^* The logical 
conclusion of this eminent jurist must therefore be 
that ethnicity alone determines cultural and political 
beliefs. It is as if "disloyalty" is somehow genetically 
transmitted and even the apparently innocent may 
subscribe to dangerous Ideologies. 
In Australia six members of Hezbolah were deported 
during the Gulf War as well as an Iraqi diplomat. The 
leading weekly magazine. The BuUeUn counselled that, 
given the essentially volatile ideological beliefs of many 
Arabs, it is difficult for the Australian Intelligence and 
Security Organization (ASIO) to sift through who is a 
potential terrorist and who is simply a law abiding 
citizen who merely wants a peaceful life in a new 
country.^^ On the other hand, it should be noted that, 
in contrast to the world wars where the state actively 
engaged in propaganda and Internment campaigns 
against enemy aliens, in the Gulf war leading 
politicians attempted to calm racist public opinion. 
Joan Kimer. the Premier of Victoria called for reason 
and for the recognition that Australian Arabs and 
Muslims were not responsible for the actions of 
S a d d a m H u s s e i n . Both the Victorian and 
Commonwealth Human Rights Commissions engaged 
in public education campaigns in support of Arab-
Australians' inherent civil liberties. Moira Rayner. the 
Victorian Human Rights Commissioner asserted that: 
Australia has faced the tragedy of war several times this 
century, and now again. But neither war nor the threat of 
war is any justification for bullying or harassing other 
Australians, ... because they are Islamic or of Middle 
Eastern origin. No individual is responsible for the 
behaviour of an entire nation or its political leader ... 
Australian laws and institutions will protect all Australian 
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residents at this difficult Ume.*' 
With regard to long-standing community claims 
that particular minorities can never be "loyal" to the 
nation or Its collective beliefs. It is ironical to 
contemplate that Australia and Canada both entered 
the world wars not because their own territory was 
threatened but because Britain was at war. 
Australians generally (although some Irish-Australian 
nationalists In World War I may have dissented) saw 
themselves as Britons In the Antipodes whose basic 
loyalty was always first to Empire and not to nation. 
The "crimson thread of kinship" bound Anglo-
Australians unquestionably to the "Mother Country" in 
the first instance and, since 1942, to fraternal allies 
like Uie USA. 
This volume Is concerned with particular test cases 
that examine the limits of liberty and the degree to 
which ethnic solidarity is exerted in three Anglo-
derived democracies undergoing the trauma of total 
war. As English speaking nations with common British 
foundations and later adaptations In their political and 
constitutional systems, they allow plausible 
interrogations of both their similarities and differences. 
Whilst both Canada and Australia were dominions 
within the British Empire, we can however observe 
differences in both World Wars with regard to ethnic 
minorities. In Australia in World War I, as Gerhard 
Fischer shows, the state sought to contain. Incarcerate 
and. In some instances, later deport those of German 
origin to an extraordinary extent. In a country of some 
five million inhabitants, over 7000 people were 
Interned, mosUy of Austrian or German origins. The 
"enemy alien" at home was confused with the enemy 
on the distant batUe field. Whereas as Geoffrey Smith 
demonstrates, Canada although characterised by 
xenophobia was more moderate in its treatment of 
enemy aliens. Unlike Australia, the United States had 
only very limited experience with internment during 
World War I. As J6rg Nagler reveals In his essay 
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treating the German-American experience in both 
wars, despite a large Germem-bom population (2.5 
million according to the 1910 census), about a fifth of 
whom were unnaturallsed and thus enemy aliens as 
soon eis the United States declared weir in April 1917, 
very few Germems were actually interned by federal 
authorities. Only some 8,000 enemy aliens - the vast 
majority of them Germans and edmost edl the rest 
subjects of Austria-Hungaiy - were arrested under 
presidential warrants and perhaps 2,300 enemy 
nationals resident in the United States were actually 
Interned, ninety per cent of them German and all but a 
few of them mede. To be sure, during World War I, 
German-Americans faced a great deal of harassment 
and persecution from lesser governmental authorities 
and the populace, something that was largely absent 
during World War II as both the American government 
and American culture distinguished between "good" 
and "bad" Germans. 
Raymond Evans highlights in his chapter that 
deportation of political radicals on the left weis a legacy 
of the internment imperatives of the Great War in 
Australia. So that a nexus weis drawn between ethnic 
minorities and radicedlsm which was regeirded eis 
threatening to conservative British ideologies. Andrew 
Moore in his exeimlnation of surveillance procedures in 
Australia in the Interwar years scrutinises the logical 
extension of these processes wherein intelligence 
officers who subscribed to an extreme form of British 
cultural identity likewise adhered to those very right 
wing ideologies that were later seen as the anti-
democratic ideology which the Allies were combating. 
In addition, Kay Saunders shows how Australia in 
the Second World Weir, especially after the entry of 
Japan and threats to its territorial integrity, targetted 
all persons of non-British origin, eventuedly interning 
persons from twenty seven nationalities. With just 
seven million people Australia interned more 
individuals of European origin than the United States 
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with fifteen times the population. Moreover, as JOrg 
Nagler. George Pozzetta and John Joel Culley show, 
the Internment of European enemy aliens in the US 
was limited. Curiously, about the same number of 
German nationals - 2.300 - were Interned as In World 
War I. along with a few hundred Italian nationals and a 
handful or so of nationals from other European Axis 
allies. To note that this was a very small number is not 
to suggest that there were not hardships and 
Injustices Involved. There were. But all of the 
Europeans placed In confinement In the United States 
were unnaturalised aliens - this was not true for 
Canada or Australia - although some citizen wives and 
children "voluntarily" accompanied husbands and 
fathers Into internment camps. As George Pozzetta 
reveals In his examination of Italian-American 
reactions to the war between the land of the first 
generation's origin and Its adopted land, there were 
major strains and stresses placed on the community 
even though only a minuscule proportion of those 
eligible for internment were actually placed in 
confinement. 
What needs to be emphasised is that in Canada and 
the US a considerable majority of ethnic Japanese 
were or had become citizens and that, in terms of the 
initial post-December 1941 Internments, the 
proportion of Japanese aliens interned dwarfed that of 
Germans or Italians. In each country, the selective 
Internment of aliens was followed, in the spring and 
summer of 1942, by a massive round-up of the entire 
West Coast Japanese population, citizen and alien, 
men, women emd children. By contrast, in war-torn 
Hawaii, where every third person was an ethnic 
Japemese, a relatively small percentage was interned or 
otherwise deprived of liberty, but that percentage was 
still higher than that of German or Japanese aliens on 
the mainland. 
Geoffrey Smith analyses the several facets of the 
Japanese-Canadian experience which, when compared 
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to that of Japanese-Americans, was both harsher - It 
lasted longer and had fewer ameliorating aspects - and 
less harsh - the Canadian government's agents 
committed no acts of homicide against its prisoners. 
John Joel CuUey. in a wide-ranging essay examines 
and appraises the processes by which the United 
States effected internment in more detail than h£is 
been done previously. Roger Daniels looks at the larger 
but more familiar procedures by which more than 
120.000 Japanese-Americans, nearly seventy per cent 
of them native-born American citizens, were 
Incarcerated by first the War Department and then the 
War Relocation Authority under conditions much more 
spartan than those under which the several thousand 
aliens were interned by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service. Sandra Taylor examines a less 
familiar aspect of the wartime incarceration by 
explicating the several expedients by which Japanese-
Americans were released from WRA captivity, 
beginning as early as the summer of 1942. Donald 
Hata J r and Nadine Hata look at the various ways in 
which the Japanese-American community reacted, 
first to confinement and then to "freedom" culminating 
In Its eventually "successful" struggle for redress, 
achieved with the passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 
1988. Deborah Overmyer and Geoffrey Gigllerano. 
museum professionals, explicate the ways In which 
American museums eventually tried to come to grips 
with a major stain on the American past, a story that 
is in marked contrast to the craven performance of the 
Smithsonian Institution and its ill-fated Enola Gay 
exhibit in 1995. 
In her chapter on policy formation in Australia. Kay 
Saunders demonstrates how military intelligence cast 
a wide net. regarding with suspicion anyone not of 
British origins. Despite an official policy that stressed 
moderation, actual practice, particularly after the Fall 
of Singapore and the invasion of Australian colonial 
territories in the early months of 1942. departed from 
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this restraint. Over 7000 persons from twenty-seven 
nationalities, though the largest numbers came from, 
in order, the Italian, Japanese and German 
communities, were interned. A small minority of 
Germans and Italians were incarcerated for their 
adherence to Nazi and fascist ideologies; but they were 
the exceptions. The vast majority were interned 
because of their ethnic origins. The Italians, on the 
north eeist coast where it was feared the Japanese 
would Invade, came under particular scrutiny and 
official action. The Japanese on the other hand were 
Interned en masse on 8 December 1941. 
Kay Saunders also writes on the experience of being 
taken into custody for an unknown period of time. 
Since they were not arrested and arraigned in a civil 
court, the very open-endedness and arbitrariness 
made the experience traumatic and bewildering. 
Yuriko Nagata takes up their story by examining in 
detail the internees' lives in internment camps. 
Strangely the Japanese community may have survived 
best; for they were incarcerated as a group and family 
and community support helped Individuals to survive. 
Whereas the Italians, Germans and those from the 
other ethnic groups Interned, were predomlnanUy 
adult men often literally ripped from the bosom of their 
families. 
As persons detained by the Commonwealth of 
Australia had no legal right to compensation and, in 
the absence of a Bill of Rights which might preserve 
abstract concepts of natural justice as well as specific 
civil liberties, we might argue that the Japanese origin 
residents of Australia in comparison to those in 
Canada and the US have not received justice or any 
public official recognition of their ordeals. Nor is this 
likely to eventuate. On the other hand Premier Carmen 
Lawrence In Western Australia in a dinner of 
reconciliation in August 1990 and Premier Nick 
Grelner In New South Wales in 1992 have ever publicly 
attempted to explore the ramifications of internment 
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but this only with regard to the Italian community in 
the former case. No major Australiem museum has 
tackled an extensive exhibition on internment. The 
Australian War Memorial, the prestigious institution in 
Canberra which contains both the national shrine to 
Australians fallen In battle as well as a major museum 
dlspla3rlng Australia's involvement in war in the 
twentieth century, does not acknowledge the question 
of widespread internment In either World War I or 11. 
Moreover, in the early months of 1995 when the 
Australian government mounted an extraordinarily 
expensive "Australia Remembers 1945-1995" 
commemorations to mark the Jubilee of the end of 
World War II, there were, not altogether 
unsurprisingly, no official plans to acknowledge let 
alone apologise for wrongs committed in a war 
supposedly to preserve liberty and justice. The past 
was selectively recast; so that all these values of 
patriotic Imperialism and national heroism were 
Ironically resuscitated once again as the conservative 
British derived values were vaunted. Despite 
multiculturalism. and Indeed ironically because 
Australia now adheres to a spurious form of 
multicultural rhetoric within a dominant Anglo-
Australian reality, questions about the persecution 
and detainment of European and Asian ethnic 
minorities is still unpjdatable. VJ Day likewise had 
become VP day as the Australian government strove 
not to oflFend Its prlmaiy trading partner. It was as If 
Australians fought some mysterious unknown 
opponent in the Pacific rather than the Japanese. 
Although neither Canada nor the USA have effortlessly 
been able to reconcile their pasts with their presents, 
they have been collectively better able to confront 
Issues of ethnic persecution engendered by World War 
II. Perhaps Australia, despite the rhetoric of "our place 
in Asia", fundamentally but secretly perceives Itself as 
a European bastion in an alien Asian-Pacific world. 
The current widespread support for the maverick 
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politician. Pauline Hemson who endorses a return to 
the old British-Australian way. demonstrates the 
endurance of these values. 
In the US no better example of a nation unable to 
come to terms with its past can be cited than the 
Smithsonian exhibition of the Enola Gay. Considering 
that the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki abruptiy terminated hostilities in the Pacific 
theatre of war and. moreover, changed the balance of 
power henceforth to the US's favour, the event 
demanded a detailed anedysis. At no time did the 
Smithsonian claim the issues were easy and 
uncontroversial; Indeed, it could provide the means by 
which the wider, long-lasting moral, strategical and 
diplomatic Issues could be debated. That the American 
Legion and other conservative bodies successfully 
lobbied to have the exhibition banned, with the 
exception of a display of the actual aircraft that 
dropped the bomb that changed the world forever, 
permits us to ask now. half a century on. were those 
values of freedom and democracy merely hollow 
rhetoric? And. like Australia, are only patriotic 
sentiments to be endorsed? For. if those precious 
values of critical enquiry and dissent are stifled in 
peace-time, how can we ever ensure that in future 
confrontations there is any hope that democratic 
debate is preserved. While prophecy is not the 
historian's province - or should not be - no serious 
student of liberty In North America and Australia can 
doubt that, given the right circumstances, the right 
provocation - today it would seem to be terrorism - and 
a similar "failure of political leadership", that some 
kind of mass Incarceration and ethnic persecution 
could happen again. 

Chapter 1 
Integration, "Negative Integration", 
Disintegration: The Destruction of the 
German-Australian Community during 
the First World War 
Gerhard Fischer 
The University of New South Wales 
In the current discourse on multicuIturaJism in 
Australia, there seems to be a consensus about a kind of 
triadic paradigm with regard to policies and attitudes 
towards non-British migrants: In a recent authoritative 
survey on Australian Immigration, this is defined as "a 
shift from assimilation through integration to 
multiculturallsm".' In terms of periodisation. 
assimilationism is identified as the prevailing dogma 
until the mid-1960s, while "pluralistic integration" 
appears as a kind of transitory stage, from the sixties to 
the early seventies, which ushers in the present phase of 
multiculturallsm.^ In another key study focussing on 
Multiculturalism and the Demise of Nationalism in 
Australia, the period 1945-1972 is summarised under 
the heading "Assimilation to Integration".^ The term 
integration is thus used to distinguish a specific 
innovative phase in the development of Australian 
society. The earlier policy of assimilation aimed at 
creating a homogenous, uniform society in which ethnic 
differences were made to disappear and immigrants were 
presumed to become socially and culturally invisible, 
indistinguishable from other residents of mainstream 
Anglo-Celtic Australian society. As an alternative policy, 
integration presupposed a model of a "plural society" 
which allowed for the recognition of ethnicity and 
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distinct ethnic identiUes that could "co-exist" within "a 
common realm" defined by equal political rights and 
shared "social valuations".* This policy promoted, in the 
words of Senator Nick Bolkus, the former Minister for 
Immigration in the Keating government, the "acceptance 
as full equals (ofi all people living legally in Australia and 
recognised immigrants' legitimate desire to retain their 
languages and cultures".^ Multiculturalism. finally, is 
held to be no longer a policy exclusively directed towards 
immigrants but one that involves all Australians. 
Multiculturalism acknowledges the existence of different 
ethnic communities and cultural backgrounds of 
Australians as a factor of societal enrichment; as a post-
nationalist "state ideology", it is primarily interested in 
safe-guarding and "managing" the ethnic and cultural 
diversity of Australian society as an important "national 
resource" and as part of the country's identity, of its 
"national distinctiveness".^ An essential difference 
between pluralistic integration and multiculturalism 
concerns the role of the state:^ in the integrationist 
model, the state adopts the non-interventionist, neutral 
position of classical liberalism, i.e. by not providing any 
special or unique considerations or privileges to 
immigrant communities apart from basic post-arrival 
services to facilitate migration and settlement. The policy 
of multiculturalism. on the other hand, demands an 
active involvement of government and state agencies in 
the promotion of a "multicultural agenda"® and in the 
management of cultural-ethnic diversity. 
The broad outline of the "assimilation-integration-
multiculturalism" paradigm and the issues involved 
seem to be undisputed. Nevertheless, there are some 
conceptual questions which are in need of clarification, 
particularly with regard to integration. The term itself is 
frequently defined rather hazily and given little critical 
attention by scholars using it. Characteristically, neither 
Castles, Kalantzis, Cope, Morrissey nor Wooden, Holton, 
Hugo, Sloan attempt to provide a definition. Integration 
is usucQly seen as opposed to assimilation (which is 
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linked to the melting-pot theory), and it is regarded as 
different from separatism (or ghettoisation which is 
sometimes criticised as Indicative of the failure of 
melting-pot strategies). However, one often finds that 
integration is also used more or less synonymously with 
assimilation.^ So what exactly is meant by pluralistic 
integration? In what way can one describe an ethnic 
minority group (or community) as integrated within a 
larger "host society"? 
There is also a question about the validity of the 
historical periodisation that appears in the discourse on 
multiculturalism. The commentators restrict themselves 
to a discussion of the post-World War II period, show 
littie if any interest at all in earlier phases which may 
offer precedents or which may be seen as anticipating 
forms of social policies eind popular or governmental 
attitudes that could be relevant to the present debate. In 
the following, I should like to suggest that the historical 
case study of an ethnic minority group that was at one 
time considered an integral yet distinct part of Australian 
society and that became subsequently "dis-integrated". 
namely the German- Australian community, may shed 
some light on the issues Involved. Perhaps ironically, the 
approach taken to explore this question in the present 
chapter is one that proceeds ex negativo, that tries to 
define integration by analysing a counter-process. In 
fact, a mode of "negative integration", describing a 
concept first developed by German historians to 
characterise a typical feature of German society during 
the Wilhelmine Empire, will be used as a central 
analytical tool. The argument in this chapter builds and 
draws upon the analysis of the Australian homefront 
experience in my earlier book entitled Enemy Aliens.^" I 
wish to argue that the German-Australian community, 
prior to World War I, can be seen as an autonomous 
socio-cultural entity and an integrad part of the fabric of 
Australian society at large. My aim is to reconstruct and 
to explain a process of disintegration which led to the 
eventual destruction of this community as a result of 
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pressures brought about by the war. 
Ever since the first group migrations of German 
immigrants to Australia In the 1830s. people of German 
origin constituted the largest group of non-British 
Immigrants in Australia, a position they held until after 
the Second World War. In 1861. at the end of the 
Victorian goldrush, they comprised 4.32% of the total 
Australian population; by comparison, the Chinese as 
the second largest group came to only 3.28%. By 1891, 
the number of Chinese had dwindled to 1.65% while the 
population of Germans had remained steady. No other 
group came anywhere near these figures: the Italians as 
the third largest group made up only 0.12% of the 
Australian population, and the total of immigrants of 
forty-eight other origins amounted to only 3.25%.' ' From 
1890 onward, the number of German-Australians 
continued to decline in relation to the total population; 
nevertheless, German migrants remained by far the 
largest non-British ethnic group. By 1914. the overall 
number of German-Australians, including the 
descendants of German-bom migrants of the second and 
third generation who had become Australians by birth, 
had been estimated at approximately 100,000 of which 
about 33,000 were immigrants bom in Germany. With 
the total Australian population approaching five million, 
this was hardly a statistically significant figure: the 
proportion of German-Australians did not amount to 
more than two per cent. In South Australia and 
Queensland, the two states with the highest 
concentration of German immigrants, the percentage was 
higher, namely 6.8 and 4 .1%. and in a few of the mral 
districts in both states it was sufficiently high to identify 
a "German vote" which could possibly "swing" an 
electoral balance in its favour, whatever that may have 
been.'2 
Particularly in the areas favoured by German settlers 
in South Australia, Queensland and, to a lesser extent in 
areas of Victoria (Wimmera district) and New South 
Wales (Riverina). as well as in the metropolitan centres 
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Melbourne and Sydney, the German-Australians formed 
highly visible, prosperous and generally sophisticated 
communities. In the cities, German clubs complete with 
their marching bands, athletics associations and 
Liedertcifel choirs constituted centres of social activity 
which attracted members not only of German but also of 
mainstream Australian background. Public festivities to 
mark the German National Holiday, organised annually 
by members of the German community, drew large 
crowds of participants, including representatives from 
govemment and politics as official guests.'^ There were 
prominent business establishments which carried 
German names: Australians of German descent were 
active in the medical and legal professions, in education, 
the arts as well as in commerce, science and politics. In 
the metropolitan cities, and in Adelaide In particular, one 
could spend the day very easily without having to speak 
a word of English: shopping, attending doctors' or 
dentists' surgeries, relaxing over a cup of coffee and a 
piece of cake while reading the German language 
Australische Zeitung in a German coffee shop, or wining 
and dining in one of the city's two German hotels, the 
"King of Hanover" and the "Hamburg Hotel" in Rundle 
Street.'* At the outbreak of the war. South Australia had 
elected a Labor M.P. of German origin, George Dankel, to 
represent the metropolitan seat of Boothby, and the 
Attorney-General of the state was Herman Homburg, 
principal of one of Adelaide's leading firm of solicitors. In 
Queensland. Eugen Hirschfeld was a member of the 
Upper House of the State Parliament. In local 
govemment. many German immigrants had long played 
important roles in municipal councils, like Hermann 
Paech £md Johann Wenke. councillors of the Culcaim 
Shire in the Riverina. 
The urban German-Australian communities were 
successfully and relatively quickly integrated into 
contemporary Australian society, with German 
immigrants participating both in the social life of their 
own community and in the public life of their state and 
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country. In the process of integration. German 
immigrants began defining themselves as Australians of 
German descent and developed, relatively early, a 
consciousness of their own Australian nationalism and 
a vision of Australia as an independent nation in statu 
nascendO^ The Germans in the rural districts of 
Queensland and South Australia, while perhaps 
retaining more of a specifically German, (or perhaps 
Lutheran) identity, underwent a similar but slower 
development. As farmers and rural tradesmen, they were 
a fairly conservative lot; their loyalties went to their land, 
their families and their church which served as the 
central cultural institution and focal point of their 
communities. An important part of Lutheran doctrine 
facilitated the "conversion" of the immigrants to the 
Australians. Respect of authority and loyalty to the state 
as part of the Zwei-Reich-Lehre (i.e.. Doctrine of the Two 
Kingdoms, temporal and spiritual), central tenets of 
Lutheranism ever since the Reformatofs dilemma in 
having to side with the feudal princes against the 
rebelling peasants in the Peasants* War of the early 
sixteenth century, were key elements of the teachings of 
the Protestant churches in Australia. It was a point that 
was emphasised over and over again: as Lutheran 
Christians, their allegiance was to the government and 
the state in which they lived. Hence, they were subjects 
of the British Crown and citizens or residents of 
Australia. It made no difference whether individued 
immigrants had become naturalised or not. 
There was thus nothing particularly disturbing about 
the fact that there was a gradual shift towards an 
emphasis on a German-Australian identity. The 
maintenance of language emd cultural ties and traditions 
had to be traded off against the imperative of succeeding 
and defining one's identity in an environment which was 
overwhelmingly Anglo-Celtic. It was inevitable that there 
would be some decrease in the significance of the 
German language as a component of cultural identity of 
the German immigrants and that there would be a 
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corresponding emphasis on English and on an 
Australian identity. By 1913, the Evangelical Lutheran 
Synod had begun publishing in English; its monthly 
periodical The Australian Lutheran had a decidedly 
nationalist tenor, as the "Foreword" of the first edition 
explained; 'The term'Australian' ... is a'national' 
cognomen, signifying that the paper is published in 
Australia, by Australians, and, first and foremost for 
Australians, be they Australians by birth or adoption".'^ 
Australians of British background, to be sure, 
continued to regard the German-Australian Lutherans 
imply as "Germans" even though many of the farmers 
and tradesmen who attended the services of the different 
Lutheran synods with their families on Sundays and who 
sent their children to Lutheran primary schools would 
have been bom in Australia or had Australian-bom 
parents, and even though the "Germans" may have 
looked and talked and behaved like other Australians 
during the rest of the week. As a result there was 
nothing discriminatory about this. German immigrants 
were highly regarded as model settlers, and the 
contribution they had made to opening up the country 
for setUement was publicly acknowledged on numerous 
occasions, ff anything, the common attitude of 
Australians of British origin was one of pride, perhaps 
mixed with a degree of condescending paternalism, 
regarding the achievements of "our Germans" who, after 
all, could be seen as apart of "our great Teutonic family" 
and as close relatives to their "Anglo-Saxon kinsmen", as 
the Governor of Queensland put it in 1867.'^ 
When war broke out between Germany and Great 
Britain, on 4 August 1914. Pastor Theodore Nickel, head 
of the Lutheran congregation at Eudunda. South 
Australia, sent a telegram to the Governor-General, Sir 
Ronald Munro-Ferguson. to assure the Australian 
govemment and people of the loyalty of the German-
Australian community. Nickel was not only speaking on 
behalf of his own parishioners but for "all the members 
of our church"; as the elected president of the 
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Evangelical Lutheran Synod in Australia he was the 
spiritual leader of the largest group of German-spealdng 
immigrants in the country. The cable read, in part: 
Although we deeply deplore that Great Britain has been 
involved in the European conflict and has been compelled 
to declare war against Germany, the land of our fathers, we 
are well aware of our duty as British subjects and shall 
always be willing to defend the honour of our beloved King 
and of our dear country with good and chattels, and body 
and life. 
In reply, the Australian representative of the British 
Crown sent the following telegram. "[D]eeply gratified and 
touched by your message of loyal devotion to King and 
country in the hour of trial which finds you standing in 
his Majesty's words: united, calm, resolute, trusting In 
God. Ferguson, Gov. Gen". 
Both cables were published on the 20th August 1914 
in Der Lutherische Kirchenbotejur Austrcdieru the official 
organ of the synod, which was then in its forty-first year 
of publication, clearly a sign of the firm place the church 
held in Australian society.'^ The pledge of loyalty, 
recognised by the Governor-General, described the 
political self-understanding of an integrated community: 
the reference to the duties of British subjects, based on 
the constitutional guarantees of the Australiem 
Commonwealth, recalled also their democratic rights as 
Australian citizens and residents. The existence of a 
conflict situation was not negated; Australians of 
German descent regretted that there was a war with the 
land of their fathers. However, there was no room at all 
for doubt or misinterpretation concerning the possible 
suspicion of dual loyalty. The decision was clear and 
unequivocal: German-Australians would fight for the 
new country against the old. It was a decision that was 
legitimated both politically and on religious grounds: as 
Australian residents and citizens, they owed a civic duty 
to their government, and as Lutheran Christians they 
owed allegiance to their temporal. God-given authority. 
Following the publication of the cables, many 
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Australian papers published editorials or printed letters 
in which similar sentiments were expressed.'^ The 
Adelaide Advertiser reminded its readers of Australia's 
"long experience of the estimable qualities of her German 
citizens", asking that "every instinct of chivalry and good 
feeling should be invoked to secure the tenderest 
consideration for the lacerated feelings of these respected 
fellow citizens".^" Other papers described the German-
Australians as "our fellow-colonists" or "our brothers in 
adoption".^' The farmers'journal The Land concluded its 
editorial on "The Great War" with this exhortation. "In 
the meantime preach loyalty to King and Country. But 
remember those who are amongst us whose nationality 
is not ours. Deal fairly and honourably by them, ever 
remembering that in the time of war. as in the time of 
peace, they are our neighbours".^^ These programmatic 
statements of editorialists testify not only to a 
recognition of past history of trouble-free relations 
between Australians of British £md German origins. They 
can be read as a clear sign of a discourse between 
majority and minority within a pluralistic, integrated 
society in which the different groups, facing a crisis, re-
assure each other of their mutual agreement about their 
mode of living together. 
While the early war editorials suggested a climate of 
cordial co-existence between German-Austrgilians and 
the majority of Australians, the image of harmony in 
community relations was largely a matter of illusion, and 
it did not last. Very quickly the war produced a social 
situation and apolitical atmosphere which brought these 
issues out into the open and into sharp public focus. A 
wave of xenophobia and hysterical jingoism soon swept 
through the country, and the noble and lofty sentiments 
of the editorial writers were forgotten. Peaceful co-
operation and domestic laissez-faire gave way to spiteful 
intolerance and blatant discrimination. Populist-
vigilantist organisations appeared with the self-
proclaimed task to ferret out, to spy on and to denounce 
an imaginary internal enemy. Anti-German riots and 
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demonstrations, sometimes fuelled by press campaigns, 
became part and parcel of a homefront experience in 
which ordinary Australians conducted their own war 
against perceived enemies who had been their 
neighbours only weeks before. 
The Commonwealth government played a prominent 
role in this development, most particularly William 
Morris Hughes who was appointed Attomey-General 
after the election of September 1914 and who became 
Prime Minister a year later.^^ While the government 
claimed, on the one hand, to respond to "patriotic" 
popular pressure to fight energetically the "enemy within 
the gate", it simultaneously manipulated public opinion 
through propaganda and censorship, flaming the anti-
German sentiment that was rapidly spreading with the 
aim of mobilising Australians' readiness to fight and to 
volunteer for overseas service. In October 1914, the War 
Precautions Act was passed which was largely modelled 
on the British Defence of the Realm Act. It conferred 
upon the government and, by extension, the military 
authorities a wride range of powers for the duration of the 
war. The act was passed after only little debate, despite 
the fact that it presented an extraordinary departure 
from customary legislation. As Frank Crowley observes, 
the War Precautions Act gave the Commonwealth 
government "complete control over the press and the 
economy, and enabled it to establish a centralised and 
militarist administration".^'* The provisions of the act 
were soon extended beyond the original definition of 
"enemy alien", i.e. foreign nationals of a country at war 
writh the King of Englcind who were reservists or of 
military age. By the end of 1914, the commandants of 
the military districts had been given the authority to 
intern "enemy subjects with whose conduct they were 
not satisfied" while the Minister of Defence had reserved 
for himself the right to order the detention of naturalised 
subjects when he thought they were "disaffected or 
disloyal".^^In 1915, paragraph 55 and 56a were added to 
the War Precautions Regulations; they enlarged the power 
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of the minister "to cover the internment of disloyal 
natural bom subjects (i.e. bom in Australial of enemy 
descent, and of persons of hostile origin or association". 
Paragraph 56a, in particular, was a blanket regulation 
that could be used against practically anybody who only 
needed to have some contact with a person defined by 
the Defence Department as an "enemy alien". In October 
1916, the regulations were further extended to include 
"all aliens, whether enemy or otherwise".^® 
Members of the German-Australian community were 
shocked by the government's policy. By one stroke of the 
pen, they had been transformed from citizens with full 
civil rights to outcasts who could be treated like 
criminals by the military authorities, worse off in fact 
than criminals who at least could enjoy the protection of 
the law. Once the military had decided an individual 
"enemy alien" was disloyal and ought to be interned, that 
person was placed in a camp behind barbed wire from 
where there was no recourse to the law. no access to the 
ordinary processes of judicial appeal vis-a-vis the 
executive or administrative powers of the state. Neither 
was there any chance of obtaining legal counsel or 
representation. The govemment itself dealt with 
complaints of internees, refusing to submit them to the 
ordinary procedures of legal arbitration. 
The total number of internees during the war came to 
6.890.^^ Of these, only about four and a half thousand 
had been resident of the Commonwealth prior to August 
1914; the remainder were either sailors who had been 
taken off ships in Australian ports or they were residents 
of other British colonies in South East Asia and the 
Pacific who were brought to Australia for internment 
under conditions resembling the transport of convicts of 
earlier times. Among the German-Australian internees, 
approximately seven hundred were "Naturalised British 
Subjects" and Emother seventy or so were so-called 
"Natural Bom" or "Native Bom British Subjects" who 
were Australian by birth, sometimes second or even their 
generation Australians of originally German ancestry. At 
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the end of the war. a total of 6.150 persons were 
"repatriated". I.e. deported to Germany. Of these. 5.414 
had been Interned. Uie remainder were family members 
of non-interned "ex-enemy aliens" who either accepted a 
government's offer to be repatriated or were ordered to 
leave the country. The total number of compulsory 
deportations came to 699. Most internees consented to 
leave Australia voluntarily, since they saw no future for 
themselves in the country that had robbed them of their 
rights and their freedom. Others protested and tried to 
stay but. with no recourse to the law, were unsuccessful 
and forcibly deported. 
Not all deportees were of German origin. The 
government also deported a number of Anglo-Celtic 
Australians, including Irish nationalists, radical 
socialists and members of the anarcho-syndicalist 
Industrial Workers of the World (FWW). In addition, some 
five hundred Italian reservists were deported for military 
service In their country of origin.^® The internment and 
deportation of hundreds of immigrants who had 
previously considered themselves Australians was met 
with either outspoken approval or with silent disinterest 
on the part of the Australian population at large. 
Similarly, the arrest and deportation of the radicals did 
not become an issue for public concern or protest, except 
by the deportees' own supporters, mostly tiny minority 
circles such as fellow IWWs and socialists. The 
mainstream labour and union movement acted only 
when its perceived "self-interest" was at stake.^^ It 
mounted a vigorous campaign against conscription and 
the feared spectre of Asian immigration, but it had 
neither the energy nor the interest to put up a fight to 
safeguard the democratic and civil rights of a few dozen 
radicals and thousands of immigrants who had been 
branded as "enemies of the state" by the government (see 
Chapter 2). Thus, there was very little opposition indeed 
to counter the policies of mass internment and 
deportation without trial, even though in Australia the 
Commonwealth enacted measures that were far more 
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repressive than similar policies in other comparable 
countries. 
The main target of the government's internment and 
deportation policy was the once powerful and proud 
German-Australian community. The Defence Department 
pursued a policy of actively seeking out and interning 
those German-Australians who were regarded as the 
leaders of the community, particularly in South Australia 
and Queensland, the two states with the highest 
proportion of immigrants with German background and 
with distinctive areas of group settlement. The aim of the 
govemment was to destroy the prominent and well-
established German-Australian community as an 
autonomous, socio-cultural entity within Australian 
society. This objective was pursued through many 
different avenues, the closing of German clubs and 
Lutheran schools, the prohibition of German language 
newspapers and journals, or the eradication of German 
place names in Australia. Since wholesale internment 
was impracticable, although this was vety frequently 
demanded in the press and by populist pressure groups, 
the govemment adopted a policy of selective internment 
which concentrated on arresting the leaders, so as to 
deprive German-Australians of their spokespersons and 
representatives in the mainstream public sphere of 
Australian society. Together with the destruction of the 
socio-cultural infrastructure of the community, this 
would have the effect - it was thought - of intimidating 
and keeping in check the rest of the community. While 
internment was the most extreme and restrictive 
measure that aiffected only a proportion of German-
Australians, there was also a host of less dramatic, if 
equally discriminatory, restrictions that were placed on 
members of the German-Australian community. 
By the end of the war, the parliamentary 
representatives who were of German origin (Dankel, 
Homburg) had all resigned their positions; Hirschfeld 
had been interned and deported.^' The councillors of the 
Culcaim Shire of New South Wales, Paech and Wenke 
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had been interned despite the fact that Wenke's son had 
fought for the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) and had 
been wounded in France. The two belonged to the 
handful of German-Australians who tried to clear their 
names and to fight for the recognition of their civil rights 
by standing for re-election. The announcement of their 
candidatures led to an Immediate uproar and a campaign 
by the RSSIL (the forerunner of the present Returned 
Servicemen's League (RSL)) in which both the premier of 
New South Wales, Holman. and Prime Minister Hughes 
became Involved. Paech and Wenke were forced to 
withdraw: it was a clear and public sign that there was 
no future for a German- Australian community. The 
policy ofthe Commonwealth government was successful: 
it had resulted in the disintegration of an integrated 
German-Australian community and in the destruction of 
its socio-cultural Infrastructure along with itsbi-cultural 
Identity. 
The persecution of German-Australians and the 
destruction of their community was part ofthe over-all 
strategy and the war aims of the Commonwealth 
government. An important objective ofthe campaign was 
to Increase economic control and participation by loyal 
Australian "Britishers". The wide-ranging provisions of 
the various Trading with the Enemy Acts brought about 
the destruction of "enemy firms", from the powerful 
Australian Metal Company, a subsldlaiy ofthe Frankfurt 
Metailgesellschaft. to countless small businesses run by 
self-employed German-Australian immigrants. It was a 
policy that was directed not only against manufacturers 
and employers but against workers and employees as 
well: the economic war had to be fought also at home. 
The government's clearly stated goal of defeating the 
enemy on the commercial front was embraced by all 
economic groups. Agencies on all levels of government 
dismissed so-called "enemy aliens" while private 
employers did the same, spurred on either by motives of 
patriotism or by the demands of unions who loudly 
protested and refused to work alongside "enemy 
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labourers" even though the workers in question might 
have been co-unionist "mates" prior to August 1914. 
The homefront experience, and particularly the fight 
over conscription, also increased the fear, widely held in 
the organised labour and union movements, that the war 
would provide an opportunity for employers to Import 
cheap Asian labour and to reduce the influence and 
living standards of the working class. What was to 
become of the white "workingmen's paradise"? Thus the 
war intensified the racism that had always been part and 
parcel of Australia's history, and notably also of the 
histoty of the country's working class movement. The 
opposition to "coloured labour" was not extended to 
include other aliens, not necessarily Germans, as for 
example the campaign against "enemy labour" in the 
mining industty in Western Australia showed. The mine 
workers' union in the gold fields around Kalgoorlie went 
out on strike in February 1916. refusing to work with 
"enemy aliens" who were immigrants from the area of the 
former Yugoslavia (Serbians, Bosnians, Croatians, etc) 
and who constituted a sizeable minority of the West 
Australian workforce.^^ The strike developed into a 
protracted industrial dispute; it was finally settled by 
intervention of the federal govemment with internment 
across the countty to the concentration camp at 
Holdsworthy, New South Wales, from where they were 
deported back to their countries of origin at the end of 
the war. Unions and employers cooperated in rounding 
up "enemy labourers" from Serbia and Croatia. It can be 
argued that the government's industrial emd trade policy, 
designed to develop Australian resources and its 
manufacturing potential and to re-orient the country's 
commercial future towards an exclusive cooperation 
within an imperial trading bloc was also largely 
successful, accepted by employer and labour groups 
alike.^^ Hughes' succinct formula of "Empire Products for 
Empire Markets" found a ready extension: it was to be 
supported by "Empire Capital and Empire Unions". The 
victims of these policies were the "aliens" who were 
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excluded from participating in the economy and branded 
as "enemies". 
There were yet other political objectives involved in 
the homefront campaign. The government used its 
powers of arrest, detention and deportation without trial 
as a tool of social control, routinely searching for and 
"weeding out" undesirable immigrants, such as persons 
who had lost their jobs as a result of the war and who 
were considered by government and military bureaucracy 
to be likely candidates for the state's welfare services. 
Such persons were asked to offer themselves up for 
"voluntary internment" and were later summarily 
deported. Other aliens met with the same fate because 
they were found out to have criminal records or were 
mentally ill. Even patients from mental institutions were 
transferred to internment camps and deported. To some 
extent, these hapless victims of a homefront war were 
"unsuccessful immigrants", mostly recent arrivals 
without a network of social contacts and support. Their 
lack of assimilation made them easily identifiable. But it 
is true, of course, that their "lack of success" was sharply 
exacerbated by the war which had changed their status 
and reduced their chances quasi over night.^"* 
An important psychological factor relating to the 
colonial mentality and identity of Anglo-Saxon 
Australians also contributed to their experience of the 
war and of the homefront conflict. The threat to 
Australian security had given new urgency to long-held 
anxieties which had been a prominent feature of the 
psychosocial make-up of average Australians since the 
early days of the colonies. The fear that Australia, due to 
its isolation and distance to Europe, was vulnerable, that 
its vital supply lines linking the Empire to Great Britain 
could easily be severed, was felt never so keenly as 
during the crisis brought about by this war that was 
fought half-way around the world. What would become 
of White Australia, last outpost of British imperialism at 
the very periphery of the Empire, surrounded by 
supposedly hostile Asian nations, if the unthinkable 
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were to happen and Great Britain were to be defeated? 
However, the war also signalled a positive incentive, 
an opportunity to be embraced with enthusiasm, a 
chance to overcome an ingrained feeling of inadequacy 
bom out of a colonial mentality of dependence and 
inferiority. Participation in the war might not only earn 
Australieuis the gratitude of the mother countty, perhaps 
even lifting the relationship between former colony and 
Imperial govemment to a level of more equality, it would 
also invest Australians with a sense of historical 
importance, of contributing to the affairs of the nations 
of the world from which the remote colonial outpost of 
the Empire had so far been excluded. The Australians 
who organised the war effort at home also needed to feel 
they were participating in this event that was imbued 
with grandeurand fraught with danger; they, too, needed 
their own challenge to test their determination to fight 
for victory and glory. But what could those Australians 
do who did not or could not enlist to fight overseas? If 
their expectations were to be met and their dreams 
fulfilled, the people who remained in AustrEilia also had 
to become involved, and the country itself had to become 
a location in the theatre of war, both as a target and as 
an actual battleground. The importance of Australia 
could be effectively demonstrated by pointing out that it 
had not been forgotten by the strategists of the German 
General Staff. Indeed, possession of Australia was what 
the war was all about, or so the Commonwealth 
govemment, along with many Australians of all ranks, 
firmly believed.^^ Thus, the vision of an internal enemy 
was bom: enemy aliens, German and Austrian nationals 
and immigrants living in Australia, a fifth column of 
saboteurs and spies, surreptitiously working to 
undermine the security of the country in order to deliver 
it as a prize target, "specially coveted by Germany",^^ to 
the enemy. It was to this complex and confusing mbc of 
conflicting emotions and ideas, anxieties and 
aspirations, ofpatriotic fervour coupled with the fear and 
hope of war, and of worries related to economic change 
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leading to industrial conflicts and new social divisions, 
that the Commonwealth govemment had to react. It 
chose to do so by adopting a strategy which also allowed 
it, simultaneously, to pursue an aggressive course of 
social and industrial modernisation. 
The war-time policies of Hughes were neither formed 
solely as a response to the events following July 1914 
nor were they in any way based on original concepts. 
Rather, they were part of a set of ideas involving a notion 
of "national efficiency" that was shared by different social 
groups, including Fabianists and adherents of a 
bureaucratic socialism. There was also a considerable 
cross-spread of these concepts which is evident in most 
of the developed industrial countries of the period.^^ As 
Judi th Smart has shown, ideas concerning the 
construction of a new social, industrial, economic and 
political order were widely discussed in Australia at the 
beginning of the twentieth century; indeed, as Smart 
puts it, "Australia saw the growth of a set of discourses 
abotit society based on a new and avowedly and 
systematic social science, mediated by English new 
liberalism, social imperialism and American 
progressivism".^® It is thus no surprise to find the key 
concepts and vocabulary of this discourse in Hughes 
1910 collection of newspaper articles published 
originally by the Sydney Daily Telegraph Most clearly, 
they appear in Hughes' critique of the left-wing radicals 
within the Australian labour movement. Hughes' own 
definition of "socialism" as the apotheosis of economic 
and industrial "systematisation" and his insistence on 
"order", "discipline", "one central authority", and 
"organization" is sharply sketched out in contrast to 
what he describes as the "chaos" and "anarchy" of the 
syndicalist Industrial Workers of the Worid and similar 
socialist groups.^^ 
One idea that is commonly found in the discussion on 
societal reform and modemisation is the reference to the 
lessons that could be leamed from the example of 
Germany's rapid development since the 1850s. The 
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image of Imperial Germany was not only a single and 
negative one. reduce to the aggressive threat of Prussian 
militarism, as John Moses has repeatedly argued.''° 
Rather, as Michael Roe argues, "many reformers [of the 
pre-1914 world] saw Germany offering a model of 
enlightened positive government".'" "Prussia", says David 
Blackboum. "was not associated only with the barracks 
and the spiked helmet: it was broadly identified with the 
cause of modernity in fields ranging from education and 
communication to the scientific management of 
forests".'*^ And Geoff Eley writes: 
In some ways the Second [German] Reich seemed terribly 
'modem' to commentators elsewhere - in the technocratic 
efliciency of its bureaucracy and military machine, in its 
more interventionist state, in the vaunted excellence of its 
municipal administration, in its system of social 
administration, and (from a difTerent point of view) in the 
existence of universal sufi"rage and the extent of popular 
political mobilization.''^ 
Eley makes the point that there was a "voluminous" 
literature in English, notably by prolific historian William 
Harbutt Dawson, which made this image of Wilhelmine 
Germany popular among readers in Great Britain. 
Dawson's work, presented in publications which had 
typical tiUes such as Bismarck and State Socialism 
(second edition 1891) or The German Workman A Study 
in Nattonal Efficiency (1906), amounted to "an extended 
hymn of praise to the German model of efficient 
administration"."'* These books also found their way into 
the Public Libraty of New South Wales where they may 
vety well have been picked up by an avid reader like 
William Morris Hughes."^ 
It comes as no surprise then that the idea of a 
"German model" played an Important part in the thinking 
of the Australian wartime prime minister. A first example 
can be seen in the initiative he took to establish a 
Commonwealth agency to coordinate scientific research. 
In his address to the advisoty council set up early in 
1916, which was to result eventually in the foundation 
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of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
(CSIR) (as foremnner of the CSIRO). Hughes "cited 
frequently German success in science as an example", 
having "caught fire at the vision of a whole nation 
Inspired by the scientific spirit and assisted by the 
application of the scientific method in all areas of 
production".'*^ The German model was all the more 
important as it was based on the recognition that 
Germany's progress in science and technology since the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century had been far 
greater than that of Great Britain, particularly in the 
leading industries of the second industrial revolution 
such as electro-technical, chemical and pharmaceutical, 
as well as in optics and the emerging communications 
industty. Frank Hagelthom, Minister for Agriculture, 
stressed that "the application of science to the activities 
of the people was much more comprehensive in Germany 
than in Great Britain" and that "it would be necessaty to 
apply to some extent the methods which Germany had 
adopted with success"."^ It was a rather plain piece of 
advice, and it appears not to have gone down too well 
with some of the British-Australian scientists of the 
advisory council who complained that the "case of 
Germany had been reiterated to a point of nausea".'*® 
Hughes' understanding of the implications of the 
"German model", however, went far beyond the 
relationship between science and industiy. The demand 
for efficiency through organisation involved a 
comprehensive vision: of a state on the road to modernity 
by organised industrial, economic, social and political 
cooperation in the interest of national harmony both 
within Australia and the larger unit of Empire. The war 
in particular created a challenge to be met by energetic 
interventionist policies on all fronts, at home and on the 
battiefield. and the economic war that Hughes predicted 
would follow after the armed conflict was over demanded 
an equal resolve to put in place s tmctures and 
legislation to meet the expected postwar challenges. 
Thus, "in speeches up and down the countty",'*^ Hughes 
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impressed upon his listeners the need for organisation, 
challenging them to imagine Australia and Britain as "an 
organised nation, and the British empire as an organised 
empire - organised for trade, for industry, for economic 
justice, for national defense, for the preservation of the 
world's peace".^° 
The message that there was a lesson to be learnt from 
Germany runs like a red thread through the war 
speeches Hughes held during 1915 and 1916, in 
Australia as well as in England and at the Allied 
Economic Conference in Paris (June 1916).^' Germany 
was not only "brutal, tyrannical, barbarous" but had also 
"qualities that it would be well that we should imitate".^^ 
In Hughes' rhetoric, metaphors of Wilhelmine German 
society as both a smooth running machine and a highly 
developed, complex organism flow together to suggest an 
image of modernity that suggests order and efficiency, 
scientific progress and rationality, but also authoritarian 
control and power: 
There is no aimless rushing hither and thither, no 
dissipation of energy through divided control or lack of 
control. There is one leader and all men follow him. And the 
efforts of every individual are systematised. All are cogs in 
a monstrous and marvellously intricate machine which 
moves as the supreme master wills. EX'ery resource of 
science, of mechanical invention, has been organised. The 
ganglia of the national organism are highly developed, the 
correlation between them complete, the whole organism is 
streaked with nerve tissues. In short, the Germans are an 
organised nation. Their efforts are systematised ... The 
advance made by Germany during the last twenty-five years 
is the best proof of the value of her methods.^ 
In another speech, the link between the German example 
and the wartime policy of the Australian Commonwealth 
govemment is made unmistakenly clear: 
Germany has brought to organisation an added factor 
which has made German industrial competition the most 
formidable in the world. Her manufacturers have not only 
organised themselves, but behind them the State has stood, 
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aiding them in this or that dlrecUon, by this means or the 
other. In Australia, at the outbreak of war. it Is fair to state 
that we had no organised Industries at all. Since the war, 
however, we have endeavoured to do something in the way 
of organisation.^ 
Thus, the German "model" provides an essential clue to 
an understanding of the wartime policies of Hughes 
which were characterised precisely by the determination 
of an active govemment to "organise" Australian society. 
The war offered both the legitimation for an energetic 
expansion of the federal state apparatus and powers of 
leadership and control in the interest of creating 
appropriate mechanisms to be utilised for the pursuit of 
national efficiency, and it provided the occasion for 
setting up the necessary legislative framework. It is 
therefore this background, then, that the domestic 
poUcies of the Commonwealth govemment must be seen. 
This is not to suggest, of course, that Hughes merely 
followed a ready-made ideological blueprint. The 
Commonwealth govemment was itself reacting to the 
economic changes brought about by the war which in 
tum accelerated the transformation of Australia to a 
modem Industrial society. But it was a process in which 
govemment action and initiative played a decisive role. 
Faced with a reduction of supplies of manufactured 
goods from Britain and Germany, the Hughes' 
govemment facilitated the setting up and development of 
secondaty industries in sectors such a iron and steel, 
ammunitions and weapons, clothing and foodstuffs. 
Hughes was particularly proud of his efforts in 
reorganizing the Australian metal industiy which before 
the war had been controlled by German firms working 
with British partners and subsidiaries.^^This constituted 
an essential feature in the interconnected war alms of 
Hughes.^ Marketing and shipping were also modemised 
by govemment intervention and control. National wool 
and wheat boards were set up to facilitate the export of 
Important primaty products, and the purchase of ships 
- undertaken single-handedly by Hughes while on his 
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trip to Britain - assured the availability of cargo-space 
that had been greatly reduced by the war. Finally, the 
govemment pursued a very active role in trying to 
control internal dissent and opposition to its ever 
expanding role in charting the course of Australian 
development throughout the years of the war. 
The key elements to be stressed here again - the 
emphasis on the organisational role of govemment and 
a strong, centralised state - offer also an explanation of 
another feature of Hughes' govemment that has been 
observed by many historians: a tendency towards 
authoritarian and autocratic rule, Hughes as a "demo-
autocrat"" with a "Napoleonic style of governing".^® 
Particularly with regard to domestic policies, these terms 
suggest yet another, third side of the "German model", 
not the militarist-imperialist image of Prussia (as the 
enemy of Australia) and not the image of the Wilhelmine 
state as the incarnation of efficiency and progress and as 
model to be imitated, but rather the image of the 
manipulative, repressive, authoritarian and autocratic 
state. Is it this shadow side of the "German model" that 
Hughes also tried to realise during his years in office: a 
directed society organised from the top down, tinged with 
shades of totalitarian control in the name of economic 
efficiency and performance, intent on discrediting 
dissent and increasingly ruthless in an attempt to 
silence any opposition. 
The domestic policies of Wilhelmine Germany may 
again explain, at least to some extent, characteristic 
aspects of Australian wartime politics. The repressive 
and manipulative strategies of the Wilhelmine empire, 
particularly under Bismarck and perhaps less so under 
his epigoni,^^ offer some interesting clues to allow a 
comparison with policies characteristics of the 
Australian homefront experience during World War I. It 
does not require a great deal of imagination to see in 
Hughes' determined fight against the perceived power 
and influence of the Catholic Church and its followers, 
and particularly the Irish-Celtic Australian minority. 
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echoes of the "Kulturkampf led by Bismarck in the 
1880s against the representatives of Catholicism in 
Germany, the institutions of the Church itself as well as 
the Centre Party, the political organisation of German 
Catholicism. Of course, the Australian govemment's 
policies were also and foremost a response to 
developments in Ireland and Britain following the Easter 
RebeUion of 1916. The repressive measures of the 
German Reich against "ethnic" minorities in Germany, 
against Poles. Danes and the French of Alsace-Lorraine, 
the insistence on a policy of enforced assimilation, also 
show familiar features when compared to legislation 
enacted by Hughes during World War I.^° Similarly. 
Bismarck's Soztalistengesetze, his anti-socialist 
legislation against the alleged insurrectionaty activities 
of the Social Democrats, find a parallel in sections of the 
War Precautions Act (which had been modelled on the 
British Defense of the Realm Acfl and, particularly, the 
Unlawful Association Act of December 1916 which was 
designed to stamp out working class radicalism. 
The anti-democratic and repressive measures directed 
against minorities, both ethnic and sectarian, as well as 
against political opponents in Wilhelmine Germany have 
been analysed as a strategy of "negative integration", a 
"technique of domination" ("Herrschaftstechnik") to 
assure hegemonic control in favour of the ruling elite to 
maintain its leading role and privileged position in 
society.^' "Negative integration" operates by identifying a 
minority of "enemies of the state" who can be 
marginalised, criminalised, excluded and persecuted, 
while at the same time offering the majority an 
integrating identity as members of a supposedly 
homogenous national group. In Germany, it was a 
strategy bom out of the specific conditions of a society 
characterised by rapid industrial and economic change 
as well as numerous and deep-seated regional and socio-
cultural cleavages. 
The eight hundred or so strikes during the first three 
years of the war could be seen as an attempt, albeit 
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lEirgely unsuccessful, by the union movement to respond 
to rapidly changing economic developments which 
threatened their influence in Australian politics and 
industrial relations. The Great Strike in New South 
Wales of 1917 began as a protest of railway workers 
against the introduction of a card system for recording 
completed work; this was seen as part of a "Taylorist" 
approach to industrial relations and the workers believed 
that their interests were to be sacrificed in the cause of 
economic efficiency.®^ Other consequences of the war, of 
course, had contributed to sharpen the awareness of 
conflicts overworking conditions or wages. Women took 
a decisive role in the food riots in Melbourne in August-
September 1917.®^ Deteriorating living standards 
because wages had fallen behind rising prices, food 
shortages and growing unemployment, all contributed to 
put Australian workers into a defensive and 
disadvantaged position. The "industrial turmoil" of 
1917®'* ended with a decisive defeat for the workers and 
the unions. As Judi th Smart has pointed out, "it was not 
only a conflict between capital and labour in the purely 
economic sense; it was also a contest about the nature 
and determination of the political and sociEd culture".®^ 
"Negative integration" was to produce a double effect, 
strengthening the internal cohesion of Australian society 
by offering a positive identification as well as presenting 
a negative enemy figure that would re-enforce Anglo-
Saxon Australians' own identity as a majority. The 
enemies were anti-conscriptionists. radical socialists, 
pacifists, Irish nationalists, and unionists who opposed 
the policies of the Australian govemment, as well as "the 
Germans" irrespective of whether they were Australian 
residents, naturalised citizens or bom in Australia; they 
would be singled out and persecuted as disloyal, a 
anarchists or "Sinn Feiners", as agents of Germany of 
simply as "enemy aliens". Propaganda campaigns, as in 
the case of the mobilisation of public support for "poor 
littie Belgium", were conducted for the same reason.®® 
The main negative focus, however, was provided by the 
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campaign against "enemy aliens". Australians were 
offered a powerful image of the "Other" upon whom loyal 
Australian "Britishers" could project their hostility and 
vent their aggression bom out of their own feelings of 
fear and insecurity. The invention of a threatening enemy 
figure dramatised the war experience and offered a 
convenient Ideological smokescreen behind which the 
growing divisions within Australian society could be 
covered up and glossed over, diverting attention from 
social inequalities and class differences sharpened by the 
conditions of a wartime economy under the 
simultaneous challenge of accelerated industrial change. 
The positive integrating bracket was provided by an 
ideology of British-Australian nationalism: a strong 
Australia that was part of the British Empire, with 
Australia and Great Britain indivisible yet distinctly 
different. Australians were fighting in this war for 
themselves as much as for the "home countty". BriUsh-
Australianism as an integrative state ideology received a 
powerful boost with the dramatic appearance of the 
legend bom out of defeat in the bloody skirmish at 
Gallipoli. The unsuccessful attempt to establish an Allied 
beachhead on the Turkish coast, in itself no more than 
a footnote in the larger histoty of World War I. assumed 
larger-than-life proportions of heroic grandeur. In this 
ideological transformation, too. Prime Minister Hughes 
again played a leading role, for instance when he took to 
direct mail canvassing in order to boost recruiting by 
writing a personal letter, how our "Call to Arms", which 
was sent to over a million Australian males: "Our 
soldiers ... have carved for Australia a niche in the 
Temple of the Immortals".®^ Thus, the ANZAC story of the 
diggers, the soldiers of the AIF. was grafted onto the 
foundation myth of Australian nationhood. It became 
part of a quasi-civil religion adopted by the state to 
provide a cultural identity, which would not only help 
"sell the war" but also conceal existing differences, 
contradictions, social cleavages and conflicts. 
In conclusion, a re-interpretation of the Australian 
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homefront experience in World War I thus suggests that 
the triadic paradigm currently in vogue amongst writers 
on multiculturalism in Australia needs to be 
reappraised. The example of the bi-cultural German-
Australian community of the colonial period shows that 
there was littie pressure brought to bare to assimilate 
into the dominant Anglo-Celtic culture. It appears that 
Integration, furthered by a laissez-faire attitude of a 
neutral state in the classical liberal mould, was the 
prevailing policy towards European immigrants until 
1914. Assimilation only became the order of the day with 
and after the crisis period on the homefront. The war is 
thus the caesura thai led to a decisive change in 
Australian political culture, an erosion of democratic 
values and traditions as well as an increase in 
authoritarian state interventionism and control. 
Chapter 2 
"Tempest Tossed" 
Political Deportations from Australia 
and World War I 
Raymond Evans 
The University of Queensland 
Of all the administrative weapons in the armouty of the 
warring state, the tactic of deportation is arguably the 
most furtive and devastating. "Furtive" in that, among 
the war-enhanced official procedures which assailled 
established civil liberties and legal traditions of due 
process during World War I, deportation was the most 
secretive and intractable - the practice most screened 
from social scrutiny and potential public redress. And it 
was the most devastating in that, without the need to 
provide charges, issue arrest warrants, supply counsel or 
any of the appurtenamces of a civil trial - let alone to 
establish thereby a condition of guilt - the state might 
summartly subject a person to unreasonable searches 
and seizure, indefinite detention and permanent 
banishment. "It needs no citation of authorities to 
support the proposition that deportation is punishment", 
stated Mr Justice Brewer of the United States Supreme 
Court in 1893: "Evetyone knows that to be forcibly taken 
away from home and family, and business, and property, 
and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is 
punishment; and that oftentimes the most severe and 
cmel". Deportation, echoed the US Department of Labor 
in 1923. was a punishment "more severe ... that 
imprisonment".' 
Yet. as a process "beyond all reason in its severity", 
deportation was nevertheless sanctioned as a legitimate 
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response to the demands of national security in a war-
engrossed society. For. under the rubric of security, as 
the war intensified in its unprecedented ferocity and 
havoc, so too did the social permission granted to the 
spread and perpetuation of essentially anti-democratic 
measures. Ironically, in combatting "Prussianism" upon 
a global stage, the liberal-democratic state had readily 
embraced ever-increasing totalitarian modes of its own 
(see chapter I). Deportation, in a sense, marked a logical 
endpoint in this process which began with militaty 
censorship and the manufacture of propaganda, moved 
on to silent surveillance as well as more intrusive 
counter-espionage methods, and increasingly attempted 
executive control over human movement, ideological 
utterance and general social intercourse. It culminated 
in prosecutions for the expression of dissident opinions, 
disfranchisements, the suppression of antagonistic 
associations such as the Industrial Workers of the World 
(IWW) and Sinn Fein, mass internments of aliens and 
agitators upon the mere "pre-emption of wrong-doing" 
and the singular orgroup deportations of "undesirables", 
so designated upon the criteria of nationality and/or 
political persuasion.^ 
Yet deportation was not simply a wayward sibling of 
war prosecution. Under the Immigration Restriction Act 
(section 8) and the Pacific Island Labourers Act of 1901. 
It had already been sanctioned as "a complement of the 
power to exclude" and had been effected against several 
thousand resident Melanesians in Queensland and 
northern New South Wales in 1907.^ Yet war emergency 
legislation had considerably enhanced executive powers 
in this regard. On 29 October 1914. a War Precautions 
Act had been passed by federal parliament amid 
assurances that it would be exercised with "prudence 
and reasonableness"; but it was rapidly expanded by 
executive fiat into a bristling and draconic civil deterrent. 
Eventually It would be attacked as "... (AJn Act ... 
disgracefully abused, and vilely administered made for 
protection and used for tyranny. ... conceived for the 
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safety of the Commonwealth and made a vehicle of 
division and antagonism; a gag on the press; an outrage 
of all liberty, a denial of centuiy-old and hard won 
rights".'* 
Its executors were scarcely less candid about its 
powers. William Morris Hughes. Prime Minister from 
October 1915 until Febmary 1923. boasted that during 
the war years. Australia was virtually governed by "a 
triumvirate" - himself, his Solicitor-General. Sir Robert 
Garran "... and Garran's fountain-pen. the multitude of 
regulations under the War Precautions Act flowing from 
that pen". Garran. in tum. would later admit that. "John 
Citizen was hardly able to lift a finger without coming 
under some technical offence against the War 
Precautions regulations".^ 
Within these regulations. Aliens Restriction Orders 
were gazetted on 27 May 1915 and 2 March 1916 which 
allowed, along with numerous other prescriptions, for 
the deportation of any unnaturalised "alien" without a 
hearing, such persons to be conveyed forthwith by naval 
or military authority to any vessel leaving the 
Commonwealth and detained thereon. Then in December 
1916 and July 1917. the Hughes' Nationalist 
govemment. in its protracted campaign to smash the 
Australian IWW. additionally passed two Unlawful 
Assoctottons Acts which further expanded federal powers 
of deportation. The first of these allowed for even British 
subjects who were not Australian-bom to be deported, 
while the second tightened procedures even more by 
placing the onus of proving Australian birth upon the 
shoulders of potential deportees themselves. Whilst 
deportations under the Aliens Restriction Orders 
continued to be arranged by the Department of Defence, 
those effected via the Unlawful Associations Act fell into 
the province of Garran's Attomey-General's Department. 
Atiee Hunt, the Minister for the Home and Territories 
Department (which administered the Immigration 
Restriction and Pacific Island Labourers Acts) later 
commented: 
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TTie UnIauj/l/ZAssoc(atfons Act of 1916-17 carries the power 
of deportation further thein either of the laws administered 
by this Department, and further than the War Precautions 
Regulations dealing with the deportation of alien enemies. 
Under these, ex-enemy subjects, if naturalized here, could 
not be deported. 
In the Unlawful Associations law. It is provided that persons 
who were bom in Australia may not be deported. All others, 
irrespective of naUoneillty, who have been convicted of 
certain defences, may be deported.^ 
Thus the war years witnessed a progressive 
Intensification of Australian nativist exclusionism which 
proudly declared itseff to be both white and 
British-based as Empire loyal as it was xenophobic. A 
compulsive official concern with anti-war radicals, 
revolutionaty agitators and disloyal immigrants, stoked 
often to a white heat by the imperatives of war 
mobilization, tended to identify left-wing thought with 
extremism, and extremism with foreign-ness. A 
monolithic analysis by Empire loyalists inter-connected 
the disaffected into one vast, destructive conspiracy as 
surely as "the knee-bone is connected to the thighbone". 
With pro-German espionage erroneously suspected of 
conjoining the pacffist, anti-conscriptionist and 
anti-capltallst causes in Australia, political antagonisms 
were Increasingly viewed through a dubious filter of 
ethnicity. Nativist stereotypes, as firmly held by the 
officials who administered these laws as by the average 
Anglo-Australlan loyalist, were cross-hatched with 
shadings of both subversion and strangeness. In a time 
of national crisis, as William Preston J r has 
demonstrated of similar reactions in the United States, 
"the alien began to carry the double burden of... foreign 
birth and ... trumped-up radicalism ... on the mistaken 
conservative theoty that foreigners were more 
dangerously extreme" than the native-bom. This alarm 
was reflected in the deportation arena, not merely by 
making only the native-bom exempt from its provisions. 
It was also compounded by abandoning two cardinal 
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procedures of the Home and Territories Department-
first, that deportation must be effected "within two years 
from the date of entty" under Section 5 (2) of the 
Immigration Restriction Act upon the understanding that 
"there must come some time or other when an entrant to 
the Commonwealth ceases to be an immigrant"; and 
secondly, that deportees must always be directed back to 
their countty of origin. Under the Wior Precautions and 
Unlawful Associattons Acts, however, the concepts of 
unlimited duration and convenient disposal assumed 
precedence. The non-native bom became vulnerable, 
irrespective of their period of residency, to potential 
expulsion to any countiy which would receive them 
including those to which they had no prior relation. A 
policy of virtually "open slather" became the order of the 
day. National security, in effect, had displaced personal 
security.^ 
Yet the potency and effectiveness of such deportation 
processes lay not in their open-ness - as say, public 
examples of official deterrence - but rather in the intense 
secretiveness by which the processes were implemented. 
Individuals unceremoniously seemed simply to disappear 
and that in itself, in its terrible and inexplicable finality, 
was undoubtedly seen as deterrent enough. Yet these 
undercover manoeuvres, coupled by the powers of war-
time censorship, made it extremely difficult at the time 
to discover and publicise Individual cases; and this, in 
tum, has continued to dog historians' efforts to uncover, 
with empirical accuracy, the full extent of the exercise. 
The earliest deportation case for which there is some 
record is that of Anthony Leenders, a Dutch unionist 
working in the Port Pirie smelters of South Australia -
one of the centres of IWW activism. Leenders seemingly 
had helped organise a grass-roots strike against 
wage-cuts at the refinety during December 1915. In early 
September 1916 his "secret deportation" under an Aliens 
Restriction Order - at an undisclosed date and probably 
to Java - was brought to the attention of the 
Commonwealth House of Representatives by William 
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Flnlayson, the federal member for Brisbane. The Prime 
Minister, however, remained tight-lipped, replying - as in 
numerous instances to follow - that in the national 
interest "no information could be given with regard to the 
matter". Some two months later, members of the 
Brisbane Industrial Council leamed of the imminent 
deportation of Berthelemy Martin, a Frenchman of three 
years' residence, arrested without charge for publicly 
speaking against conscription at the port of Townsville in 
north Queensland. 
Martin was also apprehended under an Aliens 
Restriction Order and, allegedly, informed by Captain 
Marks of Military Intelligence that he had offended by 
declaiming "against religion and conscription" at a public 
meeting on 24 October. He was ordered to leave Australia 
the following morning upon the steamer Houtman bound 
for Java, and to pay for his own third-class passage. "It 
was like an earthquake to me", Martin (a draughtsman 
with the Queensland Railway Department) later wrote: "I 
was to be packed away like an elopement in a 
melodrama". Upon boarding the vessel, however, 
complications arose. At Martin's refusal to proffer his 
fare or to accept his off-loading in Batavia. the ship's 
master vetoed the deportation and Martin was retumed 
to Townsville lockup. A local campaign to secure his 
release upon bail was mounted unsuccessfully by the 
Secretaries of the Meatworker's Union (the AMIEU) and 
the Australian Workers Union (AWU). but Captain 
Marks, having reputedly boasted "that he was going to 
remove ... all foreigners who held advanced ideas from 
Townsville" simply waited for the next ship to leave port. 
E)ven though Queensland's Premier. T.J. Ityan interceded 
upon his behalf on 14 November, Martin and a female 
companion, "Miss Harvey", were deported to Manila in 
the Philippines five days later. Ryan's telegram to 
Hughes simply met with the reply that "(T]his man is an 
alien whose conduct has been vety adversely reported 
upon. He is an open advocate of the IWW and has been 
guilty of seditious conduct".^ 
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Berthelemy Martin's arrest and deportation occurred 
at precisely the same time as the "FWW twelve" in 
Sydney, as well as another nine in Perth, Western 
Australia, were being tried and convicted upon sabotage 
and conspiracy charges. The following month, the first 
Unlawful Associations Act was passed, considerably 
tightening deportation procedures in order, Hughes 
averred, to prevent Australia becoming "the dumping 
ground for the refuse of the earth". Martin's deportation 
as an IWW advocate, therefore, served as precursor for a 
considerable line of Wobbly deportees who were to follow 
him abroad over the remainder of the war period.'" In 
September 1917, however, the next known target for 
expulsion was not an IWW member but rather the 
pacifist and socialist ex-suffragette, Adela Pankhurst 
who, from August, had led a series of tumultuous 
marches and window-smashing demonstrations in 
Melbourne, protesting federal inaction towards the 
war-inflated cost-of-living. Referring to his ongoing 
tussle with the IWW and his worries about Adela in 
virtually the same breath, Hughes wrote to war 
correspondent, Keith Murdoch on 3 September: 
rWWism is still going strong here especially in Queensland 
... We've got a pretty good Act through the Federal House 
[i.e. the Unlawful Associations Act Amendment Act of July 
1917] and at the time of writing have yarded about 30 of 
the leaders: More to follow. Adela Pankhurst is making 
herself a d—d nuisance and I really don't know what to do 
with the little devil. I hate punishing women: but fear I shall 
have to deport her ." 
Various loyalist groups were pressing for this vety 
outcome. Including the Melboume Argus, when papers 
being drawn up for Adela's deportation were leaked to 
her Defence Counsel, A.W. Foster by a professional 
assistant at the Crown Solicitor's Office, Christian Jollie 
Smith (later a founding member of the Australian 
Communist Party), Adela promptiy married waterside 
union activist, Tom Walsh on 1 October 1917 in order to 
forestall these proceedings. The action (which Hughes 
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had seemed diffident about at best) was thereupon 
withdraAvn, although Adela was nevertheless to serve 
several months' Imprisonment in Pentridge gaol. A 
confidante of the Walshes later Avrote. "Billy Hughes had 
it all arranged with Mrs [Emmeline] Pankhurst to deport 
Adela to Marsailles then Ma was going to take the rebel 
in hand - but the rebel got married and spoiled the 
plan".'' 
The Hughes govemment proved to be less 
accommodating with targetted Wobblles. When Scottish 
bom John R ("Jock") Wilson was earmarked by Garran 
for expulsion in October 1917, he too attempted to avert 
this by marrying Maty Ewart (or "May Hewitt"), a 
politically radical barmaid at the First and Last public 
house. Circular Quay, Sydney. After the wedding 
ceremony at Pentridge gaol, however, the authorities 
duly arrested his new Manchester-bom bride for an 
offence under the Unlawful Associations Act and 
deported both to Liverpool aboard the SS 
Northumberland. Mass arrests of FWW members in New 
South Wales had occurred by this time. Of the 103 taken 
at Broken Hill, Sydney, Cobar and Newcastle between 
July and September 1917 and sentenced to six months 
imprisonment for their continuing membership of an 
ouUawed movement, some forty or so were found to be of 
foreign birth. Garran, along with George Steward, the 
"exceedingly ... domineering" Official Secretaty to the 
Governor-General and covert head of the Counter 
Espionage Bureau, cooperated expeditiously upon the 
construction of deportation fists.'^ 
This fluny of surveillance and punitive activity was 
linked to the determination of the newly elected Hughes 
Nationalist govemment to destroy the Australian IWW 
movement utterly. "We have had enough of jelly-fish 
Governments and traitorous unionists", stated A.W, 
Pearse, editor of the conservative Pastoral Review. Such 
resolve was fuelled, during the second half of 1917, by 
several developments in which the IWW were suspected 
of being embroiled - the massively disruptive New South 
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Wales General Strike, between August and October, the 
disorderly second Military Reinforcements Referendum 
of November and December and, mnn ing alongside 
these, the alarm evoked by a series of explosions upon 
Australian vessels at sea, blamed upon FWW sabotage 
efforts. Following the sinking of the SS Cumberland off 
Gabo Island in July, before the second Unlawful 
Associations Act was passed, the maritime tragedies 
continued with the disappearance of the SS Matungaand 
the explosion of the SS Port Kembla in August, as well as 
fires on board the SS Ceramic and Boorara in September 
and October respectively. Mines laid by the German 
raider Wolf were later blamed for most of these 
occurrences; but for some time "the underhand, secret, 
pro-German methods" of the IWW were considered the 
cause, by planting so-called "infernal machines" on 
board these vessels during cargo loadings.'"* 
By early 1918, the general sense of crisis evoked by 
industrial dislocation at home and burning wrecks in the 
Pacific had been enhanced by the second defeat of 
mifitary conscription and the anticipated boost to local 
rebel resolve provided by the Bolshevik Revolution in 
Russia. On 17 March 1918, Ju l ius Muhlberg, an 
Estonian carpenter from Livonia, four years resident in 
Australia, and another Wobbly activist, John H. 
Randolph, the fiancee of well-known pacifist campaigner, 
Kathleen Hotson, were deported on the SS Jeseric to 
Valparaiso in Chile, a country which at the time had no 
restrictive migration legislation.'^ Following them four 
months later came eight more Wobblies - four of these 
being Britishers deported under Section 6 of the 
Unlawful Associations Act (i.e. an FWW leader, Tom 
Barker from Westmorland, the Irishman, Thomas Dillon 
and the Jewish Londoners, Hyman Isserman and 
Alexander Rosenthal). The four non-Britishers, George 
Anderson and Carl Petersen from Denmark and United 
States citizens, Sam Kipling and Carlos Friedland, were 
expeUed under Aliens Restriction Orders. Their arrival in 
Valparaiso on 13 August aboard the SS Mineric was 
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warmly greeted by Muhlberg, who met their vessel in a 
small fishing-boat, and by waterfront members of the 
Trabo^adores Industricdes del Mundo (the Chilean FWW). 
They received a hotter reception, however, from La 
Nacion, a newspaper supporting opponents of Asian 
immigration, which depicted the strangers as 
"scoundrels of the deepest dye" expelled for fomenting 
"strikes in the coal mines" of Australia. The resultant 
campaign against these "dangerous elements" led to the 
passage of Chile's first restrictive immigration act. The 
Law of Residence In early December 1918, which not 
only prevented the further admission of "undesirables" 
but also demanded the registration of all foreigners, as 
well as introducing powers of judicial expulsion.'® 
Thus, when a second batch of FWW deportees from 
Australia, despatched at the end of 1918 aboard the SS 
Boverick, approached Chile in early March 1919 they 
were prevented from landing. The Chilean naval 
authorities even refused transhipment of the three men 
(the Spaniards, Frank Bilboa and Peter VillalabeiUa and 
the Pole, John-Burtovich) onto the SS Kumerick, en route 
to England. The three were last reported heading back 
across the Pacffic and Indian Oceans for Mauritius, 
Colombo and Calcutta. Their ultimate disembarkation 
point is unknown.'^ 
Complaints to the British Legation in Santiago about 
Australia's unilateral rebel-dumping activities in South 
America led to British Secretary of State, Lord Mllner 
issuing a stem reprimand to the Australian Governor-
General later that year. Alluding to the trans-shipment 
of the four British nationals without permission to a 
foreign port. Mllner commented: 
The expulsion of British subjects from British soil, and their 
deportation to a country to which they do not belong, are 
not measures which can be considered to be in accordance 
with recognized international practice, and your ministers 
will I trust agree that unless the British Empire accepts the 
responsibility for receiving and controlling British subjects, 
foreign Governments cannot be expected to assume a 
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similar responsibility In relation to their own naUonals. If It 
were thought that a British Government was seeming to 
compel a foreign country to accept undesirable British 
subjects, retaliation might be expected which would have 
serious consequences to British travel and commerce. 
Solicitor-General Garran, obviously struggling to concoct 
a face-saving reply, contended that the Commonwealth 
of Australia had merely deported the men onto a ship: "It 
may have been that the destination of the vessel,., was 
Chfie, but it is considered that this fact does not make 
the act ... one of deportation to Chile"l Any Imperial 
response to this hair-splitting, legalistic sophlstiy is not 
on file.'^ 
While this small international wrangle had unfolded 
itself, however, numerous other deportations had been 
occurring. For instance, on 7 June 1918, four IWW 
members, Frank Fowler Ward from Lancashire, Patrick 
Francis Quinlan from London, and the Scots, John 
McCue and John Robertson were deported to the United 
Kingdom aboard the Orontes. All four had lived in 
Australia for more than two years.'^ Furthermore, 
between March and November 1918, a wide-scale 
struggle over the planned deportation of Italian male 
residents of military age for war-service in their 
homeland (under regulation 61 of the War Precautions 
Act) had been waged in Queensland, New South Wales 
and Victoria. At the Sydney Socialist Hall on 21 April, 
former deportation target, Adela Pankhurst-Walsh had 
informed an incensed audience, "[T]he deportation of the 
Italians is infamous ... we should do something to 
prevent the young lives being sacrificed ...". As Italian 
spokes-persons at Childers, Ingham, Innisfail and 
Halifax on the Queensland sugar coast called upon the 
state Labor govemment to protect their countrymen, 
medical inspections of potential reservists were 
assiduously boycotted. Luigl Torti of Kuridalla wrote to 
a compatriot at Mourilyan, "We have refused to go ... 
Some will see 50 with bayonets. ... [before] a stronger 
force will compel them". A series of protest meetings 
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throughout north Queensland were informed by an 
Italian socialist named H, Sobasante of how deportees in 
Sydney had been chained together and prodded with 
bayonets by the Australian militaty. By Armistice Day. 
hundreds of Italians were in detention awaiting 
trans-shipment and some 500 had already been deported 
from Australia.^" 
This protracted anti-deportation protest, waged 
principally by the Italians themselves - with some 
lukewarm support from Anglo-Australian workers -
served as a precedent for a more virulent resistance 
campaign which erupted in mid-1919 over another 
deportation cause celehre. A labour agitator with IWW 
association named Paul Freeman, operating as a copper 
prospector in north-western Queensland, had been 
seized by federal authorities on 8 Januaty 1919 and 
conveyed south to Darlinghurst detention centre. From 
here, he was placed aboard the Sonoma for removal to 
San Francisco. Upon arrival in the United States in 
March, however. Freeman refused to furnish any proof of 
American citizenship and was therefore denied landing 
privileges. He was retumed to Sydney only to be sent 
once more to the USA in April, in order simply to be once 
more refused admission and lodged in the Angel Island 
Immigration Depot awaiting expulsion. As the Sonoma 
crossed the Pacific towards Sydney yet again. Freeman 
decided to wage a hunger strike in order to secure his 
removal from the vessel.^' 
In this endeavour, he was abetted by the ship's 
surgeon. Dr G. Waverley Clark who exposed his plight to 
the Sydney press. From the time Freeman began hunger-
striking on 27 May until his release from the Sonoma 
nine days later, an enormous storm of protest gathered 
in Sydney and spread throughout eastern Australia - Its 
indignation and intensity fed by Dr Clark's graphic 
reports of Freeman's declining medical condition. Massed 
demonstrations, as large as anything seen in the city 
since the conscription campaigns, began on Sunday 1 
June and escalated into mob assaults upon Pyrmont 
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Wharf over the following two evenings. On Monday 2 
June , the crowd from an overflow public meeting at 
Sydney's Trades Hall marched upon the docks, headed 
by a retumed servicemen's brass band. Picking up 
supporters as it passed through the city, it was more 
than 15,000 strong before it reached the locked iron 
gates of Darling Island. Drawn up along the wharf facing 
the marchers were some 300 police and 150 marines 
"from the warships", all fully armed. Percy Brookfield, the 
radical MLA for Broken Hill and other speakers, however, 
counselled restraint as some of the immense crowd 
began breaking through fences in order to storm the 
sh ip . " 
The following morning wharf labourers refused to 
continue loading the Sonoma while, that afternoon, 
another huge public meeting convened by Sydney's 
Mayor at the City Hall heard the Anglican Dean A.E. 
Talbot call for "protests from one end of the Empire to 
the other". More than 5,000 protesters again descended 
upon the wharves to be met there by 200 baton-wielding 
police who charged the crowd. Inflicting many injuries. 
In several such clashes, as the crowd continued to 
withdraw and regroup, scores of men and women were 
batonned. By 8 pm, men were calling for revolvers to 
defend the demonstrators, as groups of retumed soldiers 
began raiding shooting-galleries and gunshops in the 
city for Winchester rifles and ammunition. Only the 
news, received an hour later, that federal authorities had 
relented and would release an apparently dying Paul 
Freeman from the Sonoma next morning prevented the 
stand-off from escalating into an armed affray. Circular 
Quay thereupon empted into tumul tuous scenes of 
carousal, reminiscent of the Armistice celebrations some 
eight months earlier.^^ 
Yet all their rej oicing that "Democracy has triumphed" 
was somewhat premature. Certainly the protest action 
had helped release this "human shuttiecock" from his 
"floating prison"; and certainly, due to US 
non-compliance, the strict secrecy surrounding the 
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normally silent bureaucratic wheels of expulsion had 
been temporarily dispelled. The Freeman case, it was 
said, had at last publicised the tyrannous militarism 
quieUy perpetrated under the War Precautions Act which 
continued to ouUive its welcome in these early days of 
peace. Yet Freeman was simply spirited away from the 
Sonoma into military custody and continued there to be 
denied a civil trial or a tribunal hearing of any kind. 
Although he attempted two more hunger-strikes whilst 
in detention, first at Darlinghurst and then in 
Holdsworthy internment camp, these proceeded without 
the benefit of the detailed publicity hitherto afforded, and 
thus failed to provoke the same effective groundswell of 
sympathy and outrage. Four months later, on 10 October 
I9I9, Paul Freeman was deported to Germany via 
Rotterdam aboard the Valencia, one of the nine special 
transports removing thousands of German internees 
from the Corrmionwealth, even though his alleged 
German origins had never been established. Freeman 
"looked tired and haggard as if he had been broken in 
spirit", reported the Daily Standard, as he was taken 
under heavy guard aboard the vessel. Hundreds of 
hapless German deportees, waiting upon the Darling 
Harbour wharf for Freeman to be boarded, raised a 
ragged cheer in recognition of his dogged, though 
ultimately thwarted resistance efforts (see chapter 1).^ " 
Freeman's hunger-striking attempts between May and 
October 1919 had been preceded by those of Russian 
detainees, awaiting deportation in the dungeons of the 
Darlinghurst militaty barracks in late April of that year. 
Yet, like Freeman's campaign after his isolation from 
public scrutiny, these prisoners' sufferings also evoked 
littie sympathetic response. "You can knock at the stone 
walls with your head as much as you like", they were 
reputedly told by their militaty custodians: "You, being 
Bolshevik must expect as much from us retumed 
soldlers".^^ These internees were part of a group of ten 
men, apprehended for deportation in Brisbane and 
Sydney in the aftermath of the Red Flag disturbances of 
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March 1919 - In effect, a civil liberties protest by 
Queensland leftists, attempting to display this prohibited 
working-class emblem, which had been answered by 
savage rioting on the part of loyalist war veterans and 
clvUlzms. Characteristically for these times, it had 
between the left-wing protesters, rather than the 
right-wing rioters, who had been apprehended and 
punished. Fffteen men had been sentenced to prison 
terms with hard labour in Brisbane, while others were 
surreptitiously removed to Sydney for deportation.^® Any 
appeal to their Soviet Consul, Peter Slmonoff was 
unavailing for he too was lamgulshing in MalUand Gaol 
at this time for the "crime" of public speaking about the 
Russian Revolution. Prior to the detainees' hunger-strike 
at Darlinghurst, Alexander Zuzenko, the most prominent 
of the Russian agitators, had been deported on the SS 
Bakara, along with another Russian activist from 
Sydney, Peter Gaiht. Although the ship was intended for 
Odessa, it was diverted en route to Colombo. Sri Lanka, 
£ifter the Russian port was closed to Allied shipping.^^ 
In the meantime, Zuzenko's young and pregnant wife, 
Civa Rosenberg (the daughter of another of the 
detainees) was placed aboard the SS Ulimaroa in early 
June and informed that she was to join her husband 
abroad. The Ulimaroa, however, sailed for Alexandria in 
Egypt where the distressed woman was landed and 
placed under detention. In despair, she wrote to her 
sister In Sydney of how she had leamed that Zuzenko 
was now imprisoned in Bombay, whilst she was being 
"treated like a criminal" in an Egyptian prison. 
Eventually the two were reunited - but only to be 
deported once more to Turkey. After further tribulations 
and the birth of their daughter in Turkish detention, 
they were smuggled across the Black Sea into Odessa, 
using false Dutch passports supplied by Russian 
comrades.^® 
Yet whereas the eviction of Gailit and the Zuzenkos 
was seemingly mshed and bungled, the deportation of 
the other eight Russian Intemees was unduly delayed. 
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Due to Allied militaty intervention in Russia, the men 
were denied direct passage to their homeland for fear 
that they would abet the opposing revolutionary forces. 
Ports held by the Alfied and White Armies in, both 
northern and southern Russia had been closed due to 
militaty reverses. Chile was no longer receiving exiles, 
nor were the Dutch East Indies; and, after experience 
with the Zuzenkos, Lord Mllner informed the Australian 
Governor-General that "Egypt did not wish to 
receive'undesirables' because of the shortage of guards 
and accommodation". Furthermore, the Governor-
General was warned "(Ijn no circumstances should 
Russian deportees ,,, be sent to the United Kingdom for 
trans-shipment" ,^ ^ 
Such restrictions not only prolonged the eight 
detainees* agonies in the forbidding Darlinghurst cells, 
however. They also frustrated local plans to deport as 
many as sixty other Russian Bolsheviks from Australia, 
lists of whom were being eagerly compiled by militaty 
personnel in the autumn months of 1919. Ultimately the 
eight men - Herman Bykov, Konstantin Klushin, Peter 
Kreslin, Walter Markln, Michael Rosenberg, Peter Timms, 
Wolf Weinberg and Michael Wishnevslq^ - were smuggled 
aboard the SS Frankfurt on 18 September 1919. This was 
another of the ships carrying intemed "enemy adiens" 
back to Europe; and, like Paul Freeman a month later, 
the group of Russ i ans were simply added 
unceremoniously to their number. It was a "scandalous 
business" reported the Daily Standard several days later: 
They were conveyed to the Pyrmont wharf ... in a military 
police-van, with an escort of five soldiers, shortly before the 
vessel left. Care was taken that none of general public or 
friends of the deported men were allowed to speak to them 
... Among those on the wharf to witness their departure ... 
were ... wives children and relatives ... and although they 
made application to see the deportees ... this was denied 
them. For what reasons nobody seemed able to say. Nor 
were the deportees seen again after they boarded the vessel 
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Upon the arrival of the Frankfurt in Egypt, the eight 
Russians were transferred - rather ironically - onto the 
SS Czar, bound for Trieste.^" 
Following the war, some 6,150 Germans, 
Austro-Hungarians, Slavs, Bulgarians and Turks were 
deported and repatriated from Australia upon the nine 
aforementioned transports - the Willochra in May 1919, 
the Kursk in July, the Ypartnga, the Tiros es Monies and 
the Rio Negro in August, the Frankfurt in September, the 
Valencia and Rugia in October and the Main in June 
1920.^' It is impossible to determine how many 
individuals situated amongst this sad conglomerate of 
humanity were, like Paul Freeman and the Russian 
Bolsheviks, banished for predominantly political 
reasons. Names like "Bjelke Boessen", "J.O. Seyffert", 
"Abraham Marks", "Otto Saaren", "Alexander Saar", "F.W. 
Meyer", "H.S. Cohen", "Charles Jerger", "F. Ratz". 
"Edward Alexander" and so on, spring fleetingly or 
spectacularly to light in the official documentation as 
research into this question advances.^^ Due to the 
abiding secrecy of the overall process, however, a 
thorough compilation still evades historians. Frank Cain, 
who has given the FWW deportees considerable attention 
in his writings, tends to increase his enumeration of 
such exiles progressively as new information surfaces. In 
1982, he mentioned thirteen removed and, in 1983 
"about twenty". In his latest publication. The Wobblies at 
War (1993), he finds that "at least" thirty-one were 
expelled under the Unlawful Associations Act^^ If the 
eleven Russian Bolsheviks and a heterogeneous swag of 
other dissidents, removed under Aliens Restriction 
Orders, are added to this total, a rough estimate of at 
least fifty political deportees does not appear an unduly 
inflated one. 
This number, in tum, is clearly dwarfed by the 
thousands of "ex-enemy" nationals and the hundreds of 
Italian reservists who were transported from Australia 
during and after the war. Yet the statistical significance 
of these political deportations is perhaps better 
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appreciated ff the Australian figure is considered beside 
that of the United States of America. In the US, with a 
population of more than 105 million, the Conmiissioner 
General of Inmiigration would report a total of only 
thirty-nine "radicals" deported in the years 1918 and 
1919 combined. Examining the aggregate of American 
Wobblies expelled before May 1919, Robert Preston Jr. 
similarly remarks, 'The total number of deportations 
could well have been fewer than 27". The 750 or so to be 
deported en masse in 1920 and 1921, following upon the 
Palmer raids, of course, still lay ahead. The 
Commonwealth govemment had therefore proceeded far 
more precipitously with its task. Its performance is even 
more starkly contrasted when it is recalled that the 
national population was a mere five million - less than 
one-twentieth of the American aggregate, and that its 
non Anglo-Celtic ethnic sectors were comparatively 
minuscule demographicaHy.^ "* 
The historical biographies of deportees are usually 
dramatically truncated ones. They fade suddenly from 
the national records In much the same way as their 
subjects had disappeared from the social landscape. At 
present we have detailed knowledge of what became of 
only a handful of these men and women. A powerful 
group of military officers, bureaucrats and politicians, 
whose limited backgrounds and training had never 
prepared them for the demanding intellectual exercise of 
unravelling complex dissident beliefs or understanding 
other cultures had stepped into the private worlds of 
these targetted ones and irrevocably altered their future 
life trajectories. Total war and its tense aftermath had 
provided the political permission for such abrupt 
interventions. For, in the ideological atmosphere of both 
militaty mobilization and post-war reconstruction, not to 
appear fervently pro-war and pro-British was to be 
immediately perceived as suspiciously anti-war and 
potentially subversive. Revolutionaty activists, therefore, 
found no margin of official tolerance for their activities 
and literally became moving targets for surveillance and 
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proscription. Those whose cultural moorings could be 
administratively loosened were first incarcerated and 
then geographically displaced. Thus, where dissent and 
difference were equated so readily and slnglemlndedly 
with danger, the "opportunities for deprivation of rights 
considered fundamental to Anglo-Saxon law where 
personal liberty is concemed"^^ were enormously 
enhanced. The state-at-war also Implied, thereby, a state 
of war upon the homefront - a war upon elemental 
liberties and accustomed securities which even basic 
citizenship rights could no longer necessarily protect. 
Chapter 3 
"... when the caretaker's busy taking 
care"? Cross-currents in Australian 
political surveillance and internment, 
1935-1941 
Andrew Moore 
The University of Western Sydney 
On 21 March 1944 Frau Irma Heigden found herself 
facing rigorous questioning from members of an Aliens 
Tribunal Committee at Tatura detention centre in 
Victoria, Austreilian-bom she had married a German 
national who had joined the Ausland section of the 
NSDAP on 1 April 1939. Due to her husband Carl's 
politics and because Dr Rudolph Asmis, the German 
consul-general In Australia, had mentioned Irma 
favourably in his pre-war private correspondence to 
Berlin, both Herr and Frau Heigden were intemed, the 
former In September 1939, the latter in March 1942. 
After two years of Incarceration, Irma Heigden had 
had enough. She appealed against her internment. While 
successful, initially the tone of her interrogators was 
hostile. Was it not remarkable, she was asked, for an 
Australlan-bom girl to become so friendly, indeed 
intimate, with Germans? This line of argument made 
Frau Heigden annoyed. She retorted, "[W]hy should I 
not? I could give you many Australian names of people 
friendly with Dr Asmus (sic) and his wffe. I sat next to 
him and Sir Earle Page".' The reactions of the three 
person Aliens Tribunal Committee were not recorded. 
Whether or not they blanched at the claim that the 
crusty old Countty Party parliamentarian, Sir Earle Page, 
caretaker Prime Minister as recenUy as April 1939, had 
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also fratemised with Nazis, is not known. 
Frau Heigden had nonetheless home witness to a 
central contradiction in Australian politics during the 
1930s. German fascism was only officially unpopular 
after 3 September 1939, Before that HiUer had many 
Anglo-Australian supporters. To use Richard Griffiths' 
term, many antipodean "fellow travellers of the Fiight" 
admired Hitler as a fearless leader taming an 
obstreperous labour movement. In their view Hitler was 
bringing order and stability to Germany while forming an 
effective buffer against Soviet communism. In this 
respect the remarks of Sir Philip Goldfinch, the general 
manager of Australia's largest public company, the 
Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR). were typical of 
his class and generation. After visiting Germany in 1935 
he told members of the Constitutional Association in 
Sydney that. "Germany was the one countty in Europe 
which did not appear to want war. There, one found a 
hard working people, who apparently desired to be left 
alone. Persons there to whom he carried letters of 
introduction emphasised that they were not going to be 
made Communists from the Eastern side".^ 
Irma Heigden's security file contains a further tid-bit 
of information equally revelatoty of the cross currents of 
Australian political life during the 1930s. On the day war 
was declared and her husband was detained he had 
immediately sought to present their case to a particular 
Military Intelligence officer. He was Major W.J.R. (Jack) 
Scott. Heigden seemed to know Scott. She seemed 
confident that if the facts of her husband's case were 
brought to his attention, the confusion could be cleared 
up. Perhaps after a few minutes of consultation with 
Major Scott her husband would walk free. This was not 
to be. The Heigden file records that the distressed wife 
was brusquely "informed that the Major was a vety busy 
man and it was regretted he was not available to be 
interviewed".^ 
Once again this sad stoty of domestic distress hints at 
a curious double-standard. Of course Heigden's belief 
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that a senior Military Intelligence officer in Sydney would 
understand her situation may signify little. She may 
have been mistaken. Even if Heigden and Scott were on 
the same wave length politically, before September 1939 
there was not particular reason why Australian security 
officers should be immune to the ideological attractions 
exerted by Adolf Hitler. Indeed there were solid 
professional reasons why a security officer might choose 
to irrraierse himself in extremist politics of immigrant 
groups. Yet, as the Heigden case hinted there was a 
potential for Ideological affinity to become quite 
complicated for those responsible for administering the 
internment process. 
Using the Heigden case as a starting point and a basis 
for comparison, the following chapter is concerned with 
the working out of such complexity. It focusses on the 
curious case of Major Scott and other Military 
Intelligence officers at the Army's Eastern Command, 
Victoria Barracks, Paddington. The chapter also 
challenges the sanguine assessment of the major 
historian of internment in Australia during World War 
Two, In Behind Barbed Wire Margaret Bevege argues that 
the tiansitlon from surveillance to internment was a 
natural product of a nation protecting itself "against 
possible spies and saboteurs". Using clear and even-
handed guidelines, Bevege argues, the wise men of 
security were honest toilers, conscious that "in a wcu* 
against a police state, a democracy cannot allow its 
security to become too oppressive", Bevege astutely 
points out that the internment process was subject to 
the vagaries of Individual interpretation, but on the 
whole her account provides fittle evidence of light and 
shade and few suggestions of fascists being confused 
with anti-fascists. In her account all of the authorities, 
from Prime Minister Menzies down, seemingly recognised 
that "It was as important to preserve justice in Australia 
as to fight for it internationally",* 
This chapter attempts to show that the relationship 
between the gaoled and their gaolers was sometimes an 
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ambiguous affair. In a few extreme cases it Is unclear 
whether the former or the latter should have been 
Intemed, Our window into this murky area. Jack Scott, 
was a scion of the Sydney estabfishment, A member of 
the prominent Street legal family, educated at the 
exclusive Sydney Grammar School, and in civilian life an 
insurance broker and partner in the firm Scott and 
Broad. Major W.J,R, Scott joined Military Intelligence in 
April 1935.^ His was a somewhat unusual position. 
Appointed chief of a civilian subgroup linked to both the 
New South Wales police who provided thirty police 
officers and the Commonwealth Military Intelligence. 
Scott occupied two offices, one at police headquarters, 
the other at Victoria Barracks. Scott was well connected 
in intelligence circles. He joined Militaty Intelligence 
carrying the personal recommendation of Longfleld 
Lloyd, director of the Sydney office of the Commonwealth 
Investigation Branch (CIB).^ Lloyd had served under 
Scott's uncle in Military Intelligence during World War 
One. Scott was also well-acquainted with the burly 
former Glaswegian New South Wales police 
commissioner, W.J. MacKay. At the 1932 CIB annual 
dinner Scott was seated at the principal table. This 
occasion MacKay characterised as "a connecting link 
between the good fellows outside the force and those 
within it".^ In his dealing with the police Scott was 
assured of "the whole-hearted cooperation and help from 
the Chief Commissioner of Police", and the civilian sub-
group evolved into Military Police Intelligence (MPl) 
during World War Two.® 
Political surveillemce in Australia had long been 
preoccupied with the Left. In part this was a legacy of a 
genuinely revolutionary group, the Industrial Workers of 
the World, an anarcho-syndicalist organisation which 
effectively pursued militant working-class objectives 
during the First World War (see Chapters I and II). After 
the war this attention was transferred to the minuscule 
Community Party of Australia (CPA).^ Former Militaty 
Intelligence officers like Longfield Lloyd and his superior 
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officer. Major H.E. Jones, the first and long term director 
of the CIB, pursued antipodean communism with a 
vengeance. This was partly because they genuinely 
believed that a Red Revolution was imminent and 
considered the CPA to be a vital, subversive force. Jones 
warned Attomey-General W.M. Hughes in 1921: "The 
storm will break here sooner or later and the more 
promptiy steps are taken to prepare for it, the better for 
the Corrmionwealth and the whole Empire".'° In addition 
there was an element of intelligent parasitism involved. 
It no doubt suited the professional interests of the 
security services to overstate the extent of the 
communist menace." As such they were either unable or 
unwilling to reflect soberly upon the relationship 
between admitted Comintern presence in Australia and 
indigenous radicalism. They believed implicitly in the 
notion that the Labor Party and the communists were 
bed fellows.'^ This naturally caused tension with Labor 
governments.'^ 
Two factors caused severe ripples in Australian 
security's comfortable preoccupation with the calumnies 
of left-wing radicals. The first was that during the 1930s 
depression liberal democracy came to be threatened from 
the Right in the form of an organisation known as the 
New Guard. Fascist in its organisation, program and 
tactics, the problem with the New Guard from the 
security services' point of view was that essentially it was 
a Frankenstein of their own making. The New Guard was 
abreakawaymovementfrom another group, the secretive 
Old Guard, This latter group Major Jones described as 
"loyal and highly influential citizens upon whom we have 
to rely in emergency","^ In fact paramilitaty auxiliaries 
had existed under the aegis of the security services and 
the police forces since the First World War, If riots or 
Insurrection broke out, using 1935 legislation they were 
to be swom in as "peace officers",'^ In 1925 during the 
seamen's strike a prominent solicitor, Lieut. Colonel Eric 
Campbell, had been charged with the task of organising 
"five hundred stalwart ex-AIF men" by Prime Minister 
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S.M. Bmce.*^ Six years later, however, Campbell as 
commander of the New Guard became an enemy of the 
state. Major Jones was keen to prosecute him and other 
leaders of the New Guard under Section 27 of the Crimes 
Act'' 
The second source of compfication was the 
proliferation of various extremist organisations among 
inraiigrant groups. It was one matter to pursue the antics 
of Italian-Australian members of the Partita Nazionale 
Fascista or the burgeoning "strongholds" of the NSDAP 
In Adelaide, Melboume, Brisbane and Tanunda, a small 
town in the Barossa Valley,'® but by the early 1930s 
there were three separate fascist movements among 
White Russian emigres.'^ The mosaic of fascism among 
immigrant groups was intricate. 
Individually these groups presented little threat to the 
estabfished order. The membership of one, the All 
Australian People's Federation founded by a Renmark 
wine salesman who experienced some success in 
convincing people he met that "HiUer's financial policy in 
Germany was an Ideal expression of true social credit 
principles" was largely confined to immediate members 
of the salesman's family,^" Yet the prospects of 
relationships emerging between these groups, effectively 
the development of a "fasclntem", needed to be 
considered, especially when they sought to associate 
with Anglo-Australian fascist groups like the New 
Guard,^' or when branches of the Link, the Anglo-
German Union were established in Melboume, Adelaide 
and Perth.^^ Agents needed to be installed in such 
groups, their cadres' mail intercepted, and their 
publications perused. Ultimately, however, the prospect 
of a 'Tascintem" was frustrated by the intense 
nationalism and racial prejudices of each of the groups, 
their differing responses to anti-Semitism, and social 
prejudices based on the differing class backgrounds of 
members of the various immigrant fascist groups.^^ 
Apart from investigating fascist emigres, by 1935 the 
Australian security services were also enthusiastically 
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monitoring their more traditional enemies on the Left. In 
that year there was an attempt to invoke the Crimes Act 
against the CPA and the Friends of the Soviet Union. 
Major Jones was especially enthusiastic about banning 
the CPA. The visit of the left-wing peace activist, Egon 
Kisch in 1934 caused a fiurry of activity in security 
circles.^'' 
Jack Scott fitted this milieu well. There is reason to 
believe that he was a reliable officer who performed his 
duties competentiy. His superior officer, J,M, Prentice, 
later waxed lyrical about Scott's knowledge of fascist 
elements In Sydney,^^ When HiUer's swashbuckling 
ambassador, Felix von Luckner, visited Australian 
shores in 1938, Scott was one of many intelligence 
officers who watched the Sea Devils every move. On 19 
May 1938 Scott reported that "The Nazis are planning to 
give Von Luckner a big reception. They are well aware of 
C.P. Movements against him and say that if the Party try 
any tough stuff the Nazis are prepared to give more then 
they are looking for". On 5 June 1938 Scott reported that 
he was endeavouring to procure a photograph of the 
Count and had secreted an agent within the German 
Club where von Luckner was scheduled to give an 
address.^^ Reports prepared and tendered by Scott on the 
Italian Fascisti in Australia and the activities of the 
Italian security services were extremely detailed and, as 
far as can be judged, valuable commentary.^^ In common 
with other competent spy masters Scott was able to 
cultivate useful contacts within groups attracting 
security Interest. His main source of information about 
German Nazis in Australia was the printer of their 
publications, A. Pooley, a British national who may also 
have worked for MI5.^ ® 
Scott became an increasingly powerful figure in 
security circles. In May 1937, for instance, he took it 
upon himself to write to Attomey-General Hughes to 
protest on Longfield Lloyd's behalf when Lloyd's position 
as trade commissioner in Toltyo was about to be 
undermined by formal diplomatic representation. Scott 
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grew arrogant. He employed an agent, Henry Freame. the 
highly erratic adventurer, to work within Sydney's 
Japanese community without the knowledge of his 
superior officers and withheld irfformation from the CIB 
because of a minor incident when a man involved in dmg 
trafficking approached the New South Wales police 
informing him that he was under security surveillance 
and had been told so by a CIB officer.^" At a conference 
in September 1939 called to iron out some differences 
between mifitary and civilian intelligence agencies Scott 
represented Militaty Intelligence, though this enmity 
continued throughout the Second World War. in some 
measure it seems, because of Scott's high-handed 
attitude.^' 
Nonetheless, when war broke out. Scott the man of 
action and hero of Flers was in his element. In his high-
powered motor vehicle he sped around Sydney like a 
motorised avenging angel, supervising the rounding-up 
of aliens and suspected fifth columnists. An unpublished 
histoty of the Australian Intelligence Corps recalls the 
events of one dramatic evening: 
No definite instructions had been issued with regard to 
their... [i.e. Scott and his intelligence sub-group's] tasks in 
the event of war and. initially they were left to take whatever 
action they thought fit in the interests of the security of the 
Commonwealth. They were able to destroy the major 
portion of Nazi (HQ) Sydney including sabotage squads. 
They quite rightly took action when war was declared, and, 
assisted by some 200 to 300 Police who had been standing 
by all night, proceeded to detain some 200 persons, 
including women, who were named on the suspect lists and 
for whom warrants had been Issued.^* 
J.M. Prentice later constructed an even more romantic 
version of the achievements of Scott's vigilante-style 
raids. A plot to destroy Garden Island was "nipped in the 
bud"; an amount of dynamite "sufficient ... to have 
destroyed half of Sydney" was seized. In the preceding 
four years Scott and his men had established dossiers on 
30.000 aliens identifying 3000 as potentially dangerous. 
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The 300 "actively engaged In espionage and other forms 
of subversion", were detained with well-drilled 
precision.^^ Scott clearly knew exactly where enemies of 
the realm were to be found and these included Carl 
Heigden, a wool-buyer who more than likely joined the 
NSDAP for commercial/career reasons. 
Richard Hall claims that many were wrongfully 
arrested and subsequentiy released.^'' Bevege disputes 
this, though her statistics suggest that Hall is right^^ (see 
chapter 7), In any case the archival record indicates that 
in late 1939 and early 1940 Sydney was gripped by a spy 
scare of extravagant proportions in which overreaction 
was inevitable. The records of Scott's group indicates 
that intelligence officers were inundated with unsolicited 
reports from members of the public regarding alleged 
acts of espionage being conducted by "dagos" and/or 
"squareheads". In reality this was mainly spite and titUe-
tatUe. A deserted wife reported that her erstwhile 
husband - a Danish national - may have been engaged 
in espionage. A householder solemnly reported his 
suspicions about a German neighbour after the latter 
had turned off his radio while the King's speech was 
being broadcast on the ABC.^ ® In truth, few spies and 
saboteurs were to be found. As a Military Intelligence 
report later recognised, the fear of a substantial "fffth 
column" was more significant and debilitating than 
treachety itself. Rumourmongering included allegations 
that Gladys Moncrieff, the singer. Sir Sydney Snow, the 
prominent retailer and the former New South Wales 
governor. Sir PhUip Game, had been intemed.^^ 
At one level Scott was operating as a reliable 
intelligence officer. Whether carrying out ordinaty 
precautionaty measures such as warning other Military 
Intelligence officers of reports received from London 
about high explosives being secreted in sardine tins 
within enemy agents' homes^® or acting upon his 
encyclopaedic knowledge of subversives, there was littie 
suggestion of impropriety. From 1939 on, however, Scott 
had been at the centre of an unseemly dispute within the 
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security world. The accusation became that he had 
severely compromised himseff, and while the charge of 
high treason was never laid, as it was against Charles 
Cousens, an Australian prisoner of war who made 
propaganda broadcasts over Radio ToltyO, it was 
Imputed. 
The issue in dispute was Scott's relationship with 
Japanese business Interests in Australia. The CIB and 
Harold Jones In particular held the view that 
"merchants" like Scott should not undertake 
"professional" intelligence work. Jones felt that Scott had 
been compromised by his close pre-w£u- associations with 
the Japanese. Scott's superior officer. Brigadier B. 
Combes, took the view that the CIB had spread 
distasteful rumours about him because of professional 
jealousy. Combes 8u-gued that the principal reason for 
the CIB campaign against Scott was that he "is able to 
get information about Japanese activities which the 
Investigation Branch cannot".^^ 
It is true that Jones staged a vendetta against Scott, 
aggravated by the latter's refusal to hand over a list of 
600 Nazis to Lieut. Colonel Callaghan of the C1B.*° ft is 
also true that Scott had been a long term enthusiast for 
the Japanese. In 1934, with arrangements facilitated by 
Japanese security, he visited Japan, discussing the 
prospects of sheep and wool production in the puppet 
state of Manchukuo with leading Japanese pastoral 
interests, as well as sounding out the prospects for 
cultural exchanges.'^' Between 1932 and 1935 he wrote 
a stream of articles and letters in the Sydney Morning 
Herald lauding and defending the Japanese.''^ He was on 
amicable terms with Japanese consular staff in Sydney 
and a frequent dinner guest at the Japanese consulate.*' 
On the surface at least and without rejecting the 
possibility that all of these contacts within Japanese 
circles refiected his duties as an intelligence officer. Jack 
Scott's and Irma Heigden's cases were not all that 
dissimilar. 
Yet the matter - and the available archival evidence** -
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carmot be readily resolved. Suffice it to say that Scott did 
Join the Heigdens in Tatura; rather, following an 
admission that he had been taken m by the Japanese*^ 
he was refused access to secret files and in June 1940 
transferred to army headquarters in Melboume as a staff 
officer. Between February and May 1941 he worked at a 
guerilla warfare training centre for Independent 
Companies at Wilson's Promontory. There Scott 
undermined the authority of his superior, Lieut. Colonel 
Mawhood, an MI5 officer who, among other things, 
claimed to have stumbled across a dangerous fifth 
colurrm element among "some highly placed people in 
Melboume society",*^ 
Ultimately Scott met his nemesis as commander of 
"Gull Force" at Ambon in 1942. After a distinctly 
unmeritorious encounter Scott surrendered to the 
Japanese roughly two weeks after he had arrived at 
Ambon. As a prisoner of war at Hainan Scott precipitated 
several disgraceful incidents whereby Australian soldiers 
were handed over to the Japanese to be punished for 
infringements against Scott's own disclplinaty policy.*^ 
Scott was indeed a weird fish. He clearly experienced 
problems with his mental health, both in the Japanese 
POW camp,*® which was explicable enough, though 
before the war his stepsons remembered Scott 
brandishing a revolver in their family home, threatening 
to go out into the garden and shoot himself.*^ What 
troubled him in the late 1930s can only be speculated 
upon, but perhaps it was the pressures of his double-Iffe. 
On the one hemd he was one of those loyal and 
industrious intelligence officers whose "painstaking" 
work Bevege eulogises. On the other there was a devil in 
him; his demons perhaps embraced the realisation that 
his ideological affinities could compromise his 
patriotism. For Anglo-Australians like Major Scott who 
despised Bolshevism above all, this was a cruel twist of 
fate. 
For Jack Scott's past was intimately connected with 
antipodean fascism, and this was as an emphatic 
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participant rather than a neutral intelligence agent. After 
returning form the First World War he had thrown 
himseff into the bully boy antics of Sydney's retumed 
soldiers. Between 1920 and 1922 he was associated with 
the King and Empire Alliance, an empire loyalist group, 
modelled on the Italian Fascisti which sought to 
"counteract and destroy the malign influence of 
disloyalists". In May 1921 Scott was prominently 
involved in a dramatic episode on the Sydney Domain 
when excited "loyalists" stormed socialist platforms.^ 
Four years in cofiaboration with his friend. Colonel Eric 
Campbell, Scott organised "X Force", that group of 500 
retumed soldiers which would assist the police if Prime 
Minister Bruce's plans to deport two union leaders led to 
riots.^' In 1931 Scott became chief of staff of the Old 
Guard, working in collaboration with Philip Goldfinch of 
CSR. When the secret army was disbanded as a mass 
movement in August 1932, Scott maintained contact 
with a nucleus of leaders who could "stand to" in the 
future.^^ Several of these people joined him in the 
Military Intelligence civilian sub-group three years later 
As late as 1938 there are suggestions that the Old Guard 
was reformed through a group styled the National 
Defence League which sought to alert citizens to "their 
responsibility as free citizens to defend Australia".^ 
Scott's private s)mipathies with fascism became quite 
complicated in his work as an intelligence officer. For 
instance one report he prepared in 1936 on the Italian 
Fasciti in Australia made mention of the prominence of 
Dr Antonio Baccarini.^ The president of the Dante 
Aligheri Society and perhaps "the best Italian speaker in 
Australia", this "cultured Italian genUeman" was also the 
main source of knowledge about Italian fascism for the 
New Guard leader Eric Campbell.^^ As we have seen 
Colonel Campbell and Major Scott were well acquainted 
and, despite the schism between the Old Guard and the 
New Guard in 1931, not poles apart politically. Some 
more cautious members of the Old Guard regarded Scott 
as a fematic.^ 
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In 1938 Eric Campbell sought to distance himself 
from his pro-Nazi views.^^ Nevertheless, he was probably 
fortunate not to have been intemed. or considered for 
internment, during World War Two. Like Frau Heigden. 
Campbell had been in regular contact with Dr Asmis. 
dined at the consulate regularly, and was often 
mentioned in despatches to Berlin in favourable light. 
One despatch reported that "Publicly Campbell has 
always shown a German friendly attitude and entertains 
the friendliest relations with me",^ Unlike Irma Heigden. 
Eric Campbell had actually sought out personal contacts 
with leading fascists in Germany. Italy and Britain. 
Campbell remained under close surveillance during 
World WarTwo®° but perhaps the prospect of Major Scott 
arresting Colonel Campbell, his erstwhile colleague an 
friend, was too preposterous to contemplate. 
Jack Scott, too, moderated his public position. He 
toned down his enthusiastic outpourings of pro-
Japanese sentiment. His articles in the Sydney Morning 
Herald criticised United States' isolationism and, after 
the surrendering of Czechoslovakia, a virulent rebuke of 
Prime Minister Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler. 
This, Scott said, "brought dishonour and disgrace" to the 
British peoples "after centuries of pride to race and 
nation".^' Scott acted with circumspection in 1940 when 
alerted to attempts to revive a New Guard style 
paramilitary organisation known as the Legion of 
Frontiersmen. Approaches had been made to Sir Philip 
Goldfinch to lead the group. Goldfinch, however, had 
politely declined because of the embarrassment such a 
group could cause the Commonwealth government.'^ It 
could also have compromised Major Scott. 
What does all of this mean? Clearly, it should not be 
implied that evety intelligence officer Involved in the 
internment process was a crypto-fascist. Roland Browne 
for instance, had been a stem figure of authority among 
Perth's labour radicals during World War One as a 
Militaty Intelligence Officer, but as an inspector of the 
CIB®' in Melboume between the wars exercised common 
60 Allen Justice 
sense when confronted with the rise of proto-fascist 
secret armies like the League of National Security, the 
Old Guard's Victorian counterpart. Brovme complained 
that the group was "a steel hammer to crush a nut", 
dangerous because it promoted hysteria and sinister 
because there was no guarantee that it would not oppose 
constituted authority,®* In the internment process 
Browne again acted as an enlightened liberal. He 
strongly defended anti-Nazi Jewish refugee immigrants 
from Germany and was not predisposed to sentence 
culturally minded and left-wing migrants to 
internment,®^ Even within Scott's work place at MPl in 
Sydney, Constable Norman Spty's anti-fascist 
sentiments shine through repeatedly. It may be 
significant that in 1932 Spty was badly beaten up by the 
New Guard while observing Eric Campbell drilling his 
men at Pendle Hill.®® 
Many members of the Australian security services, 
however, had not experienced the sharp end of fascism 
like Norman Spty. Rarely university graduates or multi-
lingual, they were poorly equipped to understand the 
seams and folds of the exotic political lives that crossed 
their paths emd whose paper work accumulated on their 
desks. The translations they relied upon were imperfect. 
Preoccupied with unearthing documentaty evidence of 
membership of a particular fascist group, security 
officers were inclined to discount the non-ideological 
factors, even prosaic commercial considerations, which 
might cause the likes of Carl Heigden, a wool-buyer for 
Czechoslovakian interests, to align himself with the 
govemment of Germany after HiUer's invasion of that 
country. Irma Heigden protestations to her interrogators 
at Tatura in 1944 may well have been sincere. "Quite 
frankly", she said, "I never heard the word'Nazi' used in 
the home ... I still do not know quite [what a Nazi is). It 
means a member of the Party? To me it does not mean 
any more than the word'Hun' in the last war".®^ 
Essentially Australian intelligence officers reflected 
the insularity of their countty's political life between the 
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war. Charles Price, later the eminent demographer, 
worked as a security officer closely connected with the 
case of Arnold von Skerst, the editor of Die BrUcke who 
collaborated with Militaty Intelligence from July 1941 
after being intemed in 1939. Price, a university graduate, 
has recenUy recalled his contacts with the likes of von 
Skerst. "They all brought with them an air of cultivated 
civilised knowledge and experience; strange to me with 
my more narrow Australian background."®® In this 
context, even operating a coffee shop, with all of its 
European aromas and cadences, as Frau Heigden did, 
could be seen as suspicious. Not only did they distrust 
cultural heterogeneity, as middle class Australians they 
invariably shared the prevailing view that Hitler was 
merely saving Germany from Bolshevism, For them 
appeasement was justified because international 
communism was a more pressing concern. And indeed 
when the war started the overwhelming concentration of 
the war effort - and that of the secret state - was on 
repressing Australian communism, on "internal 
security", rather than fighting German fascism abroad.®^ 
Apart from being politically unsophisticated, 
Australian spies were often unvarnished in their 
detective work. The CIB's Sydney expert on Nazis, Bill 
Barnwell, gathered information at the Royal Exchange 
Hotel, a venue popular with German wool-buyers, 
because the barmaid there poured beer in a German 
fashion, with plenty of froth. His role as an intelligence 
agent seems to have been no secret. Simileu'ly, at an 
official occasion in April 1941 the Japanese vice-consul 
and chief of Japanese Naval Intelligence in Sydney took 
"a mischievous delight in Introducing Mr Mitchell as 
head of the Commonwealth Investigation Branch in a 
loud voice". He also pointedly inquired of B. Tyrell, a 
Militaty Intelligence officer, who perhaps had also 
assumed that his cover was secure, whether Tyrell had 
any knowledge of the whereabouts of Major Hashida, a 
Japanese Intelligence agent then roving around 
Australia,'" Clearly the Nazis and the Japanese 
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militarists felt they had to littie to fear from Australian 
security. 
Australian security also tended to rely strongly upon 
British sources, principally within MI5,' ' It was, for 
mstance, uncorroborated advice from London that Irma 
Heigden was a member of a German women's club in 
Sydney, rather than persistent [and unsubstantiated] 
allegations that her city cafeteria was a centre for Nazi 
espionage, which prompted her internment." 
Moreover, to British security boffins, fascism was 
largely a European malaise; the authorities in London, 
were rarely predisposed to share information about the 
activities of Sir Oswald Mosley and the British Union of 
Fascists (BUF),'^ John Hope's research might suggest 
that this was because they were sinking in some of Jack 
Scott's ideological quicksand. Maxwell Knight, for 
instsmce was in cheu'ge of MI5's domestic subversion. 
While rounding up some members of the BUF, it seem 
that Knight tipped off William Joyce ("Lord Haw Haw") 
that he was about to be intemed. One of those who was 
intemed, Neil Francis Hawkins, claimed that he had 
been framed by Knight, whom he remembered as being 
chief intelligence officer of the earlier British Fascists 
when he (Hawkins) had joined. The latter part of this 
seemingly wild allegation can be substantiated by a rare 
fragment of evidence about British fascism in Australian 
Archives.'* As Hope argues, "Wherever fascism made its 
appearance in the inter-war years it displayed a 
remarkable talent for mobilising the resources of the 
state in its support. Fascists everywhere, it would seem, 
found in the agencies and functionaries of the state a 
willing and sometimes enthusiastic source of 
collaboration and protection".'^ 
Australia was no exception. Indeed It seems that Scott 
was not the only antipodean spy with a fascist past. 
Even W.B, Simpson, director-general of security after 
September 1942 was thought to have been a prominent 
member of the New Guard.'® His deputy. C.A.K, Cohen 
was involved with the Old Guard in his native 
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NewcasUe," J,M, Prentice, was a prominent journalist 
and theosophist who in 1931 had exhorted that 
Australia's most revered soldier. General Sir John 
Monash, was 'The One Man in Australia ... I could have 
accepted and gladly served under as DICTATOR". By the 
late 1930s Prentice was a leading proponent of 
appeasement. In September 1939 an issue of Man 
magazine had to be hastily recast. It contained one of 
Prentice's anti-Soviet pro-Hitler foreign affairs 
commentaries. Events in Poland contradicted his view 
that Hitier was not intent upon war.'^ Later Prentice was 
instrumental in transferring a member of the anti-
Semitic and pro-Japanese Australia First Movement to 
cyphers - the most sensitive part of any army.^ As Bruce 
Muirden would have it, of Australia First and Colonel 
Prentice it remains a moot question as to whose 
patriotism was the more puzzled. 
There are a number of ways of interpreting these 
suggestions of divided loyalties and complexity. At the 
vety least they support Russel Ward's view that one of 
the reasons Australians displayed less enthusiasm for 
the war effort in 1939 than in 1914 was the popular 
suspicion that their govemment and those in authority 
were "covertly" fascist.®' The apprehensions which 
working people articulated as they muttered in their beer 
should not always be discounted. 
At a more serious level, the case of Jack Scott and 
other intelligence officers alludes to the prospect that 
there really was something rather rotten in the state of 
New South Wales. It seems likely, for Instance, that 
doubts about the reliability of Australian intelligence led 
to the formation of Alfred Conlon's Army Directorate of 
Research and Civil Affairs.®^ 
Even the allegation of the communist journalist 
Rupert Lockwood that British security did not trust 
Prentice's "Axis Affiliations" and kept a close watch on 
him because of their suspicions^ should not be 
dismissed out of hand. For it seems that the chief of 
British Naval Intelligence based in the Far East engaged 
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the services of an outstanding agent. Ken Cook, to 
Investigate "the Japanese show in Sydney". Precariously 
Independent of any particular institutional connection 
but on amicable enough terms with Commander R.M.B. 
Long of Naval Intelligence. Cook quickly became 
suspicious of both Scott and Prentice. Shortly after 
sharing information with Scott about a pro-Japanese 
cofiaborationist tendency in Sydney's leading circles, 
Cook felt that his life was threatened. In the engine room 
of a Japanese trading vessel the Japanese vice-consul 
apparenUy threatened to murder him. Cook rushed to 
Commander Long's office to inform him of the incident 
Long advised him to disassociate himself from his 
investigations of Japanese collaborationism, and 
assigned one of his own men to investigate the incident. 
Cook later met the agent. He was told: "Scott could never 
be trusted. He was too close to the Japanese. His war 
record is vety wobbly. He's in the same camp as [Charles] 
Cousens".^ 
Whatever the truth of the matter, Frau Heigden's 
misgivings about the double-standards of official policy 
were justified. The civil liberties which Bevege argues 
were jealously guarded were, in reality, readily discarded 
(see chapter 7). When World War Two ended and the 
Cold War began, vety little was forgotten and even less 
forgiven. The Heigdens faced continuing hostility from 
the secret state. One official urged that they should be 
deported, Carl Heigden's chances of reforging his prewar 
links in Czechoslovakia, were frustrated after the 
Czechoslovakian consul-general in Sydney was "supplied 
verbally" with the ouUine of Heigden's security file,*^ 
Internment of enemies of the state was again being 
considered. This time the foe was not enemy aliens, but 
Australian citizens, specifically communists. By 1951 
Colonel Charles Spty of the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation had selected "about 1,100 
Communist officials ... for intemment".^ This would 
have happened tf Prime Minister Menzies' p lans to ban 
the Communist Party had succeeded. The means of 
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enforcing this drastic measure remain obscure. Perhaps 
the vigilante raids of 1939 would have been repeated. 
It seems likely that the services of an Australian-wide 
paramilitaty organisation known as The Association 
would have been enlisted. A rebirth of the 1930s secret 
armies and also Imbued with a proto-fascist outiook, the 
leaders of The Association were quite often the same 
officials who had supervised surveillance and internment 
during World War Two; Colonel J.M. Prentice, Captain 
Rodney Tuckerman and Colonel J.D. Rogers, for 
example. One of The Association's documents "Order No. 
1", suggests that the group had plans to "detain 
Opposition members [and] erect detention compounds 
capable of holding 200 persons".®' In a society founded 
as a gaol, detaining political prisoners proved to be an 
enduring tradition. 
Chapter 4 
Internment of German Enemy Aliens in the 
United States during the First 
and Second World Wars 
Jorg Nagler 
University of Kiel 
The twentieth centuty has seen two total wars in which 
civilians suffered tremendously under the horrors of war. 
The totality of warfare mobilised all resources -
economically and intellectually - in order to defeat the 
enemy. To achieve that goal propaganda dehumanised 
the enemy, the other, often depicted as the "alien". The 
homefront became pivotal for the war effort and often 
resembled a second front, where the "enemy within" was 
fought by those who had stayed home. Although the 
term was coined during the Spanish Civil War, the "fifth 
column" syndrome was a typical phenomenon to be 
found In the belligerent societies of the two World Wars. 
National minorities from enemy countries were destined 
to become targets of the homefront since they 
represented the "enemy within", regardless of length of 
residence in their host society. Once they were 
stigmatised with the unfortunate term "enemy alien" -
drawing an equation "enemy" with "alien" - they evoked 
nightmare fantasias of (super)patriotic Americans. In this 
context the pivotal question of citizenship arose; does 
citizenship eo ipso define national loyalty in times of 
war? Did the unnaturalised German pose a greater 
threat to national security than his fellow-countryman 
and neighbour who had acquired his citizenship and 
could call himself German-American? Was citizenship 
the ultimate proof of an accomplished and finished 
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process of assimilation and hence loyalty? In the United 
States - the country of immigration par excellence - the 
juxtaposition of national security and the rights of aliens 
in time of war produced a complex legal and ethical 
phenomenon. Internment for German aliens, however, 
was always based on the individual screening of a 
person.' 
According to the census of 1910, 2.5 million 
Americans had been bom in Germany. Together with 
second-generation Germans they formed a formidable 
group of over eight million persons in a total US 
population of over 92 million in 1910.^ In most major 
American cities German-bom immigrants constituted the 
highest percentage of the overall foreign-bom 
population.^ But the naturalisation rate for German 
immigrants of about seventy per cent was the highest of 
any immigrant groups."* Approximately a half million 
male and female German immigrants over the age of 
fourteen had not acquired American citizenship at the 
outbreak of war. 
With the declaration of war against Imperial Germany 
on 6 April 1917, these aliens were transformed into 
"enemy aliens". On this very day President Wilson issued 
a proclamation regarding enemy aliens based upon the 
Alien Enemy Statute of 1798.^ The twelve regulations 
which he found "necessary in the premises and for the 
public safety"® defined the legal framework for the war-
time restrictions of aliens over the age of fourteen and 
bom in Germany.' 
Besides the inter- and intra-departmental quarrels 
between the Justice Department, War Department, and 
Treasury Department over who should be in charge of 
the monitoring of enemy aliens, there existed no uniform 
administrative direction on how to proceed with enemy 
aliens. Secretaries of State Robert Lansing and Treasury 
William G. McAdoo opted for a large-scale internment 
program, whereas Secretary of War Newrton D. Baker and 
Attomey-General Thomas W. Gregoty believed that such 
drastic measures were not necessaty.® In view of 
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financial, administrative, and economic restraints, 
however, the wholesale intemment of this high number 
of enemy aliens as practised in Europe was unthinkable. 
Hence Gregoty's view of a selective intemment policy 
prevailed. Only once, in July 1918. in light of a possible 
German submarine attack on the East Coast, did 
Gregoty temporarily consider mass internment.^ 
Immediately after the declaration of war the long lists 
of Germans considered dangerous to national security 
and German sympathisers which had been accumulated 
by the Justice Department since August 1914. were 
classffied - often these suspects were registered v^ nth the 
advice and counsel of British Intelligence,'" and enemy 
aliens considered to be dangerous for national safety 
were arrested and subsequently intemed. Despite the 
allegedly genuine threat posed by enemy aliens after the 
declaration of war, it is surprising that only 63 of them 
were arrested in April. By the end of June , 295 and by 
the end of October 1917, 895 enemy aliens had been 
arrested and approximately thirty per cent of those were 
subsequently intemed for the duration of the war." 
The President's April enemy alien proclamation 
indicated that "if necessaty to prevent violations of these 
regulations, all alien enemies will be obliged to 
register".'^ Evidently the previous twelve presidential 
regulations were considered insufficient for the complete 
monitoring of the enemy alien population, although no 
act of sabotage and no other subversive activities had 
been discovered. But, typically, this fact was attributed 
not to the loyalty of enemy aliens but to strict 
enforcement by the several intelligence agencies and 
public alertness. The President t hus issued eight 
additional enemy alien regulations on 16 November 
1917.'^ John Lord O'Brian, special assistant to the 
Attomey-General for the newly established War Work 
division of the Justice Department - a Harvard-educated 
liberal - now was made responsible for the 
implementation of enemy alien regulations and 
intemment. '* In urban areas, registration was conducted 
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by police officials euid in non-urban areas by US 
postmasters. It became unlawful for German enemy 
aliens to be found without the possession of a 
registration card.'^ In order to monitor German enemy 
aliens, these individuals were required to obtain a permit 
for a change of residence and employment and to report 
to federal or local authorities on a routine basis.'® 
Besides other forbidden zones, Washington DC, became 
a barred area for enemy al iens." In order to enforce these 
restrictions and to have an intimidating effect, the police 
and the Bureau of Investigation (later the FBI) agents 
conducted round-ups of enemy aliens and mass arrests 
of those found in restricted zones.'® 
During the war more than 260,000 male enemy aliens 
were registered. To make the control stricter for enemy 
aliens many previously issued exemption passes were 
revoked.'^ The Just ice Department strove from the 
beginning to extend the Presidential regulations of 6 
April 1917 to female enemy aliens if they proved a threat 
to national security.^" Evidently this was the case, since 
Wilson - upon Gregory's recommendation - asked for an 
amendment to the alien enemy statute in his annual 
message to Congress in December 1917, to cover 
women.^' The Justice Department informed Senators 
and Representatives that the department received letters 
daily complaining about disloyal activities of German-
bom women and that they could not be intemed 
according to the enemy alien statute. After some 
hesitation. Congress agreed to the Justice Department's 
view that American women, In marrying enemy aliens, 
had proven that they were not loyal citizens and thus 
forfeited their American citizenship. The President gave 
his approval 18 April 1918.^^ 220,000 female German 
enemy aliens were thus registered during the course of 
the war. J . Edgar Hoover was the major planner in 
charge of the implementation of Wilson's proclamation 
regarding the surveillance and intemment of female 
enemy aliens. This was his first independent task in his 
long (Federal) Bureau of Investigation career and his first 
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experience with cases In which the power of the state 
was not restrained by constitutional considerations.^^ 
During the war and even after 8,500 enemy aliens -
the majority of them Germans - were arrested under 
presidential warrants and several thousand others were 
temporarily detained for summaty examination and than 
released.^"* Many more ended up in local jails v^thout 
notffication to the Justice Department.^^ 
After the presidential warrants had been issued and 
the enemy aliens arrested, they were temporarily brought 
to local prisons or military camps. Subsequentiy their 
cases were scrutinised, and if there was "sufficient" 
evidence of disloyalty or the violation of one of the 
presidential regulations, they were detained in one of the 
intemment camps, ff there was not enough evidence, the 
enemy alien was paroled, often on bond, and required to 
report to a police station or to report periodically to local 
American Protective League (APL) ofiices. The APL, an 
"army" of 250,000 voluntaty agents watching the 
homefront for the Justice Department, was indeed a 
unique phenomenon in American histoty,^® APL units in 
cities with high alien populations established Enemy 
Alien Bureaus which had as their sole function the 
investigation of enemy aliens and surveillance of all 
released men. Actually the small number of civihan 
enemy aliens intemed gave the APL one important 
reason for its existence - one which Gregoty certainly 
considered important - since it seemed to prove that 
surveillance w£LS very effective,^'Approximately thirty per 
cent of the arrested enemy aliens faced intemment. 
Many complaints from enemy aliens reached the 
Justice Department or the Secretaty of State concerning 
their treatment in these places of temporaty detainment. 
As the reports of the Swiss Legation - the representative 
of German affairs during the war - to the State 
Department indicated, some enemy aliens had to spend 
as much as ten months in local, often overcrowded 
prisons together with ordinary criminals, mentally 
retarded and epileptics, wearing regular prison clothes, 
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and sometimes handcuffed overnight, before they were 
detained in an intemment camp,^ ® although the Justice 
Department had repeatedly informed United States 
Marshals that the detention of enemy aliens was a mere 
precautionary step.^^ 
The arrest and detention of enemy aliens was not 
subject to judicial review according to section 4067, 
Revised Statutes which vested the President with 
summary powers. 
It is remarkable how few enemy aliens actually 
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. Up to March 1918 
the only case which had come before the courts 
questioning the constitutionality of the President's 
proclamation under the AUen Act was instituted by an 
Austro-Hungarian who had been arrested and detained 
as an enemy alien and who applied for a writ of habeas 
corpus. The court refused to extend habeas corpus 
proceedings to enemy aliens and quickly decided that It 
had no right to intervene. Nor did anyone question the 
use of the APL, its investigating methods, or the process 
of internment.^' 
Despite the overall atmosphere of hysteria concerning 
enemy aliens, who were perceived as agents of the 
Kaiser, only 6,300 men and a few women -
overwhelmingly German - were detained in four major 
intemment camps administered by the War Department. 
Besides the approximately 4000 crew members of several 
German naval vessels and merchant ships intemed for 
the duration of the war, there were 2,300 civilian enemy 
aliens, mosUy German (approximately ten per cent of the 
Intemees were afiens from the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire), were confined mainly in Fort Oglethorpe, 
Georgia and in Fort Douglas, Utah^^ as "dangerous 
enemy aliens". Among the latter there were certain 
groups of intemees which can be roughly categorised.^® 
A small minority, not more than ten per cent, 
consisted of wealthy entrepreneurs and public figures 
who allegedly posed a danger to the public safety in the 
opinion of the administration if left at large. To this 
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group belonged industrialists, financiers, merchants, 
newspaper editors, symphony conductors - the most 
notorious was Dr Karl Muck of the Boston Symphony^* -
ministers, priests, teachers, and others. Since these 
figures were exposed to the public, they automatically 
became the first focus of attention locally and sometimes 
nationally. Many times the Justice Department reacted 
to public pressure in order to appease local resentments 
and to check on the loyalty of these exponents of 
"Kaiserism", and ff necessaty to intem them, often for the 
sake of their own security. Besides these upper and 
middle class intemees the second categoty - this was the 
overwhelming majority - involved labour activists, 
political leftists. Industrial Workers of the Worid (IWW) 
members, and radicals. In this connection, it is 
important to emphasise that there existed a war-time 
congruence of anti-German hysteria and a fear of a 
certain type political radicalism perceived as "alien" to 
the American political tradition. This phenomenon and 
the threat to alien labour activists and radicals also had 
its ramifications regarding the intimidation of native 
political radicals.^^ Although the Attomey-General 
maintained officially throughout the war that mere 
membership in an organization was not grounds for 
intemment, he supported the view that the IWWs were 
an auxiliary of the German Espionage System,®® and in 
the summer of 1917 he ordered that enemy aliens who 
were IWW members be interned.®' But it was not only 
membership in radical leftist organizations that could 
lead to intemment; a political statement in public, a 
telephone conversation, or even a critical comment on 
the war situation written in a private letter that came 
under the scrutiny of private or official investigators was 
often sufficient. The reports were sent to the Justice 
Department which then decided upon the severity of the 
case. Many of these cases were innocuous in nature but 
in the general framework of the mentality of the 
homefront these could lead to Intemment. The third 
categoty of intemed enemy aliens encompassed the 
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mentally disturbed, eccentric. Illiterate, and poor. Their 
Ignorance had caused them to violate one or another of 
tiie presidential regulations, or their peculiar behaviour 
had aroused suspicion in their communities. These 
people were a nuisance to local authorities who were 
often glad to get rid of them by sending them to an 
intemment camp.®® 
Intemment and the rumours that circulated on the 
grounds for Imprisonment naturally had consequences 
for members of families, who. in the anti-German 
climate, often became as much the targets of suspicion 
as the intemees. Despite the conditions in the camps, 
the public complained about the rumoured good 
treatment of enemy aliens,®^ 
Between the Armistice and the close of the camps in 
April 1920. the Justice Department tried unsuccessfully 
to secure legislation from Congress which would 
authorise the deportation of any of those intemed aliens 
whom the administration considered "unfit" or "too 
dangerous" to remain in the countiy. Transition from the 
enemy alien hysteria to the Red Scare of 1919 and 1920 
had its Impact on the prolonged stay of the last inmates 
of the camps, who were considered to be radicals and too 
dangerous to be paroled (see Chapter 2). 
The Justice Department pressed for large scale 
deportation of the Intemed "radicals" and "dangerous 
elements", but Congress was unwilling to modify the 
deportation bill of 1918 after the war. The Just ice 
Department's recommendations stipulated that enemy 
aliens belonging to an organization advocating revolt or 
sabotage would be subject to deportation and also that 
it would have broader executive discretion in this field."^^ 
By the strict Interpretation of the term "deportation" only 
a minute minority of intemees were deported. 
Approximately one-third of the intemees were 
repatriated. Some of those wanted to return; others, 
however, facing the prospect of more time behind barbed 
wire, signed the request for repatriation under duress. 
The rest of the Intemees went back to their American 
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home conmiunities after having spent on the average 
one-emd-a-haffyears in prisons and intemment camps.*' 
It is still surprising that despite numerous examples of 
mistreatment of enemy aliens and the harassment of 
German-Americans, there was only one killing of a 
German-American during the WEU* at home: Robert 
Prager. an enemy alien, was l3mched by a mob in 
Collinsvine. lUinois. on 5 April 1918 for allegedly being a 
German spy. This case fortunately proved to be an 
exception."^ 
J u s t twenty years after the last German intemees had 
been released the Justice Department found itseff again 
corffronted with the problem of how to deal with national 
security matters concerning enemy aliens in time of war. 
In 1940 three per cent of the US population of 131 
million consisted of aliens compared to five-and-haff per 
cent in 1910"®. The percentage of German-bom persons 
in the US total population was three times lower than it 
had been in 1910. There were 1.237.772 German-bom 
persons in the US (0.9% of US total); of those some 
300.000 (i.e. 25%) had not obtained their citizenship in 
1940. Together with second-generation Germans they 
constituted four per cent of the total US population."** 
In peacetime precautionary measures had already 
been taken, ravalries between the Militaty Intelligence 
Division (G-2). the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and 
the FBI of who should be in charge of the enemy aliens 
dated back to the First World War. These tensions now 
reemerged but the President gave the FBI the leadership 
in questions of civilian surveillance and the final 
decision about who should be interned.*^ In June 1940 
Congress passed the Alien Registration Act [Smith Act! 
that required the registration and fingerprinting of more 
than three-and-one-half million aliens over the age of 
fourteen. The act also made it illegal for individuals and 
organizations to advocate the overthrow of the US 
govemment by force,*® 
As in the First Worid War. America's entty into the 
war transformed large numbers of aliens - almost a 
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million - from the Axis powers into enemy aliens, 
Roosevelt's proclamations concerning the arrest and 
detention of enemy aliens who allegedly posed a threat to 
national security was based upon the same 1798 
statutes that Woodrow Wilson had referred to in his 
enemy alien proclamation of April 1917. When, after the 
declaration of war, Attomey-General Francis Biddle went 
to the White House in order for Roosevelt sign the enemy 
alien proclamation, the President expressed his strong 
concern about the dangerous potential of German enemy 
aliens. As Roosevelt remarked to Biddle: "1 don't care so 
much about Italians. They are a lot of opera singers. But 
the Germans are different; they may be dangerous". 
Consequently Roosevelt asked Biddle about the exact 
numbers of German enemy aliens and if there was any 
discussion of mass intemment for this group.*' Biddle 
rejected the concept of wholesale intemment and opted 
for a selective Intemment policy that should be based on 
surveillance, restriction, and then only as the last 
measure internment.*® A list of approximately 3,000 
names of enemy aliens of Japanese, German, and Italian 
origin, deemed dangerous to national security, had been 
prepared by Hoover's FBI in peace-time. Immediately 
after the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 -
although without any statutoty authority - J . Edgar 
Hoover began his highly confidential "Custodial 
Detention" program. He advised his special agents to 
report on persons with "German, Italian, and Communist 
sjnmpathies", including aliens and American citizens.*^ 
Also the Special Defense Unit of the Justice Department 
under Lawrence M.C. Smith had prepared a so-called 
ABC list of potentially dangerous enemy aliens.^ The 
main target groups among German immigrants were 
members of the right-wing pro-Nazi "German-American 
People's League" (Deutsch-Amerikanischer Volksbund), 
more commonly known as "the Bund", and the 
militaristic "Kyffhauser Bund".^' This is not to indicate 
that all arrested enemy aliens were pro-Nazi. As always 
under the stress of war there were persons who were 
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victims of misinformation, denunciation, and red tape. 
After the outbreak of war. Hoover was authorised to 
arrest enemy aliens under the President's proclamation. 
During the first week after Pearl Harbor more than 1.000 
Japanese. 500 German, and 87 Italian enemy aliens were 
arrested.^^ Biddle expressed his amazement at how 
relatively few German enemy aliens had been 
apprehended, especially since Roosevelt had expressed 
his special concern about the Germans.^® 
The officials in Washington who were engaged in the 
enemy alien question constanUy emphasised historical 
continuity and looked at the experience with enemy 
aliens in the First World War, Administrators such as 
John Lord O'Brian retumed to Washington to counsel 
the Just ice Department in questions relating to the 
enemy alien problem. O'Brian strongly advised against 
the initiation of another voluntary spy army of the 
homefront such as the APL in order to avoid public 
hysteria.^ And indeed nothing comparable to the APL 
was created on the American homefront during the 
Second World War. Also. Biddle was determined not to 
repeat the worst excesses of summaty detention of 
enemy aliens.^^ 
He consequenUy established a "control filter" in the 
decision-making process of who should be intemed or 
not. The Attomey-General appointed 92 civilian hearing 
boards in 86 federal judicial districts to hear cases and 
to make recommendations.^ These boards were 
composed of three or more prominent citizens -
experienced (ideally) in dealing with ethnic groups - of 
the community in which the respective enemy alien had 
been arrested. Enemy aliens were allowed to present 
affidavits or call witnesses after an US attorney 
presented the case to the board and the FBI 
representative had read its report on the enemy alien. 
Lawyers were barred from these proceeding, since these 
hearings were "merely a matter of grace, and war-time 
does not permit the elaborate judicial proceedings or the 
elaborate criminal protection of a criminal trial", as 
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Edward J . E n n i s " - the director of the newly created 
Allen Enemy Control Unit within the Justice Department 
- explained.^ Ennis reviewed the individual cases and 
recommended to Biddle whether he should order the 
release, parole, or intemment of an enemy alien. 
"Reviews usually took up to one month to complete; 
most of them, according to the Justice Department, were 
completed In one week." Ennis' unit also coordinated the 
activities and communication between the FBI and the 
Immigration Servlce.^^ 
In order to Implement his strategy of control, in mid-
Januaty 1942 Biddle ordered all enemy aliens to register 
during the first week of February. ConsequenUy 
approximately 938.000 persons over the age of fourteen 
were fingerprinted and registered. Travel restrictions 
were put into effect and the ownership of weapons and 
radio transmitters became illegal.®" 
As the spirit of the homefront became more 
belligerent, the fear of a fifth column increased 
proportionally to the unpropitious situation of the Allied 
Forces. Public pressure resulted in the increase of the 
number of arrests of enemy aliens. By late February 
1942. 5.151 enemy aliens (3.250 Japanese. 1.532 
Germans, and 369 Italians) had been arrested.®' At the 
end ofthe first year of war 12.701 enemy aliens had been 
arrested.®^ In the second haff of 1943 the arrests 
decreased and at the end of that year over 15.000 Axis 
Power aliens had been arrested.®® In the final report on 
the situation of civilian enemy aliens arrested in the 
United States during the war the Justice Department 
reported that the total number was 16.062 (7.043 of 
these were Germans. 5.428 Japanese and 3.591 
Italians).®* Despite these numbers, however, not a single 
enemy alien was convicted of sabotage during the war.®^ 
Although Ennis claimed publicly that the intemment 
rate of approximately fifty per cent of the arrested was 
much higher than the one during the First World War. 
the actual figure was closer to thirty-five per cent. Clearly 
these number games served a public relations purpose: 
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to convince the population that the Justice Department 
was investigating the enemy aliens' cases thoroughly.®® 
Since the number of arrests mentioned above only 
refer to enemy aliens caught on the American homefront 
and were based upon individual investigations, the 
following numbers of German intemees exclude the 
seamen stranded in American harbours at the outbreak 
of war, German enemy aliens transferred from Latin 
American countries, and some relocated Germans from 
the West Coast who had been intemed. So far there has 
been no reliable number of enemy aliens intemees 
released that makes these distinctions. Based upon 
various sources it is safe to assume that approximately 
2,300 German enemy aliens, mostly male, who had been 
screened by the FBI, were intemed during the war.®' 
They were incarcerated mainly in Fort Lincoln, Bismarck, 
North Dakota and various other camps - among them 
Fort Stanton, New Mexico, a segregation camp for the 
most ardent Nazis.®® The majority of German intemees 
came from the New York metropolitan area where the 
intemment rate was higher than elsewhere.®^ The 
responsibility for administering the camps shifted back 
and forth between the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) and the War Department. When the latter 
became too preoccupied with running POW camps for 
thousands of captured German soldiers, the INS finally 
took over the civilian intemment camps. The historical 
irony lay in the composition of the camps: cU"dent Nazis 
were put together with those anti-fascists and Jewish 
refugees from the Third Reich who were unfortunate 
enough to be ludicrously labelled as enemy aliens and 
detained In intemment camps.'° Vety late, the camp 
administrations acknowledged this dilemma and 
separated these groups, sending the Nazi-intemees from 
Fort Lincoln to Fort Stanton in exchange for anti-fascists 
from that camp." 
At the end of the European war approximately 900 
German enemy aliens remained in intemment camps 
with the prospect of deportation. In addition there were 
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several hundred Germans who had been seized in other 
American republics and sent to the US. On 14 July 1945 
President Harry S. Truman issued a proclamation that 
placed the deportation of "all dangerous alien ,,. enemies 
... who adhered to enemy Governments" under the 
control of the Attorney-General.'^ Consequently in 
September of that year 500 German enemy aliens were 
deported together with Fritz Kuhn, former leader of the 
Bund, who had been denaturalised in 1943 and 
consequenUy became an enemy alien.'® 
In contrast to the situation after the First World War, 
repatriation hearings of enemy aliens were conducted. 
These hearings were not granted as a right but - in 
keeping with a public policy not to deprive persons of 
their liberty without at least some semblance of due 
process - intemees were given a chance to state their 
loyalty to the United States. Consequently a substantial 
number of the remaining enemy aliens were allowed to 
stay in the United States.'* 
Chapter 5 
Alien Enemies or Loyal Americans? 
The Intemment of Italian-Americans 
George E. Pozzetta* 
University of Florida 
America's 4.5 million first and second generation Italian-
Americans lived with special anxieties as 1941 drew to a 
close. Already suffering under the weight of 
discrimination and prtiudice, they worried that 
conditions would only worsen ff their homeland declared 
war on America. When govemment officials moved 
quickly after hostilities began to designate all 
unnaturalised Italians as "alien enemies", impose various 
restrictions on their freedoms, and intem some 
residents, their worst fears seemed confirmed. During 
the next twelve months Issues surrounding the alien 
enemy classification and intemment came to Infiuence 
the homefront attentions of Italian-Americans, shaping 
both their response to the war effort and the dynamics of 
the ethnic group's internal development. 
As carried out, govemment policies toward Italians 
were neither unfform nor consistent. For the group, the 
lobbying of ethnic leaders and the exigencies of power 
politics played a role in determining how Italian aliens -
and their friends and families - fared during the first year 
ofthe war. Individual Italian-Americans found that place 
of residence, personal connections, and sometimes 
The author wishes to thank the National Endowment for 
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simple luck guided their experiences. These outcomes 
largely resulted from the fact that the govemment 
followed a multipart program spread among several 
agencies which often operated independently in dealing 
with alien residents. ' Such an approach almost 
guaranteed Inconsistencies, bureaucratic infighting, and 
confusion among the affected population. 
At the start of hostilities, the United States classified 
all alien residents from Axis nations as "alien enemies", 
and imposed travel restrictions, curfews, and 
prohibitions on joining any organization designated 
subversive by the Attorney-General.^ The govemment 
additionally required alien enemies to surrender within 
sixty days a variety of prohibited items including 
weapons, explosives, codes or ciphers, cameras, and 
short-wave radios.^ A final ruling mandated that aliens 
file registration applications during February 1942 to 
obtain Certificates of Identification. The orders 
encompassed all individuals fourteen years of age or 
older who were German. Japanese, or Italian citizens or 
subjects."^ 
Bewilderment and concern abounded in Italian 
neighbourhoods as people misinterpreted the new 
requirements. Many feared that the moves foreshadowed 
mass Intemment and/or deportation, and a few resorted 
to acts of desperation. Scattered reports of suicides 
among Italian aliens surfaced, and each received 
widespread coverage in the Italian language press, no 
doubt invoking additional consternation in an already 
jittery population.^ Milano Rispoli of the Italian Weffare 
Agency in San Francisco, for example, reported in early 
1942 that three suicides in a single week resulted from 
fear among Italian aliens "that they will be forced to enter 
intemment camps, although they are 100 per cent 
American in feeling and action".® 
Although the decision to define and impose the alien 
enemy designation on Italians appears not to have 
generated any serious discussion, the much more 
difficult question of what to do with alien enemies 
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produced a vigorous exchange in the govemment. 
Several executive agencies and the military debated 
various proposals to deal with the affected population. 
Much additional study and evaluation also took place 
within individual departments and bureaux. Since no 
presidential orders required that different Initiatives be 
harmonised, efforts to coordinate plans were often 
complicated by a tension-filled mix of agency infighting, 
ethnic lobb3ring, and hard-nosed political calculation.' 
Perhaps the least controversial governmental initiative 
involved the detention and individual intemment of 
persons appearing on the Custodial Detention Lists, 
better known as the "ABC Lists", master indexes of 
potentially dangerous subversives.® Created by the FBI, 
the Olfice of Naval Intelligence, the G-2 Intelligence 
Branch ofthe Army, and the Special Defense Unit ofthe 
Department of Justice, the primarily contained the 
names of individuals who had belonged to suspect 
organizations in the prewar years. For Italians, these 
groups included such associations as the Federation of 
Italian World War veterans in the United States, the 
Lictor Association, and the Dante Aligheri Society. All 
persons on the registers were liable to irrmiedlate arrest 
in the event of war.^ 
On both 7 and 8 December 1941, the President signed 
proclamations providing that Axis aliens deemed 
dangerous to public peace or safety were subject to 
summary apprehension, and arrests accelerated rapidly 
thereafter.'" By the end of the first week of war. 
authorities had taken into custody approximately 3,000 
Individuals under the custodial detention program, of 
whom only some one hundred were Italians." Periodic 
arrests of suspects in subsequent weeks gradually 
increased the total number of detainees.'^ 
After initial questioning and processing, authorities 
on the East Coast typically shipped arrested Italian 
aliens to Ellis Island for intemment, where a small 
number of Individuals remained throughout the war.'^ 
The preferred destination for West Coast aliens was Fort 
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Missoula, Montana. Detainees sent there joined 
company with approximately 1,000 Italian national 
seeimen and food workers from the New York World's 
Fair. Agents had begun Interning these individuals as 
early as May 1941."* 
While detainees were trickling into Fort Missoula, 
Ellis Island, and a handful of other locations, law 
enforcement ofiicials and military agents continued to 
make arrests throughout the country. One FBI report 
revealed that by 30 J u n e 1942, the agency had taken 
into custody 1,521 Italian aliens. The document in 
question recorded data from each field district reporting 
arrests of Italian aliens. Of the 40 out of 56 offices 
submitting data. New Orleans reported 228 arrests, the 
greatest absolute number of any district, followed by New 
York, with 219. Given the fact that New York City alone 
counted nearly one and a half million persons of Italian 
descent, the disparity is striking. The third ranking field 
office in arrests was Miami with 168. Only 59 arrests 
took place among Philadelphia's large Italian-American 
population, while, incredibly. Chicago's Italian 
population of approximately a quarter million yielded 
only five arrests! Houston counted 56 arrests, a total 
that was substantially higher than that recorded in 
Pittsburgh (8). New Haven (27). Cleveland (43) and 
Boston (21). all of which were areas of substantial Italian 
settiement. Fifteen arrests took place among 
Charleston's 34 foreign-bom Italians, and 33 of 
Savannah's 88 foreign-bom Italians came into custody. '^ 
How can these data be interpreted? Some tentative 
conclusions appear reasonable. A few special cases 
suggest themselves Immediately. The totals for some 
southern and southwestern locations such as Miami. 
Houston, and New Orleans were no doubt swelled by the 
Inclusion of Italians from Latin American countries who 
had been detained and shipped northward by compliant 
governments, only to be arrested by the FBI once they 
arrived in the United States.'® Additionally, the 
individual motivations of field office heads undoubtedly 
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played a role. Some may have been overzealous in their 
efforts to please the director with evidence of productive 
activity, while others may have been more restrained in 
pursuing arrests. 
The FBI report offers two further insights. First, there 
Is a strong statistical correlation between region and 
arrests, with the Southwest and South demonstrating 
high incidences of arrests relative to population. Second, 
there appears to be a relationship nationally between the 
level of integration and power achieved by Italians in the 
different field office zones and rates of arrests. In those 
districts in which the Italian-American population was 
large and possessed economic and political influence, 
arrest numbers were low.'^ In these centres, Italian-
American leaders who had been ardent pro-fascists prior 
to the war almost uniformly escaped questioning and 
arrest. Conversely, Italians living in smaller 
concentrations and on the margins of local societies, 
appear to have been both more visible and vulnerable. 
They suffered arrest and detention in disproportionate 
numbers.'® 
ff most prominenti who had closely identified with 
fascism remained untouched, what can be said of the 
Italians who were arrested and intemed during the war? 
Many appear to have been individuals who joined pro-
fascist organizations in the prewar years and were vocal 
in their support of Mussolini, but who lacked infiuential 
supporters or timely advice about how to respond to the 
questions posed by special agents or hearing board 
interrogators.'^ Jerre Mangione, who worked as a special 
assistant in the Allen Control Unit of the Department of 
Justice, concluded after a two-month tour of alien enemy 
camps that most of the intemees were absolutely no 
threat to national security and, had they received due 
process, would probably never have been intemed. He 
reported one representative case. A man had written 
Roosevelt prior to Pearl Harbor, imploring the President 
to seek peace with Italy, "since Italy is my mother and 
the United States is my father and I don't want to see my 
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parents fighting". Agents arrested emd intemed him 
shorUy after the letter arrived.^° 
Arrest and confinement rates for Italian aliens were 
consistenUy much lower than for their Axis counterparts 
under the individual intemment initiative, despite their 
much greater presence in the population. On 10 
December 1941, FBI Director Hoover announced that 
1,291 Japanese, 857 Germans, and 147 Italians had 
been taken Into custody. By 30 June 1942, the FBI had 
arrested a total of 9,405 suspect alien enemies: 4,764 
Japanese, 3,120 Germans, and 1,521 Italians. Figures 
from the Immigration and Naturalization Service revealed 
vety similar patterns. After one year of war, intemment 
figures reflected an even more glaring gap. FBI figures 
showed that a total of 1,974 Japanese, 1,448 Germans, 
and only 210 Italians were still interned.^' 
During the war approximately 4,000 Italians suffered 
arrest and/or detention at the hemds of the FBI and 
other agencies under the individual intemment program. 
A large number of these merely answered a few questions 
and received an outright release or parole, spending vety 
littie time in custody.^^ Plans to implement a policy of 
Italian mass intemment never advanced beyond 
preliminaty discussions, and the govemment forced only 
a small number of Italians to evacuate from restricted 
defense areas.^^ The best estimates suggest that 
approximately 200 individuals of Italian descent actually 
endured incarceration for the entire war period. Even tf 
this number is too low, there can be littie doubt that a 
tiny minority ofthe Italian-American population actually 
corffronted the reality of detention, intemment, or 
evacuation.^* 
The question remains as to why so few Italians were 
affected. Certainly the political importance ofthe Italian 
vote swayed Roosevelt in his decisions, not only to 
approve of the eventual removal of the alien enemy 
designation (implemented by Attomey-General Francis 
Biddle on Columbus Day, 1942) but also to deunpen 
moves to arrest and intem prominent pro-fascists. 
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Individuals such as Generoso Pope in New York carried 
substantial political clout In critical electoral districts, 
and Roosevelt could not lighUy dismiss their Influence. 
Moreover, Italians had maintained a strong allegiance to 
the Democratic Party throughout the 1930s, a situation 
not shared fully by Germans, and President Roosevelt 
was acutely aware of the necessity of retaining them In 
his electoral coalition. Of additional political importance 
was the fact that Italians constituted a significant 
component tf labour unions, another vital element in the 
New Deal bloc.^^ 
But more subtle reasons help to explain why so few 
Italians were rounded up. Strong American stereotypes 
of the "Italian character" had the ironic impact of 
lessening fear and assisting in ameliorating harsh 
reactions during the early months of the war. Although 
most Americans continued to associate Italians with 
criminal behaviour and lower-class Itfestyles, they did no 
connect them with treachety, disloyalty, deviousness, or 
authoritarianism, qualities which the conventional 
wisdom ascribed to both the Germans and Japanese.^® 
The reputations of a handful of Italian-Americans who 
had achieved national prominence in this era helped to 
reinforce the generally more mild images attached to 
Italians. Individuals such as Fiorello LaGuardia and Don 
Ameche were known throughout the country, but no one 
was perhaps more significant in this respect than Joe 
DiMaggio and his baseball playing brothers. The "Yankee 
Clipper" had set his phenomenal fifty-six consecutive 
game hitting record in 1941 (which still stands). Even 
before this season, however, he was immensely popular 
and already a household name, "a national hero with 
class", according to one source.^^ 
DlMaggio's parents were aliens who had reared nine 
children and lived peacefully since immigrating, facts 
that received widespread press coverage and proved 
reassuring in the larger debate over Italian alien enemy 
policies.^^ Representative testimony before the 
Congressional Committee, for example, assured tiie 
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panel that the "senior DlMaggios, though non-citizens, 
are as loyal as anyone could be .... To evacuate the 
senior DlMaggios would, in view of the splendid family 
that have reared and their unquestioned loyalty, present 
... a serious situation."^^ 
Within the govemment, various reports assessing the 
loyalty of Italians assured officials that they were not a 
substantial threat. One analysis conducted in May 1942, 
for example, concluded that the majority of Italian aliens 
had resided in America more than twenty years. They 
now constituted an aging population that was 
substantially assimilated. For the most part, they had 
families and "many relatives" in America. So that the 
point not be missed, an infiuential govemment report 
concluded: "the great majority can without question be 
characterised as industrious, peaceful, law-abiding 
residents of their present communities.^° 
When the general public attempted to assess the 
relative danger posed by Axis nationals, it invariably 
ranked Italians far behind their Axis partners. One 
survey conducted in April 1942, found that forty-six per 
cent of respondents considered German aliens the most 
dangerous element in the nation, thirty-five per cent 
chose the Japanese, and only two per cent selected 
Italians. This particular document advocated relaxing 
controls on Italians and concluded that "(s)elective and 
special treatment could be accorded Italians apparently 
without arousing American fears in any high degree".^' 
Part of the reason Americans held such relatively 
benign views of Italian-Americans stemmed from their 
uncomplimentaty attitudes of Italians in Italy. On no 
point were these opinions more sharply etched than the 
subject of Italian war-making potential, and in this sense 
the course of the war itself had an impact on shaping 
popular views. As 1942 progressed Italy appeared less 
and less a real threat to the United States as it 
experienced repeated defeats. The Asheville, NC Citizen 
caught the essence of prevailing convictions when it 
claimed "ofthe three major enemies we face the militaty 
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power of Fascist Italy is the least formidable, the least 
respected and the least feared".^^ 
The majority of Italian language publications in the 
United States stressed a common set of themes when 
deaimg with the alien enemy and intemment questions. 
Running throughout was praise of the group's selfless 
support ofthe war effort, particularly in terms of military 
service, and frequent comment on the remarkably small 
number of persons intemed or arrested. The formerly 
pro-fascist press, in fact, dwelt at length on the fact that 
Italians constituted the largest group of foreign-bom, but 
had the smallest number of individuals who came into 
police custody.^^ Editors and reporters drew the obvious 
conclusions, as did Ii Leone of California: 'This is 
conclusive evidence of the loyalty and patriotism of 
Americans of Italian extraction."^'* 
Yet, not all Italian-Americans found comfort in the 
small number of arrests and internments. Many long-
time anti-fascists urged the govemment to expand its 
round up of the old pro-fascists. In their view, the most 
notorious supporters of Mussolini were escaping 
punishment, and they were concerned that lenient 
treatment sent the wrong message to the general public 
and especially to Italian-Americans. They urged more 
thorough investigations to "separate the good aliens from 
the bad" and to move vigorously against the latter.^^ 
When the govemment failed to act aggressively toward 
the "Pearl Harbor Patriots", they howled in protest 
suggesting that the anti-Fascist cause had been sold out 
for short-term pofitical gain. 
Surprisingly few direct protests against the arrests 
and internments in camps (campi di concentramento) of 
Italians appeared in Italian language newspapers. For 
the most part, Italian papers accepted the need to 
maintain vigilance and detain suspected individuals. 
When complaints occurred, they most often concerned 
well known corrmiunlty figures and appeared in local 
newspapers.^® Publisher James Donnaruma of Boston, 
for example, championed the causes of several 
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individuals in the city who were under investigation for 
pro-fascist activlties.^^ On a national basis, chapters of 
the order. Sons of Italy, were the most active supporters 
of Italians who suffered arrest and/or intemment, 
especially when legal action touched members.^® 
ff Italian-Americans were generally reluctant to 
conderrm the nation's intemment and enemy aliens 
policies in public, the issues were by no means ignored 
within the group itseff. This was particularly true of 
events surrounding the most dramatic incident of the 
war's first year involving Italians - Attomey-General 
Francis Biddle's October 1942 decision to remove 
Italians from the alien enemy classtflcation (and 
impllciUy, from the threat of intemment). Various Italian-
American leaders had been active in urging the 
govemment to adopt this policy, and each was anxious 
to gamer prestige and ethnic power by claiming success 
for those interventions. A spirited dialogue accordingly 
ensued. 
In the euphoria follow/ing Biddle's announcement, few 
noticed what the edict did not do. In actuality, the 
reclasstfication simply made the general regulations 
governing alien enemies inapplicable to Italian nationals. 
It did not change the legal status of such individuals; 
they remained alien enemies and were still technically 
subject to intemment and to restrictions covering 
strategic defense employment. Intemed Italians did not 
benefit from the exemption, until and unless they were 
individually declared no longer a threat to the internal 
security ofthe nation and released, nor was the status of 
paroled Italians affected. The Depcutment of Justice still 
retained the power to arrest, then parole and intern for 
the duration, any Italian alien anywhere in the nation 
considered dangerous to national security.^^ Similarly 
overlooked was the fact that Biddle's announcement did 
not void military restrictions which Army Lieut. General 
John L. DeWitt had superimposed on Justice 
Department decrees and which remained in effect under 
the general's watchful eye.'*° 
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The most fervent of the formerly pro-fascist Italian 
n e w s p a p e r s r e s p o n d e d initially to Biddle's 
announcement in a cortfused manner. Three types of 
general reactions were evident. The majority of owners 
and editors Indulged in hysterical praise and joy at the 
announcement 's recognition of the "morality and 
excellence" of Italians, for which they often took credit. 
Others concentrated on President Roosevelt's Columbus 
Day speech, which said nothing about Italian-Americans, 
and soft-pedalled Biddle's address. Finally, some Italian-
American papers simply reproduced Biddle's remarks, 
making no comment at all and relegating the entire 
matter to Interior pages."' 
Anti-fascist publications were overwhelmingly 
supportive of the action taken, with two noteworthy 
exceptions. In much the same manner as they had 
earlier questioned the small number of pro-fascist 
arrests and internments, some now responded with fear 
that the wholesale absolution of Italian aliens would 
undo the work they had accomplished in directing 
attention to "subversive elements"."*^ With all Italian 
aliens removed from the special status, they worried that 
their pro-fascist opponents would escape unscathed. 
Prominent anti-fascist exile Gaetano Salvemini also 
warned that Biddle's action could have additional 
"harmful consequences". He was specifically concerned 
that the prominenti would discredit democracy by 
pointing out that it could be challenged by anyone 
without danger.'*^ 
Followring the Attomey-General's proclamation came 
the inevitable orgy of credit-taking from a fuU range of 
the prominenti So many stepped forward because the 
question of who swayed FDR assumed importance in the 
ongoing negotiation of ethriic power and identity taking 
place among Italian-Americans. Numerous contestants 
were vying for the right to speak for the group as a 
whole. In particular, anyone able to prove the ability to 
reach the President's ear and shape his judgment laid 
claim to significant prominence. Hence, the batUe over 
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recognition for irtfluenclng the alien enemy cancellation -
was sharply contested. 
Among anti-fascists, AFLlabour leader and outspoken 
anti-communist Luigi Antonini boasted that not only 
were his Interventions key factors in convincing the 
govemment, but also that his organization was the first 
in the nation to appeal to the President for the 
exemption,'** From within the labour camp Antonini's 
claims were strongly contested by CIO leader Augusto 
Bellanca, who also enjoyed access to the White House. 
These voices were joined by other anti-fascists 
clamouring for inclusion, including leftist Congressman 
Vito Marcantonio and various Mazzini Society 
spokesmen, all of whom advanced their respective cases 
for access and power before Italian-Americans."*^ 
On the other side of the Ideological spectrum, many 
former pro-fascists unashamedly put themselves forward 
as important power brokers in this contest. Such 
assertions were part of their efforts to rehabilitate 
themselves in the eyes of larger society and to 
reestablish their positions within Little Italics. In 
Philadelphia, for example. Judge Eugene Alessandronl 
and his rival. State Representative Anthony Di Silvestro, 
pushed their competing claims."® Generoso Pope of New 
York perhaps outdid all others in his frantic attempts to 
gamer attention and favourable notice. Through his 
newspapers he published all communications he had 
with President Roosevelt in which the matter of alien 
enemies appeared, asserting that his intercessions were 
criUcal in convincing the government.'*^ On the national 
level no organization was more vigorous in praising its 
own contributions than the various chapters ofthe Sons 
of Italy, many of which pointed out, as did members of 
the Massachusetts Grand Lodge, that they were "in the 
forefront openly espousing the cause of the'ahen 
enemy'".'*^ 
The debate among Italians over alien enemies and 
intemment, therefore, constituted an early wartime salvo 
In a cortflict that was often as intense as those taking 
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place on distant batUefields. These two issues served to 
mark and solidify the fault lines of a deeply contested 
internal ethnic struggle. Although no clear winners 
emerged at this stage of the war, the old-Ilne prominenti 
and those "accommodationalist" elements of the anti-
fascist forces (most notably the Antonini labour faction) 
were able to bring an impressive curay of community 
contacts and publicity outlets to bear. They began to 
surge ahead of their adversaries within the Italian-
American world. But the final determination of this 
encounter would not take place until after the end of 
global hostilities, surviving by several years the effective 
resolution ofthe alien enemy and intemment questions 
themselves. 
Chapter 6 
The J a p a n e s e - C a n a d i a n s a n d World War II 
Geoffrey S. Smith 
Queen's University 
During the Second World War, civilian populations 
became an integral component of military and political 
decisions made by the warring powers. Advances in 
technology, together with Japan 's Pan-Asian aspirations 
and Adoff HiUer's dream of a 1,000-year Reich dominated 
by an Atyan super-race, made pawns and refugees of 
civilians on a horrific scale. The second global war to 
shake Europe and Asia in twenty years was a total war, 
resulting in unprecedented devastation and the 
uprooting and, in some cases, near annihilation of whole 
populations.' The Nazi Holocaust visited upon European 
Jewry stands as an Indelible monument to this 
inhumanity. 
Though unequalled in its horror, the Holocaust was 
not the only instance where whole populations were 
targeted for political reasons. In Canada, untouched by 
the physical destruction that laid waste Europe and 
Asia, a tiny Japanese population was rounded up and 
imprisoned in concentration camps. With no evidence 
whatsoever to demonstrate that these Japanese 
constituted a threat to national security, Ottawa opted to 
deprive this minority of its property, livelihood, emd 
liberty. Ironically, while Canada fought a racist enemy in 
the name of freedom and representative govemment, 
these values were extinguished for the 20,881 Japanese 
who inhabited the West Coast of British Columbia. 
Ottawa's decision to relocate the Canadian Japanese 
did not come overnight; it culminated a long histoty of 
tension in British Columbia that began with the arrival 
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of the Chinese in the late-nineteenth century.^ 
Castigated by white British Columbians as immoral, 
bestial, cmd above all unassimilable, the predominantly 
male Chinese Immigrant population kept to Itself, took 
jobs that others disdained, and replaced union workers, 
such as the Knights of Labor, during strikes. The 
Canadian Pacffic Railroad would not have been 
completed in 1885 had it not been for the 6000 Chinese 
labourers who comprised two-thirds ofthe project's total 
work force. Yet as British Columbia workingmen and 
pro-labour politicians who courted them reiterated time 
and again, the Chinese remained an alien presence in a 
white man's countty and had to go. 
BC nativists remained a minority, for they ran head-
on into the view held by powerful entrepreneurial 
groups, as well as the federal govemment. The Chinese 
may have been irtferior, but their presence was a 
necessaty asset to the province, "a most efficient aid in 
the development of a countiy and a great means to 
wealth", in the words of an immigration commissioner. 
Chinese labour would enable the province "literally [to] 
shoot ahead as one of the great seats of commerce and 
industricil activity".^ Yet recurring violence in Vancouver, 
Victoria, and other centres periodically replenished the 
British Columbia "reservoir of racial animosity".'* That 
province's hostility toward the Chinese grew especially 
stormy during the 1880s, a decade of economic strife 
across North America. Sinophobes were outraged when 
the courts and Ottawa rejected several attempts to halt 
Chinese Inmiigration by legal means. This bitterness was 
exacerbated in 1882 and after, when the United States 
excluded the Chinese, followed by Australia, New 
Zealand, and Natal, fellow members of empire. 
To assuage its galling impotence British Columbia 
prohibited ethnic Asians from exercising the right to 
vote. In Canada voting was a provincial, not federal, 
prerogative, and this exclusion was accomplished by law 
in 1885. In the same year. Ottawa imposed a "head tax" 
of $50 on each Chinese entering the country, raised the 
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amount to $100 in 1900. and to $500 in 1904. Still, 
though, the Chinese continued to arrive until 1923. 
when a federal immigration law excluded them for three 
decades.^ 
The first Japanese who settied in signtficant numbers 
in British Columbia in the late 1890s inherited this 
Sinophobic legacy. In the view of local white 
supremacists, nothing distinguished the Japanese from 
their Chinese predecessors. In fact, the few thousand 
Japanese who stayed in Canada (a considerable number 
were migrant workers bound for California or transients 
who retumed to Japan) considered themselves superior 
to the Chinese. The Japanese who remained, moreover, 
were politically sensitive, and. more important, they 
represented a new world power that had expansive 
designs in East Asia. Modernising, westernised. Meiji 
Japan vanquished China in war in 1894-95 and fought 
Russia to more than a standoff a decade later. Of the 
fewer than 4800 Japanese immigrants in British 
Columbia in 1901. most settled in the Eraser River Valley 
and took up commercial salmon fishing at towms like 
Steveston. at the mouth ofthe river.® Most of these Issei^ 
became naturalised citizens (a requirement for fishing 
licences). Other Japanese arrivals tended apple orchards 
and grew tomatoes and strawberries - on Vancouver 
Island and in the Okanagan and Eraser Valleys. Still 
others moved into the timber industty further inland, 
while one Issel enclave took root in Vancouver.® 
As the Chinese were condemned for having a lower 
standard of living and again for striving to improve it. so 
were the Japanese. Twice, in 1897 and 1898. British 
Columbia legislators enacted laws to prohibit Asian 
immigrants from working on provincial projects. Both 
times, however, Ottawa disallowed the legislation. In 
1900, a literacy test modeled on the South African Natal 
Act of 1897 - which allowed immigration commissioners 
a wide latitude of languages to test (and fail) Asian 
Immigrants for citizenship - was similarly disallowed. 
This pattern of provincial enactment and federal 
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rejection continued into the twentieth centuty. Once 
more, British poficy dictated Ottawa's position toward its 
westemmost province. In 1902, seeking to stabilise the 
balance of power in the Far East, London concluded an 
alliance with Tokyo, which also gave nationals of both 
countries full privileges in each other's territories. Four 
years later, when Ottawa approved the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance, British Columbians once again reacted in anger 
The Federal Govemment's decision also reflected the 
continuing desire of British Columbia business interests 
to acquire cheap labour and to restrain the wages of 
white workingmen.^ 
Ottawa's wish, therefore, not to affront Japan 
thwarted BC demands to limit - ff not end - Asian 
Immigration. Along the entire West Coast of North 
America, as a new wave of Japanese immigration arrived, 
new nativist groups emerged and Anti-Asian sentiment 
flared in brush-fire fashion. The worst outbreak, 
erroneously blamed on outside agitators from New 
Zealand and Seattle, came on 7 September 1906, in 
Vancouver, where a mob of one-thousand left an anti-
Japanese meeting, sacked Chinatov^nn, and then entered 
the local Japanese section. There the mob encountered 
stiff resistance, and the ensuing riot produced numerous 
injuries and signtficant damage.'° 
The Vancouver riot produced considerable soul-
searching in Ottawa. Deputy Minister of Labor (sic) 
William Lyon Mackenzie King chaired a commission that 
ultimately ordered restitution for damage to both 
Chinese and Japanese communities. But the King 
commission disingenuously attributed the riot neither to 
racism noreconomic competition. Rather, the underlying 
reason for the riot was the British Columbian dread of 
the imminent volume of Asian immigrants. Consequently 
the Liberal Govemment of Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier 
despatched Minister of Labour and Postmaster-General 
Rudolphe Lemieux to Tokyo to fashion a Canadian 
"GenUeman's Agreement", similar to the pending 
American arrangement, that would regulate the number 
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of Japanese newcomers by treaty. The ensuing 
Japanese-Canadian agreement, which endeavoured to 
mollify British Columbian anxiety, gave Tokyo 
responsibility for regulating Japanese immigration. "In 
the interests of Anglo-Japanese harmony", historian 
Patricia E. Roy points out, "Japan was being asked to 
solve Canada's problem in BriUsh Columbia".'' Japanese 
immigration was now restricted to contract workers 
approved by Ottawa, domestic servants, and previous 
residents. This resulted in an abrupt drop in the volume 
of Japanese Immigration to an average of roughly 580 
persons annually over the next two decades. In 1928. 
after Mackenzie King became Prime Minister. Ottawa 
succeeded in pressuring Japan to cut this number 
further, to 150 immigrants yearly, and to ouUaw the 
practice of proxy "picture" brides which it had failed to 
do in the Lemieux agreement.'^ 
During the 1920s and 1930s, though Japanese 
immigration to British Columbia slowed to a trickle, 
provincial labour leaders, politicians, veterans' 
organizations, and white supremacist groups like the 
Asiatic Exclusion League and the Canadian Knights of 
the Ku Klux Klan deemed this migration a torrent. In 
reality, the proportion of Japanese to the entire 
Canadian population during these decades never 
exceeded .001 per cent. The proportion of Japanese to 
British Columbia's total population between 1921 and 
1941, meanwhile, dropped from 2.9 per cent in 1921 to 
2.7 per cent on the eve of Pearl Harbor.'^ 
Yet the persistent notion that white British Columbia 
would soon disappear within a sea of yellow owed 
somethlngto postwar disillusionment and, ironically, the 
anti-urban, anti-modem impulses that gave the alleged 
"roaring twenties" its anxious, often fundamentalist 
underside. Provincial Premier John Oliver reflected this 
apprehension in 1927 when he warned Prime Minister 
King that the time had come to "to bring about the 
reduction and final elimination of this menace" through 
"deportation or other legitimate means"."* 
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The minuscule number of British Columbian 
Japanese, and their law-abiding character, made Oliver's 
warning curious at best. During the 1920s and 1930s 
the Issel and their Nisei descendants faced blatant and 
covert discrimination with equanimity, and they formed 
seff-help associations like the Japanese Canadian 
Citizens League (JCCL) to counter the prejudice that 
kept them, among other things, from becoming lawyers 
and pharmacists, from serving on juries and school 
boards, and from positions on public works projects. 
Less than eight per cent ofthe tiny Japanese community 
in 1931 could be considered "white collar", and most 
worked Inside their owm ethnic community,'^ Yet tf too 
few Issel and Nisei existed to take jobs from white 
workers, the dominant cultural image of a dangerous, 
fecund Asian minority persisted, together with the 
gnawing fear nurtured by the Great Depression and 
ominous developments in the Far East, that the 
Japanese minority threatened the white man's economic 
livelihood and security. 
This apprehension was nurtured by the hoary mottf of 
the "Yellow Peril", which depicted British Columbia's 
Japanese as advance agents for Tokyo's long-range plot 
to invade and conquer the Canadian West Coast. By the 
1930s, the existence of Nisei dual citizenship, the use of 
Japanese govemment texts in Japanese language 
schools, and the education of Nisei youngsters (Kibei) in 
Japan "proved" this crude hypothesis. In addition, the 
proximity of the fprty-stx per cent of EC's Japanese 
residing in the Eraser Valley to such strategic sites as 
dams and power stations suggested the ease with which 
a disloyal ftfth colunm might disable provincial defense 
facilities.'® As Japan intensified her war against China 
after 1937, and especially after Hitler's Panzers roared 
into Poland in September 1939 to initiate another round 
of global war, the very absence of disloyal acts by 
Japanese in British Columbia gave cause for grave 
concem. They were awaiting word to strike from Tokyo. 
Understanding the historical background to the 
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Pacific War and to relocation is indispensable to 
comprehending the dynamics that brought Ottawa's 
decision for relocation. Exaggerated security fears, 
political opportunism, economic cupidity, and, above all, 
Caucasian assumptions of racial superiority - all 
cultivated in British Columbia during the previous eighty 
years - became determinants of national policy after 
1942. 
The immediate causes of the relocation of the BC 
JapEuiese were several. In 1940, the Pacific Command's 
Joint Service Committee cautioned that in event of war. 
West Coast Japanese fishermen posed a real threat to 
the countty and that each Japanese would be a possible 
enemy. This militaty alarm overrode the view ofthe Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, Canada's chief security 
bureaucracy in charge of enemy aliens in wartime, which 
had surveyed the Japanese since 1938. In October 1940 
the RCMP reiterated its view that this minority did not 
"constitute a menace".'^ 
The Pacific Corrmiand's warning paralleled the views 
of Prime Minister MacKenzie King's closest advisers. In 
October 1940 King created the Standing Committee on 
Orientals to advise on matters involving the British 
Columbia Japanese. The five British Columbians 
comprising the committee included Professor H.F. Angus 
and RCMP Assistant Commissioner Frederick J . Mead, 
both empathetic vdth the Japanese minority; Lieut. 
Colonel A.W. Sparling of the Department of National 
Defence and Mayor F.J. Hume of New Westminster, both 
moderate in their views; and Lieut. Colonel Macgregor 
Macintosh, a conservative Japanophobe. A second. 
Special Committee on Orientals, also established in the 
fall of 1940, included, in addition to Sparling and Mead, 
Hugh Keenleyside, assistant under-secretaty at the 
Department of External Affairs and George Sansom, 
professor of Asian Studies at Columbia. This Special 
Committee was also dominated by moderates. During the 
1930s, for example, along with Co-operative 
ConunonwcEdth Federation (CCF) MP Tommy Douglas of 
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Saskatchewan, Keenleyside was one of few Canadian 
pohticians to defend the loyalty and patriotism of the 
Japanese against rabble-rousing BC extremists like 
Vancouver's alderman Halford Wilson, Thomas Reld, 
Liberal MP for New Westminster, and A.W, Neil, an 
independent representing Comox-Albemi.'® 
Members of these two committees also worried about 
the Japanese minority in BriUsh Columbia, but their 
concem focused upon the danger white extremists posed 
for their safety. For a countiy already at war in Europe, 
new violence would exacerbate relations with Japan, 
perhaps even precipitating war in the Pacific, Even after 
the JCCL proclaimed its "deepest loyalty and devotion" in 
September 1939, and numerous Nisei volunteered for 
duty. King's cabinet heeded its War Committee's warning 
that the Japanese should not be accepted "at a moment 
when war with Japan is possible". Hence, despite 
contrary advice from Keenleyside, Mead, and Sansom, no 
Nisei were accepted for active duty with the Canadian 
forces,'^ 
Colonel Sparling proved the key player in this 
decision, which set the stage for those to follow. Aware of 
his colleagues' empathy with the Japanese, he informed 
Ian Alistair Mackenzie, MP for Vancouver Center and the 
Federal Minister of Pensions and Health, of his concem 
about keeping the Japanese out of the militaty. 
Mackenzie needed no convincing. A proud Scot who 
served with distinction in the Great War at Ypres, 
Kemmel, and the Somme, he had upheld all the anti-
Asian measures he had seen for twenty-one years in 
politics, in the BC legislative assembly, as an MP, and in 
Cabinet. As early as 1935, Mackenzie recognised that 
accepting Nisei enlistment would strengthen his CCF 
opposition, weaken his standing among conservative 
veterans' groups, and leave him open to the same pro-
Asian charges he had used with great effect against his 
opponents. Although an inept administrator (with the 
outbreak of war his portfolio was shifted from National 
Defence to Pensions and Health), he stood by reason of 
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experience and home constituency the Cabinet's "expert" 
on the question ofthe British Columbia Japanese. Other 
cabinet ministers generally deferred to him, and he 
quickly became "the main engineer of Japanese 
Canadian policy".^" 
As Mackenzie successfully fought Nisei enlistment, so 
also did he harp privately upon the need to exorcise the 
Japanese menace from British Columbia. In public 
statements, however, he articulated the polite 
euphemism that now dominated official discussions - the 
threat of white extremists to public order and the safety 
ofthe Japanese minority. Renewed waves of anti-Asian 
prejudice that swept the province in 1937-38 and 1940 
appeeu'ed to confirm these warnings.^' 
In his latter contention, Mackenzie echoed the Prime 
Minister. A political pragmatist whose prime goal from 
the beginning to the end of his political career was to do 
that which garnered votes for the Liberal Party, King 
himself held racist views of the British Columbia 
JapEuiese and he privately told his war committee that 
they should not have weapons.^^ Publicly, however, he 
praised their patriotism. In January 1941, reporting that 
the Nisei would be exempted from service, he stated his 
fear that "the white population, with only the slightest 
provocation, might suddenly resort to violence against 
Japanese individuals or groups". If Nisei joined the 
armed forces, they too would face danger from "the less 
responsible elements among their comrades". This 
situation might "be further complicated at any time by 
acts conmiitted outside Canada ... which cannot be 
foreseen, which might be intensely provocative".^^ 
King faced the far more problematic issue of 
conscription during the early years of war. Ironically the 
predomlnanUy Issei Canadian Japanese Association 
called attention to this question during the enlistment 
debate when it favourably contrasted Nisei loyalty with 
French Canadian resistance to a proposed militaty draft 
of Canadian citizens for overseas service. In 1941, it 
appeared that Britain would go it alone against the Nazis 
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in Europe, and the British called upon Ottawa to 
contribute four divisions for service in Europe. The 
Cabinet War Committee concurred, adding two more for 
home defense. By November King saw that mobilizing 
forces for use in British Columbia might defuse a row 
over conscription.^'* As one-third of Liberal members in 
Parliament came from Quebec, King knew that 
conscription would destroy his party's political fortunes 
and his govemment. In the same month, moreover, 
severEd members ofthe Canada-United States Permanent 
Joint Board on Defence, the advisoty group of militaty 
and civilians which sought to coordinate defence 
plarming, had lobbied strongly to advise both 
governments in case of war with Japan to move to 
"deport or to place in custody those'elements in the 
population of Japanese racial origin'".^^ For the moment, 
Kmg decided, political pragmatism would take 
precedence over moral considerations. Japan 's surprise 
attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, which 
brought the United States into the war, was 
accompanied by a simultaneous attack upon Hong Kong, 
which propelled Canada Into the Pacific confiict. In 
Ktag's view, this "wanton" and "treacherous" strike at 
British territoty threatened "the defence and freedom of 
Canada".^® A day later, as King's Cabinet urged calm and 
proclaimed its belief in the patriotism of Issei and Nisei 
in British Columbia. Ottawa moved to implement several 
"defensive measures", decided in tandem with American 
associates after 1938. The RCMP detained forty persons, 
including judo instructors and Imperial Japanese Army 
veterans; Japanese-language schools and the vernacular 
press shut dowm; and the Canadian Navy began 
impounding the 1.200 vessels which comprised the 
Japanese Canadian fishing fieet. The fishermen 
cooperated, but bitterly, as lack of coordination and 
haphaz£u-d mooring procedures resulted in the 
destruction of 162 boats and significant damage to most 
others.^^ 
As word spread of Japanese bmtal i ty toward 
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Commonwealth prisoners in the Pacific, hostile feelings 
grew toward the Canadian Japanese minority. Scattered 
acts of vandalism occurred in several BC cities; Japanese 
businesses slumped and faced wholesale insurance 
cancellations; the Canadian Pacific Railroad dismissed 
porters emd yard workers; and luxury hotels and 
sawrmills followed suit. On 16 December. Order-In-
Council (P.C. 9760) required all persons of Japanese 
origin to register with authorities, and to be ready to 
produce their card when requested by authorities.^® 
Hong Kong fell on Christmas Day. with 2500 
Canadians taken prisoner. This debacle had been 
preceded by the unfounded assertion by American Navy 
Secretaty Frank Knox that espionage and subversion by 
Hawaiian Japanese had triggered the Pearl Harbor 
attack. British Columbia racists, meanwhile, clamoured 
about their province's vulnerability and castigated 
Ottawa for failing to take necessaty drastic measures 
against local Japanese. Vancouver's Alderman Wilson 
called for their expulsion and also organised the Pacffic 
Coast Security League to propagate his message. Others 
joined Wilson, including Liberal Premier John Hart. 
Conservative provincial Attomey-General R.L. Maitland. 
and the mayors of five communities on Vemcouver 
Island. So. too. did the Standing Committee on Orientals 
and an important leader in the military repeat this 
demand. Major General R.O. Alexander, who headed the 
Pactfic command, kept close touch with Lieut. Colonel 
Sparling and Premier Hart and shared their negative 
opinion of the Canadian Japanese. Ironically, the Army 
General Staff argued correctly that Pearl Harbor actually 
strengthened British Columbia security by adding the 
shield of US air and naval cover. But this convinced 
neither West Coast racists nor all the General Staff.^ ^ 
A key meeting to determine Federal policy toward the 
British Columbia Japanese took place on 8-9 Januaty 
1942. in Ottawa. Chaired by Ian Mackenzie, the 
indefatigable Japanophobe, this "Conference on 
Japanese Problems" Involved provincial and federal 
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pohticians. mifitary officials, and the RCMP. Mackenzie 
and several other British Columblems sought to convince 
the meeting ofthe need to expel all adult male Japanese 
nationals from the province, but his arguments did not 
prevail. RCMP, mlfitaty, and civil servants demurred, 
with Keenleyside playing a key role, and the British 
Columbians reduced their demand to the exclusion of 
Japanese aliens only. An associate of Keenleyside, 
recalling the meeting a quarter-centuty later, felt that 
some of the British Columbians "spoke of the Japanese 
Canadians in the way that the Nazis would have spoken 
about Jewish-Germans. When they spoke I felt in that 
committee room the physical presence of evil".^" 
Nonetheless, on 14 Janua ty King and his Cabinet 
embraced in its essentials the program of British 
Columbia nativists. This about-face owed much to 
developments during the previous two weeks in the 
United States. There western politicians and militaty 
officials met and demanded the expulsion of enemy 
afiens from West Coast states. Lieut. General John L. 
DeWitt. who headed the Western Defense Command at 
the San Francisco Presidio, underlined the theme of 
"military necessity" to defend this position, and the 
Justice Department reluctanUy accepted the argument. 
Records of the Permanent Joint Canada-United States 
Board indicate that King paid close attention to these 
discussions. As the historian Ann Comer Sunahara 
points out. if the Jo in t Board agreement provided for 
consultation and the exchange of Information to produce 
"a practical coincidence of policy". King took the 
agreement more solemnly, "at least as long as it served 
his purposes to use American policy to justify Canadian 
policy".^' 
Order-In-Council (PC 365). promulgated on 16 
January 1942. cited "the development of the war" for 
authorizing the Minister of Justice to establish a 
"protected area" free of enemy aliens. This zone 
encompassed, roughly, a strip of coastal BC. 100 miles 
long, including the offshore islands. For reasons of 
Japanese-Canadians In WWII 105 
"national security", all able-bodied male enemy aliens 
would have to vacate the area by 1 April, as would 
"between 800 and 1.000 Canadian citizens of Japanese 
ancestty". In addition, with the War Measures Act of 
1914. as codtfied in 1927. serving as the basis for these 
and subsequent laws, the minister of justice now took 
total control over all enemy aliens.^^ 
During the next month, the Pacific war continued to 
go badly for the British and the Americans. The fall of 
Singapore on 15 February did nothing to diminish either 
the anxiety of federal and some military authorities or 
the clamour of British Columbia extremists.^^ Indeed. 
Mackenzie and his associates now intimated willingness 
to support conscription tf dll Japanese were removed 
from the West Coast.^'* Although moderates In External 
Affairs worried lest expulsion underscore the racial 
component of the war and embitter relations with India 
and China. Mackenzie had dissolved the Standing 
Committee on Orientals on 27 January and took control 
of the drive for expulsion himself. 
On 24 February, five days after Franklin Roosevelt 
issued Executive Order 9066. providing for the relocation 
of 110.000 American Japanese from the West Coast. 
Mackenzie King and his cabinet promulgated Order-in-
Council PC 1486. Like its American parallel, this edict 
did not enunciate particulars for the evacuation; 
ominously, however, it encompassed "evety person ofthe 
Japanese race" in British Columbia. Under its auspices. 
Ottawa created the three-person BriUsh Columbia 
Security Commission (BCSC) and gave it the mandate to 
"pleui. supervise, and direct" the evacuation. This 
directive included providing transportation, food and 
housing, and protection for the evacuees. Personal 
property left behind was in care ofthe Custodian of Alien 
Property.^^ 
In retrospect. Keenleyside concluded, the decision 
marked "a cheap and needless capitulation to popular 
prejudice fanned by pofitical bigotty or ambition or 
both".^ Equally clear. Mackenzie and his BC cronies had 
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found amenable allies in a govemment that cared little 
for the civil liberties of non-whites. The professionals 
who staffed External Affairs might condemn what Escott 
Reid termed "an evil act", but they lacked necessaty clout 
to oppose the politicians when things tmly mattered." 
Ultimately. Ottawa confirmed the specious argument 
that the Canadian-Japanese were a dangerous security 
threat. This point became doubly clear when overseas 
conscription was approved in principle. The evacuation 
had nothing to do with national security. 
Having opposed expulsion from the outset, the RCMP 
now oversaw the evacuation. But there was no irony in 
the fate of the Japanese, save, perhaps, that 
community's aid to the unemployed and purchase of 
$300,000 in Vlctoty Bonds prior to being branded 
disloyal.^® Although PC 1486 did not affect Eurasians 
and Japanese married to spouses of other ethnic groups, 
the remaining 21.000 - aliens and citizens alike, men, 
women, and children - were all uprooted, their 
livelihoods gone, their lives changed forever. Of this 
number, 11,500 ended up in housing centres set up in 
interior silver mining "ghost towns" (Slocan City, 
Greenwood, Roseberry, Sandon, and Kaslo), and in two 
new "towns" at Tasme and Lemon Creek. Road work 
camps in places like Hope and Princeton, British 
Columbia, and Schreiber, Ontario, meanwhile, enfisted 
2.150 males In the first year of relocation, though for a 
variety of reasons the camps did not endure. Not only did 
the camps divide families, but the men who populated 
them were not always "able-bodied", while American 
military leaders complained about Japanese proximity to 
key communication routes to Alaska.^^ Another 3,600 
Japanese, primarily farmers from the Eraser Valley, were 
sent to work in the sugar beet fields of Alberta and 
Manitoba, while yet another 3,000 found new homes and 
seff-supporting projects in the British Columbia interior 
and other provinces. Finally, 750 men that Ottawa 
judged dangerous or who were targeted as "dissidents" 
were intemed at camps in Petawawa, Ontario, and later 
Japanese-Canadians In WWII 107 
at Angler, Ontario, In a former German POW camp.'*° 
By 16 March 1942, the process of evacuation was 
underway. Vancouver's Hastings Park, a fairground, 
became the central assembly site for the evacuees, whose 
living quarters were the stinking, maggot-infested pens 
and stalls that usually quartered pigs and horses. These 
venues now housed up to 3,000 people daily. Crude 
living quarters and eating facilities, a total lack of 
privacy, and the separation of families made this the 
most tiaumatizing phase of relocation. Having been 
termed "bestial" by white racists, the Japanese were now 
treated like animals. On 23 March, with most able-
bodied men being shipped out to the BC interior and 
beyond, Hastings became the site of angry protest 
against the sundering of families. Led by angry women 
inmates, the protest foreshadowed the creation in April 
of the Nisei Mass Evacuation Group, which lobbied 
BCSC chairman Austin Taylor to reunite families in the 
Interior Housing Centres immediately. Further 
demonstrations in several road camps convinced Taylor -
who believed with the other commissioners that the 
families should not be separated - to restore family units. 
This decision proved crucial, as working together 
{tonariguma through family units provided a key 
resource to allow the intemees to adapt to exile and 
often hostile and primitive environments. Although the 
evacuees received some help from church groups, a 
portion ofthe CCF, and private citizens like Amy Leigh at 
the Hastings Center, Walter Hartley at Slocan City, and 
Henry Lougheed at Kaslo, in the end - for the Japanese -
family and community mattered most."' 
It is difficult to generalise easily about the wartime 
experiences of the Japanese-Canadians."^ Whether in 
converted ghost towns, newly created interior sites. 
Alberta and Manitoba sugar beet fields, or Ontario and 
Quebec, most Japanese made the best of enervating 
situations. The exfies endured unprecedented winter 
cold at the Interior Housing Sites, Alberta nativists such 
as Social Credit demagogue William "Bible Bill" Aberhart 
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(who demanded that Ottawa promise to remove the 
Japanese after the war),"^ the indignity of dravidng 
minimal pay from the proceeds of forced sales, at great 
loss, of their homes, farms, and personal property, 
censored mall, the need to raise education fees (and 
develop schools and train teachers) for their children, 
even the requirement in some road-camp venues, to 
purchase unemployment insurance."" 
Despite this discrimination and Ottawa's guarantee 
that the Japanese would not stay, by June 1944 nearly 
5,000 evacuees had setUed In Alberta. Manitoba, and 
Saskatchewan, a far cty from the 700 Japanese who 
inhabited the prairie provinces before 1942. In eastern 
Canada, where fewer than 200 Japanese lived prior to 
Pearl Harbor, one found by mid-1944 more than 3.000. 
the great majority living in Ontario. These "immigrants", 
moreover, now moved into diverse trades and 
professions, though fewer than 100 gained acceptance 
into business colleges and universities."^ 
The dispersal of Japanese-Canadians eastward from 
the Pacific suited the wishes of most parties Involved. 
Only Ian Mackenzie and the hard-line British Columbia 
racists desired more: permanent expulsion from the 
province, and deportation from the country. In April 
1942 Mackenzie lobbied Minister of Mines and 
Resources, Thomas A. Crerar, urging passage of a 
Veterans' Land Act and making the Japanese farms 
available to returning Canadian soldiers. These moves 
would cut postwar unemployment and help the Liberal 
govemment. After the Land Act became law in August, 
(following a govemment appraisal that ignored the value 
of current crops emd discounted the worth of farm 
bufidings by as much as seventy per cent), Ottawa 
instituted another order-in-councfi under the War 
Measures Act that allowed the Custodian of Enemy 
Property to sell the Eraser Valley farms. 
With both the Office of the Custodian of Enemy 
Property and the Department of Labour eager to sell off 
enemy property, the policy of dispossessing the Japanese 
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ofthelr property was added to that of dispersal. Without 
farms to return to, the exiles would have to stay where 
they were. Moreover, the forced sales, which began in 
1943, would provide funds to allow the Japanese to pay 
for their own confinement. Ultimately encompassing the 
real estate, homes, and belongings of all the exiles, this 
drive to dispossess the Japanese-Canadians also 
furthered the policy of dispersal east of the Rocky 
Mountains. Even here, however, the exiles could neither 
purchase nor lease land or business premises, virithout 
gaining special permission from Minister of Justice. 
Louis St Laurent. And St Laurent strongly favoured the 
deportation of Japanese-Canadians after the war."® 
Deportation, Ian Mackenzie's holy grail, was also on 
Mackenzie King's mind. In August 1944 the Prime 
Minister announced that he felt it "unwise and 
undesirable" to permit the Japanese population to return 
to British Columbia. Although he admitted that 'Tor the 
most part the people ofthe Japanese race have remained 
loyal", and that "no person of Japanese race bom in 
Canada has been charged with sabotage or disloyalty", 
the Prime Minister added a new twist to an old argument 
- the 'future protection" of the loyal Japanese depended 
upon the exile to Japan of those "persons of the 
Japanese race" who had been disloyal. Recognizing that 
prohibiting free movement in Canada would be 
"undesirable in principle". King called upon the exiles 
voluntarily to "distribute their numbers as widely as 
possible through the country where they will not create 
feelings of racial hostility". Such outcome would confirm 
Canada's abhorrence o f t h e hateful system of racialism 
which is the basis of the Nazi system everywhere", 
uphold "principles of fairness and justice", and "protect 
the people of British Columbia"."^ 
On 12 March 1945, less than two months before VE 
Day, the King govemment set in motion its final solution 
to the Japanese problem. The govemment's haste owed 
much to a landmark decision in December 1944 by the 
United States Supreme Court. In the case of Ex Parte 
J10 Allen Justice 
Endbif^ the Court underlined a key difference between 
American and Canadian judicial processes regarding 
their respective Japanese minorities. Mitsuye Endo, the 
Court found, was a loyal American and could not be 
refused the freedom to move to any region open to other 
law-abiding citizens. This mling opened the door for the 
American-bom Japanese to return to Callfomla from 
their own incarceration, a process that began less than 
a month later."^ 
The Canadian govemment. meanwhile, unhindered by 
either a constitution or a bill of rights, determined not to 
allow a similar outcome. In a formal notice to Japanese 
still in British Columbia, the Department of Labour 
warned that those "who wished to remain in Canada 
should now reestablish themselves East of the Rockies 
as the best evidence of their intentions to cooperate with 
the Govemment policy of dispersal".^ To this end Ottawa 
initiated a repatriation survey providing two distasteful 
alternatives: either the Japanese choose repatriation to 
Japan at an unspecified future date, or they accept 
immediate relocation east of the Rockies. To those 
Japanese who had suffered the insults of exile in the BC 
interior, and whose morale was at its nadir, the angry 
choice, not surprisingly, was often repatriation. 
By August some 6.884 Canadians over sixteen years 
of age signed "voluntarily" for repatriation. These 
individuals, and their 3.503 dependents, represented 43 
per cent of the Japanese population in the countty and 
86 per cent ofthe population then In British Columbia.^' 
With the end of the war in the Pacific, however, the 
"voluntaty" act of embracing repatriation, taken with the 
view that persons might change their mind, became In 
the view of the federal govemment a permanent choice. 
This ominous tum became clear by April 1946. after 
4.527 Japanese-Canadians sought to expunge their 
names from repatriation lists.^^ A special Cabinet 
committee examining the problem in September 1945, 
meanwhile, concluded that only those Nisei and 
naturalised Japanese who removed their names from the 
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lists before Japan 's surrender, would be allowed to 
remain. 
After Supreme Pacific Commander General Douglas 
MacArthur gave the go-ahead in late October, some 
4.000 Japanese-Canadians retumed to Japan during the 
next year and one-half.^ Only in January 1947. when it 
became clear that it was out of touch with postwar 
realities, did the policy of repatriation come to an end.^ 
Even then, however, the official policy of dispersal 
continued for another two years, until 1 April 1949. 
when Ottawa allowed members of the "Japanese race" to 
return home to the former "protected zone". 
Several reasons explain Ottawa's change of heart. 
First, one did not have to look too closely to see parallels 
between Nazi racial policy and Ottawa's treatment of 
Canada's Japanese minority. World War II was a race war 
as much as a military confiict.^ and the juxtaposition of 
German anti-Semitism with Canadian Japanophobia 
produced much soul-searching among elites and 
populace alike. This introspection and guilt no doubt 
became deeper with revelations after 1945 of the real 
character of Germany's concentration camps. 
More important was the exemplary conduct of the 
Japanese-Canadians themselves during their time of 
tribulation. Throughout the war most sought to prove 
themselves "good" Canadians, and to prove this they 
abided a series of govemment decisions that made a 
mockety of any notion of civil liberties in a parliamentaty 
govemment. Left by the white majority to solve their 
problems alone. Ontario Japanese formed the Japanese 
Canadian Committee for Democracy in 1944 and. joined 
by twenty Caucasian organizations a year later, the 
Cooperative Committee on Japanese-Canadians 
(CCJC).^ With the war over, and the War Measures Act 
no longer applicable, the CCJC threatened hundreds of 
habeas corpus cases to convince Ottawa to end 
Deportation. In 1948 a federal statute granted all citizens 
the right to vote In national elections, and a year later, 
with public opinion solidly behind the province's 
112 Allen Justice 
decision. British Columbia ended its historic policy of 
denying the franchise to all Asians. 
Dispersed across Canada by the wartime diaspora, the 
Japanese-Canadians proved less successful in securing 
redress for financial losses incurred during the 
relocation. In J u n e 1950. after considerable negotiation 
by the CCJC and the new National Japanese Canadian 
Citizens Association (NJCCA). British Columbia Supreme 
Court Justice Henry I. Bird spoke for a claims 
commission and reported figures that resulted In awards 
of $1,222,829 to the community, in addition to $150,000 
in legal fees and claims outside the commission's terms 
of reference. In the view of Justice Minister St Laurent, 
the awards to the 1434 persons who made claims 
through the commission closed this chapter in Canadian 
histoty. St Laurent failed to mention that overall recovery 
on the claims was 56 per cent ofthe gross value claimed, 
and that the great majority of Japanese-Canadians 
received nothing.^^ 
Not until the 1960s did the Canadian govemment 
apologise to the Japanese community. On 7 June 1964, 
while opening the Japanese Cultural Center in Toronto, 
Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson acknowledged that the 
relocation was a "black mark" against "Canada's 
traditional fairness and devotion to the principles of 
human rights".^ Even then, the NJCCA demand for 
further financial redress from the federal govemment 
endured, concurrent with the ongoing integration ofthe 
Japanese as a "model minority" within mainstieam 
society and culture.^^ As Canada embraced an ofilcial 
policy of multiculturalism in the 1970s and 1980s, this 
drive culminated in September 1988. shoriJy after 
President Ronald Reagan signed an American redress 
bill. Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. whose 
admiration for Reagan knew no limits, announced a 
Canadian reparations package scant days later. Under 
the agreement the govemment paid the twelve-to-
fourteen thousand remaining survivors $21,000 each, a 
total up to $300 rmllion. Although Ottawa began 
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payment immediately, this amount could never 
compensate the Japanese-Canadian community for its 
losses.®" 
The relocation and dispersal of the Japanese-
Canadians during World War II represented the 
culmination of a fifty-year crusade by British Columbia 
racists. The panic Induced by Pearl Harbor and the allied 
militaty and naval disasters in early 1942 provided the 
immediate context for the federalisation of much of Ian 
Mackenzie's program. In retrospect, the relocation 
facilitated Japanese-Canadian acculturation, albeit at 
the sharp end of a bayonet. The decisions themselves 
owed littie to "national security", as federal authorities 
after 1942 claimed. The decision for relocation was a 
political decision which demonstrated how the War 
Measures Act might be utilised to deprive a specific 
group of its livelihood and freedom.®' In a countiy 
avowedly reverential of tradition, leaders, law, and 
parliamentary rights, this chapter of history stands as 
both paradox and warning. For here is the underside 
that warrants further critical examination of the many 
racial and civil fiberties contexts of the "peaceable 
kingdom".®2 
Chapter 7 
A Difficult Reconciliation: 
Civil Liberties and Intemment Policy in 
Australia during World War Two 
Kay Saunders 
The University of Queensland 
Following upon precedents laid down in the Great War, 
Australia during the Second World War pursued an 
internal policy of widespread intemment of enemy aliens, 
those of enemy alien origin or parentage and an external 
policy of accepting POWs from Britain, the United States, 
from the Free French in the Pacific as well as Javanese 
political prisoners from the Dutch East Indies. Far from 
acting as an independent sovereign nation, Australia, 
propelled by the Impulses of xenophobia, acted as a 
dependent colonial outpost ready to accept more 
powerful Allied problems. Although Commonwealth 
policy laid down in the War Book required restricted and 
selective internal intemment such as members of the 
NSPA and direct security risks, actual procedures 
refiected the Allies' defeats on the battie field rather than 
a fair assessment of any individual's case. With the fall 
of France and the entiy of Italy into the war in mid-1940 
widespread intemment of Italians and Yugoslavs 
occurred in Western Australia. With the fall of Singapore 
in February 1942 and the bombing of Darwin the 
following week, enemy aliens, most particularly Italians 
and Japanese in northem Queensland, were summarily 
detained. Those of European origin were mosUy released 
within a few months in order to perform vital labour 
services for the war effort. These dual processes 
ultimately reveal Australia's long standing hostility to 
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those not of Anglo-Celtic origins and a national 
immaturity and hesitancy. 
Intemment challenges the fundamental precepts upon 
which the entire system of British justice and law 
enforcement in peace-time is based. Unlike arrest for a 
criminal offence where a warrant is issued on a specific 
charge, intemment allows an individual to be taken into 
custody seemingly arbitrarily for an open ended 
indefinite period without presentation in a court of law 
or a public hearing. The attempt to balance national 
security and Individual liberty during war is an onerous 
undertaking in an ostensibly liberal and democratic 
society, albeit one undergoing the trauma involved in 
modem technological warfare, which also encompasses 
the clvifian and the non-combatant. This is not to say 
that Australian juris ts and constitutional authorities 
were unaware ofthe discrepancy between the rhetoric of 
fighting for liberty and democracy and, simultaneously, 
engaging in arbitrary detention. Justice E.E. Cleland, a 
Chairman of the Aliens Tribuned, a body established to 
hear in camera objections against intemment, wrote to 
the Minister for the Army in December 1940 that: 
I find my duties are particularly distasteful because there 
is nothing'judlclar about them. First of all, I understand 
that the onus of satisfying the Committee that any person 
detained is loyal lies upon ... [him] and the more general 
and indefinite the charge against him, the more difficult it 
is for him to satisfy the Committee. Again ... the Committee 
has before it, the oath of the person detained subject to 
cross-examination and, on the other, the unsworn efforts of 
more or less anonymous individuals (always described as 
belng"a particularly reliable agent") and some of these 
reports maybe personally malicious, probably honest, and 
sometimes, no doubt, inspired by patriotic hysteria.' 
Thisjudicial rebuke identifies many ofthe legal problems 
inherent In the processes of intemment - anonymous 
reports, arbitraty imposition of authority and the 
absence of habeas corpus or the right to a public 
hearing. 
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Responses to the different ethnic groups and the 
severity and comprehensiveness of their incarceraUon 
was not uniform but corresponded with the degree to 
which they supposedly threatened first the Australian 
war effort and most importanUy, how the Allies were 
faring m the war zones of Europe, Africa and the Pacific. 
Australia, along with Britain, unlike Canada or the USA 
where mosUy those of Japanese origins were 
systematically intemed, targeted all ethnic minorities, 
paying particular attention to those engaged against in 
combat the British Empire, like Thais, Germans, 
Austrians, Albanians, Italians and Bulgarians. On a visit 
to the USA in 1942 Australia's federal Minister for 
External Affairs, Dr H.V. Evatt was amazed to learn that 
other Allied nations did not intem those of enemy alien 
origin or parentage en masse and that many were drafted 
into the Armed Services.^ 
Paul Hasluck argues that the intemment of enemy 
aUens was one of the "most important measures taken 
during the first six months of war...".^ The War Book, 
prepared by the Commonwealth Department of Defence 
and modelled closely on its British counterpart, had 
already indicated those issues and procedures which 
were regarded as potentially significant in the event of 
declared war.'^ It laid down that the intemment of 
resident enemy aliens should be restricted to "the 
narrowest limits consistent v^th public safety and public 
sentiment".^ The dilemma, which involved the 
reconciliation of the demands of national security with 
the preservation of the individual's civil liberties (which 
theoretically constitute the hallmark of the British and 
thus the Australian legal system), was no more clearly 
ifiustrated than in the question of policy directives 
towards enemy aliens and those of enemy aJien origin. 
Australia was not alone in this difficult reconciliation. 
A report from the Australian Director-General of Security 
in early 1941 indicated that the British govemment was 
also experiencing "... considerable difficulties ... in 
devising some suitable means of reconciling the claims 
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of individuals with national security".® In Febmaty 1939 
a sub-committee of the Committee for Imperial Defence 
on Uie "Control of Aliens in War" forecast that 18,000 
male enemy aliens might be intemed in the eventuality 
of hostilities with Germany. The committee recognised 
that of the 74,000 Germans and Austrians resident in 
Britam the vast majority had fied Nazi persecution. Only 
415 persons (on lists prepared by MI5) were initially 
Incarcerated in 1939.^ By March 1940 nearly two 
thousand people had been intemed after the fall of the 
Chamberlain govemment and the invasion of Hofiand. 
Two months later all male enemy aliens between the ages 
of sixteen to sixty in the coastal regions were arrested to 
avoid possible activities of a "fifth column". When Italy 
entered the war in June , this process was extended to 
Italians. One of Britain's solutions to its enemy alien 
problem was to arrange the wholesale transportation of 
German and Austrian Jewish refugees to Canada and 
Australia as POWs.^ This was the commencement of a 
common pattern for Australia - accepting more powerful 
Allied nations' POWs. 
In November 1940 the British Home Secretaty, 
reporting the findings of the Joint Intelligence Sub 
Committee and Home Defence (Security) Executive, 
believed that there should be no relaxation of the 
principle of general intemment as security and military 
considerations should be the govemment's first and 
most urgent domestic priority.® Neil Stammers concludes 
that it was not until January 1942 that the govemment 
significantly reduced the numbers intemed and allowed 
categories of intemees to aid the Allied war effort by 
preforming manual, usually farm, labour.'° Austialia too 
pursued a policy where intemment followed the pattern 
of the war front rather than an accurate or calculated 
assessment of an Individual's security risk. 
In September 1939 Prime Minister Menzies had 
assured parliament that his govemment had no 
Intention of pursuing a poficy of general intemment of all 
enemy aliens. Rather, it would be concerned only to 
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intem persons specifically "engaging in subversive 
activities"." What might constitute "subversive activity" 
however was ill-defined, thus allowing for considerable 
flexibility in interpretation and emphasis. Especially in 
1942, this policy was not adhered to; for panic extended 
the parameters of potential "disloyalty". Those of 
non-British origin were detained according to their 
geographic location rather than their ideology. 
Considerable flexibifity in interpretation and emphasis 
emerged - all too often responding to the progress of 
distant batUes in Egypt and France or, more potently, 
the rapid advance ofthe Japanese into the Pacffic sphere 
of Australian control in early 1942 - rather than from a 
fair and jus t examination of a particular case. 
In another crucial document that articulated general 
intemment policy, Lieut. Colonel James Chapman ofthe 
Military Board, Southern Command in July 1941 averred 
that,"... power may be defined as the authority to restrict 
or detain persons as a precaution - any measure in war 
time (is necessary against a person] whose lovaltv to the 
cause for which we are at war, is reasonably suspect".'^ 
In official procedures the h a ^ concept of "disloyalty" was 
aU too readily £md tragically confused with "subversive 
activities". In Australia in World War Two no one was 
convicted of treason, sabotage, or sedition, though 7780 
residents were detained in intemment camps in the 
interests of security or because their "loyalty" to the 
British Empire was found wanting. This process provided 
a sharp contrast to the policy of incarcerating prisoners 
of war. Here the rules are clear cut - the enemy in 
combat when captured must be incarcerated underrules 
formulated by the Geneva Convention. 
William Mackay, the Director-General of Security in 
Canberra in revievdng the Australia First Movement's 
"disloyalty" argued that: 
The aim and sole justification of all restrictions upon 
individual liberty Is to prevent Injury to the war effort ofthe 
country, not to punish the individual. In short the object Is 
preventative rather than punitive ... The sole ground ... is 
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that the individual. If left unrestricted, might prejudice the 
successful defence of this country against the enemy. The 
second principle Is that Individual liberty is to be restricted 
only If there Is a real danger that the Individual will act In 
a way that prejudices the war effort ... Full Intemment 
being reserved where the possibility of Injury to the nation 
Is undeniable.*^ 
Mackay's statement therefore re-emphasised the broad 
policy directives laid down in the War Book and initially 
followed by the Menzies' govemment. The actual manner 
in which these were subsequently Interpreted and 
readjusted reflected those changes in the wider society 
as Australia faced a direct impending crisis in late 1941. 
Lieut. Colonel Sydney Whittington, the chief of 
Militaty Intelligence for Southern Command, informed 
the Aliens Tribunal Hearing Number 3 in February 1941 
that, "(Ilntemment is not a punishment; we merely 
deprive an enemy alien of his liberty, otherwise he is 
treated exacUy as an ordinaty individual ... Intemment 
is just an ordinary form of restraint".'* This myopic 
statement totally overlooked the central issue and 
minimised the impact of this process of arbitraty 
incarceration of the particular individuals involved. 
Rathermore realistically, Pastor J.J. Stolz, the President 
ofthe United Evangelical Lutheran Church of Australia 
(UELCA), protesting over the detention of his frequently 
Australian-bom clergy, identified a key contention, "... 
without a hearing in an open court: without even being 
told the charge laid against them; without permitting 
their lawyer to know the accusation raised against them 
they were deprived ofthelr liberty".'^ Several questions 
present themselves - on what grounds was any resident 
intemed? Who decided? Was intemment simply a 
deprivation of liberty and did this constitute de facto 
imprisonment? In whose interests did this selection 
occur? The issue of the Intemment of enemy aliens and 
naturalised BriUsh subjects of enemy alien origin in 
Queensland and Western Australia (where more 
foreigners were proportionally residenO throws light on 
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these important dilemmas. 
Local or regional considerations were usually 
prominent. In Westem Australia a report from the 
Commander of the Fourth Mifitary District in April 1940 
believed that twenty-two Fascist leaders in Perth posed 
a "grave danger of sabotage".'® More pressing however 
was the problem wdth the Volunteer Wharf Labourers 
Union most of whose members were Italians. This had 
been set up as a rival organisation to the Wharf 
Labourers Union during the explosive 1928 Waterside 
strike. The Commander believed that, not only did the 
continued use of labour present an Industrial threat but 
these men were in a prime position to corrmiit acts of 
sabotage. A further report that month identified the 
antagonism on the goldfields of Kalgoorlie, Coolgardie 
and Boulder. Memy miners were Italians and the Slavs 
(mostly Yugoslavs). They produced all the vital wood 
supplies for the area. Union pressure ensured their 
detention.'^Again in Sydney, Military Intelligence in May 
1940 believed Italians with fascist leanings working on 
the waterfront needed careful monitoring whilst others in 
the fruit growing district of Shepparton in Victoria and 
the miners in Gippsland "could be checked without large 
scale internment".'® The Italian schools in Adelaide and 
Port Pirie in South Australia were regarded by military 
intelligence as breeding grounds of fascist ideology and 
loyalty. A celebration of the "March on Rome" held in 
Adelaide on 17 April 1940 provided further damning 
evidence of disloyalty to Britain; for the Italian consul, 
Felice Rando publicly condemned "the bastard 
despicable treachety Britain and France in their 
imposition of sanctions during the Abyssinian 
campaign".'^ All Italians were erroneously assumed to 
share his sentiments. 
Certainly, actual procedures and actions differed in 
both degree and emphasis from the Militaty Board's 
"Principles to be observed with Intemment". composed in 
September 1939. Referring particularly to NSDAP (Nazi) 
and Fascist party members in Australia as prime 
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candidates for intemment. the Military Board's policy 
directed further that: 
... enemy aliens of military age. or any other persons who 
are rationally suspected of being likely to act in a manner 
prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the 
Commonwealth, or as being likely to cause disaffection, are 
regarded as suitable subjects for intemment on the 
outbreak of war. ^ 
Flexibility and vagueness in the category of "likely to 
cause disaffection" could, moreover, sustain broad 
interpretation, and, as the war continued, became 
increasingly important in the identification and 
incarceration of disaffected enemy aliens. In particular, 
Lutheran pastors in 1943 were regarded with acute 
suspicion. 
Specific regulations were promulgated under the 
National Security Act (1939-40) to implement these 
Intemment procedures. National Security (General) 
Regulations, Statutoty Rule No. 87 of 1939, regulation 
26 (amendment 40 in 1941) provided the legal provision 
for detention in a general form. National Security (Aliens 
Control) Regulations, Statutoty Rule number 88 of 1939, 
regulation 20 (amendment 59 of 1941) applied 
specifically to enemy aliens. In November 1940 enemy 
aliens were permitted to lodge appeals against detention 
and intemment with the Aliens Tribunal.^' Women and 
children were not to be systematically intemed, except in 
unusual circumstances. In the case of the Japanese, all 
residents except consular staff were to be taken into 
custody (see chapter 9). 
In September 1939 the Commonwealth Minister for 
Defence recommended that the state police prepare lists 
of potential suspects. "The Principle to be Observed with 
Intemment", the handbook which laid down procedures 
reiterated that the civil police force should be scrupulous 
in their investigations, stressing that, "... instructions 
have been issued that the suspected person is not to be 
intemed unless his being at large constitutes potential 
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danger to the public safety or the defence of the 
Commonwealth".2^ Like Westem Australia, the 
Queensland police had already begun Investigating 
potential alien saboteurs before the official declaration of 
war. In April 1939 Home Secretaty Hanlon had ordered 
the police to check the location and extent of arms and 
ammunition in the possession of private citizens, 
"particularly foreigners".^^ Later, under Alien Control 
(Prohibited Possession Order) Regulation 22 of the 
National Security (Alien Control) Regulation, enemy 
afiens and naturalised British subjects were forbidden to 
possess firearms, transmitters, more than four gallons of 
petrol or any infiammable liquid, cameras, and motor 
vehicles except under strictly regulated and defined 
conditions.^* In the process of investigations under the 
above regulations, the police were not only able to 
monitor and assess the attitudes of potential enemy 
aliens and naturalised British subjects of enemy alien 
origin but to ascertain who to disarm in order to prevent 
possible acts of sabotage. With the Italian community 
along the sugar coast of Queensland, this occurred 
almost immediately after Italy entered the weu" in June 
1940.^^ In Westem Australian however large numbers of 
Itafians were detained by August 1940; for instance, 125 
fishermen and tomato growers in the small setUement of 
Geraldton were intemed in June 1940.^ ® In Queensland 
however most Italians were not physically rounded up 
until the fears of a Japanese invasion in early 1942 
prompted more drastic measures.^^ 
Whilst instructing the civil police to assess the 
"loyalty" of enemy aliens, the Militaty Board was alert to 
the potential hazards involved in this devolution of 
power. In July 1941 Lieut. Colonel James Chapman of 
the Militaty Board wrote that it was often difficult for the 
civil police to obtain detailed written reports because 
citizens feared intimidation in terms of both personal 
safety and economic retaliation, in areas like the sugar 
districts where large numbers of enemy aliens were 
concentrated and influential. Chapman acknowledged: 
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The military authorities should never usurp the function of 
the civil police authorities in a country not under martial 
war, even if the notice is entirely laudable I.e. to lend the 
police a hand in difficult circumstances. Every effort must 
always be made to check any tendency to assist the police 
In carrying out the normal duties merely with the object of 
enlisting the willing cooperation of the police In return, on 
what may be described as'quld pro quo'.^ 
Difficulty arose because, although the military was 
ultimately responsible for the escort and protracted 
detention of Intemees, the civil police were responsible 
for the initial determination and apprehension of 
suspected persons. Chapman visualised a very real 
"gross misuse of the power entrusted to the military 
authorities" if the pofice exceeded their instructions and 
recommended the intemment of enemy aliens and NBS 
of enemy alien origin for reasons other than those of 
national security. Specific situations could arise where 
this "gross misuse" could be paramount. First, 
unwarranted intemment could prove an effective form of 
economic retaliation; secondly, its widespread 
application could operate as a means of obtaining civil 
order, and thirdly, it would relieve the police ofthe task 
of monitoring the activities of "undesirables" (viz: 
Suspected Criminals or "troublemakers").^^ 
Though Chapman's assessment of intemment 
procedures refers to the problems of the delegation of 
powers between the civil police and military authority, 
the process was more complicated. Whilst the civil police 
did gather local intelligence information, the 
Commonwealth Investigation Bureau (CIB), a section of 
the federal Attomey-General's Department also 
maintained local Intelligence gatherers. In peace-time 
Information flowed between the police and the CIB; in 
war-time surveillance reports were sent to the 
intelligence interpreters or subversive sections of Military 
Intelligence. Dossiers on intemees reveal a complicated 
series of patterns of information collation and decision 
making, resting ultimately upon the Militaty Intelligence 
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umt of the Army. 
With the declaration of war In September 1939 the 
security forces Implemented their first objective - to take 
known Nazis and "Friends of the Third Reich" (a fraternal 
organisation for Germans and Austrians who were 
naturalised British subjects), into custody. Nazis and 
their sympathisers had been "under notice" to use the 
parlance of militaty security, since the arrival of Dr 
Rudoff Asmis, the German Consul in 1932. In 1938 
during the Munich crisis the security forces conducted 
a series of raids on the homes of declared Nazis in 
Sydney and confiscated lists of members and their 
sympathisers. By late November 1939 some 343 
Germans and Austrians mostly from Sydney, Melboume, 
Brisbane and Adelaide had been intemed, although 
sixty-six were soon released. Of this number 170 were 
declared Nazis.^° A comprehensive intelligence report, 
forwarded to Southern Command in March 1940 
summarised the combined knowledge of those federal 
and state agencies concerned with security - for instance 
there were 918 German and Austrian nationals resident 
in Queensland, concentrated in distinct communities in 
the south east comer although there were 16842 
persons of German birth in the state. In September 1939 
there were an estimated 500 pro-Nazi sympathisers who 
were "regarded with suspicion" with 150 "under the 
strictest surveillance". By December seventy of them had 
been interned.^' Margaret Bevege's research confirms 
this pattern throughout the Commonwealth; for she 
believes that by mid-1939 all Nazi supporters in Adelaide 
and Sydney, two prominent communities, were "under 
notice".^^ In the Sydney church of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Federated Church of Germany there were forty 
Nazis among its congregation. Many were intemed in 
September and October 1939.^^ 
In the initial list prepared by the CIB in August 1939 
seventeen persons of German origin in Queensland alone 
had been targetted for immediate detention on the 
declaration of hostilities. The arrival of Count Felbc von 
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Luckner, who was assumed to be an emissary of the 
German govemment, on two goodwill visits to 
Queensland in J u n e and August 1938, was a key event 
which allowed the CIB to gather an immense range of 
(later) incriminating information. A Military Intelligence 
report prepared in September 1938 believed the Count's 
visit was Important, as his mission was deliberately, if 
subtiy,"... to arouse among all persons of German origin, 
a sense ofthelr unity with the'New Germany', with one 
another and with the rest ofthe German race".^'* Another 
Militaty Intelligence report commented that, "(Ijn closely 
knit German communities it is not always easy to get 
evidence of what is going on; but the visit of Count von 
Luckner brought a good deal to bare on the real 
sentiments of the people".^^ In New South Wales also, 
security forces kept Dr Asmis' contacts under strict and 
comprehensive surveillance (see chapter 3). 
Despite theirideological confusion, the security forces 
were initially most concerned with active Nazis and 
"Friends ofthe Third Reich". Their next priority was to 
collate information on enemy aliens of military age and 
those who had served in the German or Austrian armies 
or German Navy in the Great War. Arthur Piepjohn had 
fled Danzig in 1935, working as a merchant seaman 
before he jumped ship in Sydney in 1938. Working as a 
mill hand in the North Eton Mill at Mackay he had 
written articles in the Mackay Mercury exposing national 
socialism. He was irate at his incarceration in Tatura 
Camp in central northem Victoria in May 1940.^ ® 
Some individuals were intemed as security risks on 
purely political grounds given their membership of the 
Nazi Party or Fascist Party and their affiliated 
associations. Yet the National Security (Aliens Control) 
Regulations demanded that any male enemy aliens, 
regardless of political persuasion, could be detained. 
This meant the Austrians and Germans sent from Britain 
In the "Dunera", most of whom had fied persecution as 
Jews, were initially Intemed. until mobfilsed into Labour 
Corps or later into the Australian Military Force.^^ 
126 Allen Justice 
German and Austrian Jewdsh refugees, who had arrived 
in Australia in the later 1930s bu t had not yet been 
naturalised, were also Intemed, mosUy at Tatura Camp 
in Victoria. Barbara Winter, argues that Tatura Camp 
number 1 contained a hard core of Nazis who called 
themselves "Reichsteue" or "Loyalists".^^ German and 
Austrian Jews, s taunch anti-Nazis, communists and 
Nazis were all accommodated in the same camp, as the 
Australian Army classified inmates according to 
nationaUty not political affiliation or religion. An 
Australian citizen. Charles Willyan. intemed in March 
1942 because of his support for the Australia First 
Movement, concurred that in Tatura 1: 
Every German bom prisoner in the camps was a declared 
Nazi. He had to be - or pretend to be - or live in hell. I have 
seen a man bashed by a gang trying to throw him over a 
fence with his belongings, and mobile machine guns 
brought up and trained on the mob by order of the only 
Australian officer present, while he rescued the victim at 
revolver point^® 
The Army was aware the problem of interning Jewish 
Germans and Austrians as early as Janua ty 1941; but as 
the Deputy Chief of General Staff reported to the 
Minister, "in an attempt to distinguish Jewish refugees 
and enemy aliens problems arise because some could be 
agents because of family stifi in Germany".*" In March 
1942 the Secretary of the Army declared he was not 
willing to change policy."' It was not until pressure was 
brought to bare by the Aliens Classification and Advisoty 
Committee in September 1942 that a categoty of "refugee 
alien" was instituted. This allowed 6,500 enemy aliens to 
change their s tatus to that of a "refugee".'*^ 
After the round up of Nazis and German and Austrian 
males of military age. Military Intelligence in Melboume 
in May 1940 next prep£u-ed a list of Italians "likely to be 
intemed on the outbreak of hostilities" throughout the 
Commonwealth. 
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TABLE I: ITALIANS LIKELY TO BE INTERNED. 
MAY 1940 
Northem Command 
E^astem Command 
Soutiiem Command 
Westem Command 
Total 
Italians 
3 0 
112 
106 
248 
NBS 
30 
147 
22 
700 
899 
Total 
60 
259 
118 
700 
1137 
Clearly the Italian community of Westem Australia was 
being targetted by Military Intelligence as being 
potentially dangerous. These figures would not seem to 
be accurate for no Italians were included in the categoty 
of "enemy alien". As Table 2 shows however 915 were 
intemed six months later, although many may have been 
naturalised. 
By November 1940 some 2338 (1726 Italians and 661 
Germans) out of 22.314 recent arrivals had been 
intemed throughout Australia. There were 45.000 
persons of enemy alien birth in Australia but dossiers 
were not kept on all Individuals. Policy was always 
selectively applied.''^ 
TABLE 2: INTERNEES IN AUSTRALIA. 31 OCTOBER 1940 
Enemy Aliens 
Allied Aliens 
NBS 
Total 
NSW 
595 
9 
114 
718 
VIC 
167 
1 
9 
177 
QLD 
328 
2 
55 
385 
SA 
118 
5 
16 
139 
WA 
951 
-
17 
968 
Total 
2159 
17 
271 
2387 
Source: N.W. Lamiday, Aliens Control in Australia, 1939-46. 
Until the entiy of Japan Into the global conflict in 
December 1941. official internal scrutiny in Australia 
kept its attention upon active Nazis. Fascists and 
selected enemy aliens, particularly those men of militaty 
age who had arrived in Australia since 1933 or those in 
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industries crucial to the war effort, like mining or 
transport in Westem Australia. But from that date 
onwards new targets were isolated and contained. In the 
first instance on 8 December 1941, 110 Japanese 
residents of Thursday Island were placed "under guard" 
to await luggers to take them to an intemment camp. 
Two days later, 366 men, twenty-six women and 
twenty-two children of Japanese birth or parentage 
mostly from Thursday Island, Townsvifie, Calms, Mackay 
and Brisbane had been taken into custody. In May 1941 
the War Cabinet had approved the amended "Intemment 
Policy for Japanese" prepared by the Army, whereby all 
Japanese medes over sixteen (except consular officials) 
were to be intemed immediately in the outbreak of 
hostilities. Australia would also accept and incarcerate 
Japanese civilians from the British Pacific islands and 
from French New Caledonia.'*'^ Policy on this matter had 
been determined in Cabinet in July 1941 when an 
annexe was inserted into the "Policy laid down in the 
Commonwealth War Book". Unlike the Italians and 
Germans whose pofitical affiliations might be 
ascertained, if often inaccurately, the Japanese did not 
have an equivalent to the Nationalist Socialist or Fascist 
parties. Furthermore, it was asserted that the "strong 
national sentiments" on the part of the Japanese would 
lead to acts of sabotage. In Februaty 1939 Inspector 
Wake of the civilian intelligence unit in Brisbane had 
reported in a "general overview" assessment that there 
were 754 Japanese in Queensland."^ By August 1940 
this number had dropped to 666 and had fallen further 
to 543 by November, leading him to the conclude that 
may had fied home as they had been forewarned about 
intending hostilities.''^ 
The Truth newspaper of 14 December 1941 
congratulated various agencies on the alacrity of their 
actions: 
With utmost speed and efficiency, officers In the 
Commonwealth Investigation Branch, Military Intelligence 
and the State police co-operated in a Queensland-wide 
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round-up of Japanese nationals, hundreds of whom are 
lodged in intemment camps within a few hours of the 
declaration of war with Japan. 
Rarely, especially in wartime when censorship was strict, 
did the public ever learn of these bureaucratic 
procedures and the methods of cooperation between 
state and federal agencies and between civil and military 
authority. Only with the gravest emergency and the fear 
of invasion that gripped both the community and its 
officials did such procedures gain public knowledge. 
A post-war assessment in November 194 5 by Northem 
Command's Mifitary Intelligence stressed that the federal 
govemment had, in its estimation, acted judiciously in 
apprehending and incarcerating the Japanese on a 
community basis. Various "well trained and disciplined 
laymen who had operated in other parts of the Pacific" -
mostly using the cover of humble laundiymen and 
market gardeners - had been supposedly active in 
gathering geographic and intelligence information about 
Queensland prior to 1939.^ ^^  Yet a civilian police report 
from Calms written on 15 December 1941, during 
intense community anxiety, reported that Japanese "... 
aliens have never been heard to express any anti-British 
sentiments".''^ The local police clearly felt that these often 
elderly men, who had arrived before the introduction of 
the Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, 
were not security risks and were certainly not spies as 
Military Intelligence and the CIB alleged. 
The surveillance and assessment of the Italians, 
particularly those in the strategically vulnerable areas of 
the north east coast of Queensland, was far more 
complicated than the processes operating with respect to 
the Japanese who were incarcerated solely as an ethnic 
group. Various factors operated with regard to the 
intemment of the Italians. The National Security 
(Subversive Associations) Regulations allowed for the 
comprehensive investigation, and in some cases, 
intemment of communists and members of affiliated or 
fraternal organisations which had been banned from 
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June 1940 to December 1942. Predominately, however, 
Italians were intemed because of their residence in 
strategically vulnerable areas rather than on purely 
pofitical grounds. Though an increasing proportion of 
Italians were Intemed, usually temporarily, after June 
1940. it was not until early 1942 that concerted 
manoeuvres were Instigated against them. Police 
Commissioner Carrofi. writing to Justice Phllp of the 
Queensland Supreme Court on 18 December 1941 
forcefully expressed the view that "We need more 
vigilance with enemy aliens who ... we allowed to roam at 
large at the present time of grave national peril".''^  North 
Queensland, at that time, contained the largest 
proportion of enemy aliens and. most particularly, 
naturafised British subjects of enemy origin in the 
Commonwealth. It was not simply their numbers that 
caused concem but their location in the north-east coast 
where strategists thought the Japanese intended to land 
a huge invasion force. 
TABLE 3: NUMBER OF ENEMY ALIENS AND NBS* 
OF ENEMY BIRTH. 1941 IN QUEENSLAND 
Enemy Aliens NBS of Enemy Alien Origin 
1,798 
45 
5,559 
55 
Germans 
Austr ians 
ItaliEms 
Albanians 
Finns 
Rumanians 
Hungar ians 
J apanese 
536 
56 
3,156 
434 
506 
14 
6 
587 
5.395 7,457 
Combined Total 12,852 
* Naturalised British Subject 
Reaching a peak of 5.643 resident intemees in mid 
1942. by the end of the year there were only 1.000 
persons incarcerated. W.B. Simpson, the Director 
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General of Security in Canberra, commented in early 
1943 that there was an unfortunate unreliability in 
current intemment figures.^ Presumably, in this 
number most were Japanese given the diligence with 
which the military incarcerated Japanese nationals and 
those of Japanese origin. Other groups had been also 
targeted for special consideration in early 1942. 
Inspector Wake of the CIB was particularly concerned 
about the presence of Russian Fascists at Biloela in 
central Queensland. He argued in late January 1942 that 
they were potential saboteurs as pressure could be 
brought upon them because the Russian communities at 
Harbin were now under direct enemy control. The 
"Russian Nationalist Revolutionaty Party" was regarded 
as being particularly anti-Semetic. anti-British and 
pro-Nazi.^' 
A Mlfitaty Intelligence security report in October 1941 
argued that, although the Finns in Queensland had no 
links with Italian Fascists or German Nazis in Australia, 
they did contain a subgroup of Swedish speaking Finns 
who supported Nazi principles and were fiercely 
anti-Soviet. The report from interpreter section of 
Militaty Intelligence of February 1942 which caused their 
incarceration regarded them as "very patriotic over the 
Russo-Finnish war of 1939-40"; but presumably because 
ofthelr residence in Tully. Ingham and Mt Isa they were 
now regarded as potential fifth columnists.^^ By May 
1942. twenty-five Russians had been intemed. along 
with eighty-five Finns, and seventy-eight Albanians.^ 
Other alien, but not enemy groups, were intemed. 
Danes. Portuguese and Swiss were neutral nationals; the 
Indonesians. Papuan New Guineans. Javanese and 
Chinese were all Allies, though in some cases Australian 
security may have suspected support for the advancing 
Japanese. 
Under the National Security (General) Regulations 
Number 26. the Army had power to detain British-bom 
citizens like members of the Australia First Movement. 
They constituted the final categoty of persons detained. 
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after Nazis. Fascists and enemy aliens of recent arrival, 
military age. strategically vulnerable residence or those 
opposed by the trade unions. In September 1942 William 
Mackay. Director General of Security reported to the 
Attomey-General over the Intemment of sixteen 
members of the radical nationalist organisation, the 
Australia First Movement which wanted Australia to 
eschew all alliances with Britain and the USA and join 
proported supporters of the Japanese from Westem 
Australia. They had been taken into custody in March 
1942. A Commission of Enquiry held in June 1944 to 
investigate this unprecedented intemment of prominent 
educated BriUsh subjects found the security forces were 
"justified" in securing eight members, some of whom 
were "Intense admires of Japan". Eight others were 
offered compensation for what was termed "hasty" 
detention.^ 
In 1943 when the crisis in the Pacific had abated after 
the defeat of Japanese naval forces at the Battle of the 
Coral Sea in May 1942 and the Battle of Midway several 
months later, the Australian govemment reassessed its 
in temment policies for both resident intemees and 
POWs. With regard to internal procedures, moves had 
been mooted as early as mid-1940. Writing to General 
Whiteland in J u n e 1940 (a crucial period in the 
operation of the war for it signalled the Fall of France 
and the high point of Axis power), the Commandant of 
the 4th Militaty District identified "disloyal Australian 
Germans" as key security risks. Though as dossiers 
indicate, the Lutheran pastors were actually taken into 
custody in 1942 and 1943. Two interrelated problems 
present themselves. First, as W.J. Mackay declared"... it 
may possibly be shown that naturalisation has been 
obtained as a mere cloak. In the circumstances of a 
particular case have to be weighed carefully".^^ Given the 
geographic position of Germans on the Darling Downs, 
in the Bundaberg and Brisbane Valley districts in 
Queensland and the Barossa Valley in South Australia, 
they were never to be subject to the same widespread 
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detention like the Italians on the north east sugar coast. 
Secondly, there was the vexing problem in the 
security agencies' perception of the Lutheran pastors 
who held great authority In their parishes. This did not 
apply to Catholic priests in the sugar districts. They were 
predominately Irish-Australians. loyal to the war effort 
and. though vehemenUy anti-communists, were not 
fascist in sjmipathy or inclination. The Lutheran clergy 
were often, perceived as being highly political. As a 
security report on Pastor E.V.H. Gutenkunst of 
Toowoomba remarked."... since the outbreak ofthe war 
the German communities are Uvlng in compact groups, 
and do not fraternise to any great extent with the British 
section of the population",^ Mackay further declared 
that. "... Pastors of the Lutheran Churches are 
recognised local Nazi leaders and. in several cases, there 
is evidence that their, behaviour is more in helping with 
a Prussian guardsman than a man of God".^^ Given 
Mackay's pre-eminence in the field of security and his 
ability to influence federal ministers it is not surprising 
that pastors were placed under particular security by the 
police and local military intelligence agents. At Mackay's 
direction, evidence was sought for "disloyalty" and 
potential subversion emanating from the pastor's 
promptings or teachings. In Toowoomba security agents 
beheved the Germans there were "... passively disloyal 
with possible active disloyalty on the part of certain 
individuals and the (entire) German population is a 
potential fifth column".^ 
Dealing with the intemment of several notable UELCA 
pastors certain patterns emerge. First. Pastors Anton 
Hiller of Boonah parish and E.V.H. Gutenkunst had been 
under surveillance since the arrival of Dr Asmis; their 
mall had been intercepted by the postal and telegraphic 
censor within the Post Master General's Olfice. 
translated and then forwarded to Interpreters Section of 
Militaty Intelligence. Northem Command in Brisbane. 
Secondly, they had arranged the visit of von Luckner 
through their parishes. The strongest cases assembled 
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by Militaty Intelligence involved Hiller and Gutenkunst, 
despite the fact that Gutenkunst 's son was an officer in 
the Second Australian Imperial Force. Though the local 
pofice report stated that there was no evidence of Hiller 
"being anti-British" at the outbreak of the war he was 
kept under surveillance. Evidence at his hearing before 
the Aliens Tribunal in Gaythome Intemment Camp in 
March 1943 alleged how he had allowed Dr Neumann to 
make a pro-Nazi speech in his church in June 1939. 
When questioned about his political beliefs he naively 
stated "[A]s far as the Nazi regime is concerned, I have 
always contended that it may be all right for that country 
but not for Australia".^^ Sent to Tatura camp. Hiller was 
released in Februaty 1944 a vety embittered man. 
A policy to release resident intemees began tentatively 
in March 1942 when those who were not Nazis. Fascists 
or Japanese were considered for work release under 
stringent restrictions and curfews. Neutral aliens. Allied 
nationals and the "Dunera" refugees were eligible to 
apply for important national service, in some cases in the 
armed services.®" The Aliens Classification and Advisoty 
Committee recommended in March 1943 that male 
"friendly and refugee aliens" be encouraged to join the 
Army. This is a strange t u m around for refugees from 
Nazi persecution who. having fled to England, were 
intemed then transported to Australia, incarcerated at 
Hay POW camps and finally asked to join the Austialian 
Military Forces.®' 
The Allied Works Council had been established in 
Febmaty 1942. with E.G. Theodore as its Chairaian. to 
coordinate and implement the massive public works and 
defence installations needed to launch AIHed offensives 
in the Pacific. The Civilian Constmction Corps, under 
the control of Theodore's business partner. Frank Packer 
employed a total of 53.518 men between Febmaty 1942 
and June 1942. Most of those directed to perform labour 
were men unfit for or over the age of mfiitaty service. To 
supplement the chronic shortage of able-bodied 
personnel, suggestions had been made to introduce 
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25.000 workers from the Netherlands East Indies for the 
duration of the war.®^ Within the Commonwealth, given 
the competition between the Manpower Authorities and 
the Allied Works Council to control all available labour, 
moves were made to recruit among registered aliens. 
Therefore most low-risk intemees were released from 
incarceration in order to contribute gainfully to the Allied 
war effort. 
In early 1942 the Civil Alien Corps was established as 
a section of the Alfied Works Councfi. Released intemees 
and aliens, whether of neutral or enemy status, who had 
been cleared through the security procedures of the 
Aliens Tribunals, could be employed by this body. They 
were paid the basic allowance of the Australian Militaty 
Forces scale and in circumstances that would not 
contravene international conventions. They were 
therefore precluded from working on direct defence work 
such as aerodrome construction. Italians from north east 
Queensland were not permitted initially to return home 
due to proximity of the war front in the Pacific. In 
Westem Australia after the undue haste to intem Italian 
enemy aliens in June 1940. the Army soon realised that 
this would deprive the state of valuable labour and 
commodities. As early as 29 August 1940. GOC Westem 
Command pointed out to the Military Board in 
Melboume that the Italians of Geraldton produced most 
ofthe tomatoes in the state and recommended that 30 of 
the 65 intemees be immediately released. Westem 
Command did not recommend the release of sixty 
Geraldton fishermen taken into custody as "the fishing 
Industry is more difficult to control".®^ 
Whilst the Army was required to furnish "adequate 
security arrangements". Northem Command in 
Queensland accepted some 1100 former intemees and 
other aliens who were deployed for ancillaty Allied Works 
Councfi projects from March and April 1942 onwards 
mostly engaged In road construction and forestty in the 
southern and central regions which were not considered 
strategically vulnerable. In Victoria 550 released 
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intemees from Queensland worked at the saltworks at 
Underwood and Laverton and the forestty camp at 
Werrimllll. Altogether some 1128 intemees from all over 
the continent worked at these two centres.®* In October 
1943 the federal Standing Committee of Rural Manpower 
realised that this labour was particularly distasteful and 
the Deputy director of Manpower in Victoria the following 
month feared that these vital projects would be bereft of 
labour if all enemy aliens were released to their home 
states. 
When, in April 1943 the War Cabinet re-formed the 
Civil Aliens Corps, the whole operation subsequently 
proved a failure. Only 1,671 ofthe 15.601 then eligible 
for service were actually assigned. 350 were employed on 
the Port Augusta-Kalgoorlie railway to replace tiie Italian 
POWs and another group were delegated to the Port 
Augusta-Alice Springs line. In May 1945. given the poor 
numbers cmd the excessive administrative costs it was 
replaced by the Civil Construction Corps. Most 
potentially eligible members were exempted because they 
were already employed on essential agricultural, pastoral 
labour or secondary industry. In February 1945 only one 
percent ofthe 16.701 members ofthe Civil Construction 
Corps were refugees and only eight per cent were enemy 
afiens.®^ 
In conclusion, the policies and processes of internal 
intemment of those deemed security threats by virtue of 
their national origin or ideology continued the practices 
pursued in the Great War. Spurred by fears of 
contamination and destmction by non- British elements, 
xenophobia added layers of intense suspicion and 
incomprehension to the embedded foundations of racism 
a n d A n g l o - A u s t r a l i a n c h a u v i n i s m . Though 
Commonwealth poficy laid down in the War Book 
required restrictive and selective intemment. public and 
official anxiety demanded continually expanding 
categories of those deemed candidates for incarceraUon. 
Initially in 1939 only Nazis and their supporters were 
intemed. When Italy entered the war in J u n e 1940 not 
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only were Fascists detained but in Westem Australia 
most specifically, old Industrial disputes from the 1920s 
were setUed. Italian miners, wood cutters and farmers 
were Indiscriminately taken into custody. The greatest 
numbers detained however were incarcerated in the early 
months of 1942 when a Japanese invasion of 
Queensland appeared imminent. Thousands of 
Japanese. Italians and other enemy alien Europeans 
were summarily detained and sent to intemment camps. 
From mid-1942 when the initial alarm abated, plans 
were made to utilise labour resources of all forms of 
naturalised British subjects and "cleared" enemy aliens. 
No other Commonwealth country accepted so readily 
so many categories of foreign POWs from Britain. 
Austialia alone was engaged in holding POWs and 
political dissidents from other Allied powers. Curiously 
at the vety time when Australia was engaged in a fight 
for its own survival, its heritage as a convenient distant 
refuse dump was reasserted and intensified. 
Furthermore the elaborate procedures to ensure the 
control, and indeed in many instances, forced labour of 
Intemees. POWs and. later after 1946 displaced stateless 
persons and refugees, reflected the patterns of control 
estabfished in the days of penal servitude and 
transportation. Mature nationhood remained an elusive 
dream while the old patterns of dependency, 
authoritarianism, and xenophobia were intensified and 
extended. 
Chapter 8 
Enemy Alien Control in the United States 
during World War II: A Survey 
John Joel Culley 
West Texas A&M University 
In late September 1939. the Department of State, with 
the approval of the President, proposed to the 
governments of the belligerent powers. Britain. France, 
and Germany, that they refrain from the harsh policy of 
interning civilian enemy aliens, and suggested that the 
problem might be dealt with by repatriation and parole.' 
Such was not to be the case. As the war spread, civilian 
enemy aliens would be intemed in Europe, in Asia, and 
in the United States. Even before Pearl Harbor, the War 
Department and the Just ice Department had jointly 
developed a program to apprehend Individual aliens, 
selected by prior Investigation, and to provide them 
hearings that could lead to intemment. People of 
Japanese ancestiy constituted a large percentage ofthe 
enemy aliens intemed by this system. While focusing on 
this group, this paper makes no pretence of exploring or 
viewing this intemment experience from their 
perspective. That would require a more extensive work. 
The goal of this essay is to provide an overview of the 
origins and implementation of this intemment program, 
and to note some of the major features and 
characteristics of the intemment camps. 
Aliens who live in a nation that goes to war with the 
land ofthelr birth have a tenuous hold on civil liberties. 
Overnight they become enemy aliens and are subject to 
civil disabfiiUes. Legal discrimination was not new to the 
Issei. the generation that had immigrated from Japan to 
the United States. The 1790 Naturalization Act as 
amended In 1870 and reinforced by a Supreme Court 
decision of 1922. denied naturalised citizenship to the 
Issei^ and relegated them to permanent non-citizenship 
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status regardless of their length of residence in the 
United States. The govemment of Japan, however, 
considered the Issei to be Japanese citizens.^ Their legal 
status as aliens, their concentration on the West Coast, 
long standing racial prejudices, and rising fears of 
subversion and Fifth Column activities, all insured that 
the govemment would view the Issel with suspicion even 
before Pearl Harbor. 
On 6 September 1939. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt designated the FBI as the primaty agency to 
investigate matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and 
violation of neutrality regulations. The FBI embraced the 
opportunity to use this new mandate'^ and began to 
investigate aliens whose backgrounds, activities, or 
associations aroused suspicions of possible disloyalty. 
The bureau drew up a list with potential detainees 
classified into one of three categories according to their 
presumed degree of dangerousness - the ABC fist. The 
Justice Department filed the FBI's information away for 
future use.^ On 28 June 1940. Congress passed the Alien 
Registration Act or Smith Act which ultimately became 
best known for its provisions on sedition. But Title III of 
the Smith Act required every alien over fourteen years old 
to register and be fingerprinted. By December 1940. the 
Justice Department had supervised the registration and 
fingerprinting of almost five million aliens, assigned them 
Identification numbers, and put this information on 
punch cards for tabulation.® In addition, in J u n e 1940. 
the administration moved the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), an agency that would play 
a key role in the enemy alien control program, from the 
Labor Department to the Justice Department. With both 
the INS and the FBI under its supervision the centrality 
ofthe Justice Department was assured.^ 
The defeat of France in J u n e 1940. shocked the 
American public and deeply disturbed the President. 
Fear of subversion, espionage and fifth colunm activities 
grew, as reflected in the President Roosevelt's fireside 
chat of 26 May 1940. While these fears focused on 
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Germans and Italians, the Japanese were not immune 
from suspicion, especially after J u n e 1941. when the 
govemment arrested an officer of the Japanese Navy on 
espionage charges in Callfomla.* By 18 July 1941, a 
joint committee ofthe War Department and the JusUce 
Department had produced a plan for the selecUve 
apprehension, temporaty detention, and long term 
intemment of resident aliens who were citizens of 
potential enemy nations.^ 
In October 1941. the question of which agency. War 
or Justice, would have permanent custody of those 
enemy aliens ordered intemed was still a point of 
contention on the War-Justice Joint Committee. The 
State Department decfined to become embroiled on 
either side of this issue but was eager to assert its vital 
interest in the treatment of enemy aliens. On I 
September 1939. the department had activated the 
Special War Problems Division, whose purview included 
Americans intemed abroad and civilian aliens who might 
be intemed in the United States. From inter-
departmental memoranda it is clear that State was 
convinced that the treatment of enemy aliens intemed In 
this countty would largely determine the treatment 
afforded to American citizens intemed abroad. The 
department believed that the question of which agency 
held custody was less important that the actual and 
perceived terms and conditions of treatment. There was 
no international agreement covering the treatment 
afforded to civilian enemy afiens. However, through the 
efforts of the Red Cross, the European belligerents, with 
the exception of the Soviet Union, had Informally 
undertaken to apply the principles ofthe 1929 Geneva 
Convention on Prisoners of War to civilian intemees. The 
State Department approved and concluded that in light 
of humanitarian responsibility and in view of possible 
retaliation against American citizens, the proper course 
of action was to insure that enemy aliens intemed in the 
United States would be held in conditions to which they 
and their governments could not reasonably object. The 
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department argued that intemment camps should be 
open at all times to inspection by the Red Cross, by the 
protecting powers, and by the State Department. To 
facilitate this, the department fostered the formation of 
ajolnt War-Justice-State committee on intemee affairs.'" 
Section 21 . Title 50. US Code provided the 
govemment's authority over enemy afiens. After the 
President proclaimed the existence of a state of wcir or a 
threat of invasion, all natives, citizens, or subjects of a 
hostile govemment residing in the US as un-naturalised 
aliens who were fourteen years of age or older were 
"liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and 
removed as alien enemies". The courts had held 
previously that such arrests were not subject to the due 
process clause ofthe fourteenth amendment or to review 
by habeas corpus. The presidential warrant on which 
each arrest was made did not have to disclose the 
specific grounds of the arrest. On 7 and 8 December 
1941. President Roosevelt issued three proclamations 
(nos. 2525. 2526. and 2527) which noted the existence 
of a state of war and which made Japanese. German, and 
Italian aliens subject to summary arrest and detention.' ' 
Within twenty-four hours of the attack on Pearl 
Harbour, the FBI had apprehended 1.717 aliens and 
turned them over to the Justice Department for 
temporary detention; 1.212 were of Japanese ancestty.'^ 
Meanwhile the Justice Department assured the public 
that enemy aliens would be dealt with in a manner that 
was orderly, fair, and sufficient to meet any threat. On 11 
December. Attomey-General Francis Biddle declared that 
no alien had been apprehended, or would be. on the 
basis of nationality alone, and that evety alien taken into 
custody had been under surveillance for over a year. 
Biddle's public statements continued to reject a policy of 
collective guilt and wholesale Intemment. He claimed 
that the govemment's policy considered each individual 
case on its merits. The arrests of enemy aliens 
continued; by 9 March the Justice Department held over 
4.000 people in custody.'^ The rapidly accumulating 
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number of people under detention threatened to 
overwhelm the govemment's pre-war plan for handling 
them. Any emalysis of this enemy alien control program 
should address three points: (1) the basis on which 
individuals were originally apprehended. (2) the process 
that determined the fate ofthe individual once detained, 
and (3) the conditions and treatment afforded the 
individual ordered into intemment. 
The enemy alien control program was based on the 
apprehension of selected Individuals, not on an 
indiscriminate mass round-up. The Justice Department 
established the Alien Enemy Control Unit (AECU) In 
Washington. DC. shorUy after Pearl Harbor to serve as a 
central coordinating agency. Within each of the more 
than one hundred federal judicial districts across the 
nation, the department established an Alien Enemy 
Hearing Board. An FBI field oflTice initiated the process by 
submitting its dossier on an individual alien to a US 
Attomey who considered the evidence and forwarded a 
request to the AECU for a presidential warrant of 
apprehension. After review, the AECU could issue a 
warrant which the FBI executed, and the case moved to 
the local Alien Enemy Hearing Board where the second 
phase of the program began. 
Each hearing board consisted of three civilian 
members drawn from the local community. 
Representatives of the US Attomey's office, of the FBI. 
and ofthe INS also attended each hearing. As described 
by the head of the AECU. Edward J . Ennis. what 
fofiowed was a "summary informal hearing", in which 
"evety effort [was] made to get away from costly time 
consuming judicial procedures". The alien appeared 
before the board in person and was allowed to present 
affidavits but could neither object to the govemment's 
evidence nor have a lawyer present. As Ennis noted: "If 
there is substantial reason to sustain the charge against 
the alien, every doubt at this time must be resolved 
against him and in favour of the Govemment. The man 
cannot be given anything like a jury trial on Uaese 
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issues". The board's decision for release, parole, or 
Intemment. was forwarded to the AECU in Washington 
for review. If the AECU concurred in a recommendation 
for intemment. the alien passed into indefinite custody 
and from the hands of a civilian agency, the INS. into 
those ofthe US Army, which was at that time responsible 
for the custody of all civilian male enemy aliens ordered 
interned.'* Defects in this procedure soon appeared due 
to the actions of both the FBI and the Army. 
As early as 8 December 1941. Edward J. Ennis. at 
that time the general counsel of the INS. noted that the 
FBI was turning many afiens over to the INS without a 
written statement showing good cause for detention. He 
feared that mass arrests made without assurance that 
the persons were afiens and sufficiently dangerous to 
detain, would unnecessarily overwhelm the service's 
temporary detention facilities and precipitate the 
breakdown ofthe hearing and parole machinety. Ennis 
also argued that the system of limiting hearing boards to 
the role of making recommendations to Washington was 
too centialised and would cause large numbers of people 
to spend a lengthy time in temporaty detention.'^ 
In late 1941 and early 1942 the Army pressed for the 
removal of aliens from sensitive areas on the West Coast 
based on militaty necessity. At this time only the Justice 
Department had legal authority to effect such removal 
and its program was directed toward individuals with 
hearings provided in the local community. Nonetheless 
the Army forced the issue and effectively compelled the 
Justice Department to acquiesce in Indiscriminate 
removals. The INS found Itself taking custody of large 
numbers of Issel excluded from their homes and the 
judicial districts where they should have received a 
hearing. The Justice Department, to its dismay, saw its 
own program being circumvented and overwhelmed. The 
Army vented its disgust with Justice for obstructionism 
and delay, and for expecting the Army to provide care for 
those whom it excluded. When queried about this 
development by the State Department. Lieut. Colonel 
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Karl R Bendetsen ofthe War Department's Office ofthe 
Provost Marshal General replied that the War 
Department would do its best for persons who fell into 
its hands, but that it was not a resettiement 
organization, and that other govemment agencies should 
remember that the Army's job was to kill Japanese, not 
to save them.'® Colonel Bendetsen notwithstanding, the 
Army was responsible for the permanent custody of 
those aliens ordered intemed. 
Initially, however, enemy aliens were held in 
temporary detention by the INS. When the war began the 
INS operated seven stations for the detention of aliens 
under immigration proceedings. More importantly, the 
service also operated three special camps at Fort 
Stanton. New Mexico; Fort Missoula. Montana; and Fort 
Lincoln. North Dakota, for detaining Italian and German 
merchant seamen taken into custody between September 
1939 and December 1941. Fort Missoula, which held 
995 Italians, and Fort Lincoln, which held 256 Germans, 
were old army posts. Fort Stanton, another old army post 
and more recently a Public Health Service facfiity. held 
411 Germans. The INS expected to detain the aliens for 
a period of two to three weeks only, pending the hearing 
process, and the service believed that it had the situation 
in hand. In addition to the existing detention stations 
and facilities, the INS opened a number of temporaty 
detention centres. The service took over an old CCC 
camp at Tuna Ceuiyon near Los Angeles, and an old state 
relief camp at Sharp Park near San Francisco. At 
Portland. Salt Lake City. St Louis, and St Paul separate 
floors or wings of county jails were used, with the 
detainees segregated from the jail population and 
supervised by INS staff. This practice drew a rebuke from 
the State Department which suggested that aliens 
should not be held in jails, but in places more in keeping 
with the spirit of the Geneva Convention. Other 
temporary detention stations were established on the 
floor of a municipal building in Kansas City, in a police 
station in Cleveland and Houston, in a fire station in 
Enemy Alien Control in USA 145 
Syracuse, in part of a public building in Cincinnati, at a 
community centre in Hartford, in a railroad building at 
Niagara Falls, under a stadium in Miami, in a National 
Guard Armoty in Pittsburgh, and in a large private 
residence in Chicago. Thus the situation stood until the 
Army began to exclude significant numbers of aliens 
from mfiltary zones on the West Coast and the INS had 
to absorb them. In a short time the continuing transfer 
of Issei filled the available accommodations at Fort 
Missoula and the overflow was sent to Fort Lincoln. By 
March 1942. both camps were filled to capacity, and with 
more Issel expected to arrive, the service opened a new 
detention camp at Santa Fe. New Mexico at the site of an 
old CCC camp.'^ 
The INS ultimately had seven permanent intemment 
camps: Fort Stanton. New Mexico; Fort Missoula. 
Montana; Fort Lincoln. North Dakota; Kenedy. Texas; 
Seagovfile, Texas; Ctystal City. Texas; and Santa Fe. New 
Mexico. Five other sites that the INS considered suitable 
for prolonged detention were located at Sharp Park. 
California; Kooskla. Idaho; Algiers, Louisiana; Gloucester 
City, New Jersey; and Ellis Island, New York. Some of 
these served special purposes. Fort Stanton, in addition 
to holding German merchant seamen, had a separate 
segregation unit to hold individuals from all ofthe camps 
who were deemed to be escape artists, trouble-makers, 
or recalcitrant individuals. The Kenedy Intemment Camp 
primarily contained enemy aliens deported from Latin 
American nations and held in custody in the United 
States. At Ctystal City, the INS intemed family units; 
Seagovfile held family units and unattached or single 
women. Kooskla Intemment Camp was for intemees who 
volunteered to work, for pay. on constructing the Lewis 
and Clark highway. Santa Fe Intemment Camp held only 
Japanese males. Fort Missoula held primarily Italian 
merchant seamen and some Japanese, while Fort 
Lincoln held German merchant seamen and Japanese.'® 
The third aspect of the enemy alien control program 
to consider is the treatment afforded to the intemee and 
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the conditions of his confinement. This was largely 
determined by two factors: (1) the decision to apply the 
provisions ofthe 1929 Geneva Convention on prisoners-
of-war to civilian intemees. and (2) the fact that the 
United States had the economic ability to provide for tiie 
material needs of the intemees. It is also important that 
the govemment in general, and the State Department in 
particular, recognised that this was in the self-interest of 
the United States. This, at least, was the plan. But plans 
and programs are administered by men and whether 
those men were Army personnel or civilians would make 
a difference. 
On 11 Februaty 1942. the first group of enemy aliens 
ordered Intemed was transferred from the temporaty 
detention of the INS to the permanent custody of the 
Army which had opened several camps for this purpose. 
The Army held German aliens at Stringtown. Oklahoma; 
Italians at McAIester. Oklahoma; and Japanese at Camp 
Livingston. Louisiana and Lordsburg. New Mexico.'^ By 
May 1942. some 1.065 enemy aliens were in Army camps 
such as the one at Lordsburg. Not unexpectedly, militaty 
control over civilians proved troublesome for all 
concerned. The intemees found Army control harsh and 
disagreeable, and the Army authorities sometimes 
incompetent. Strife, and even death, could result, as it 
did for Hirota Isomura and Toshiro Kobata. two intemees 
who were shot and kified. allegedly while ttying to 
escape, at Lordsburg on 27 July 1942. The situation was 
not satisfactoty for the Army either, for by 1943 the Army 
faced the need to provide for growing numbers of 
German prisoners of war from the North African 
campaign. On 27 Februaty 1943. the War and Justice 
Departments reached agreement to transfer all civilian 
enemy alien intemees back to the INS. In May and June 
1943. approximately 4.200 were transferred.^" 
The intemees definitely preferred to be in the custody 
ofthe INS.^' Unfike the Army, the service had experience 
in dealing with civilians from different cultures and 
backgrounds. This did not entirely prevent Instances of 
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mistreatment. In May 1942, at Fort Lincoln and Fort 
Missoula, cases came to light In which intemees had 
been struck, required to stand for excessive periods of 
time, shouted at. called liars, grabbed by the body or 
clothing, shaken or pushed, and confined to the guard 
house for up to twenty-seven days without 
justification.^^ For the Issei. intemment under the INS 
sUll involved serious physical and psychological 
deprivations. Objectively, as the tragic histoty of civilians 
intemed and imprisoned in many nations during World 
War II filustrates. deprivation is relative. For the 
intemees in the United States, however, the reference 
point was not the inhumane treatment of civilians 
imprisoned elsewhere, about which they knew nothing, 
but rather the life and conditions they previously had 
enjoyed at their own homes - in freedom. 
Loss of freedom of movement was central to the 
physical experience. Generally the camps were enclosed 
by wire fences ten feet high, with guard towers at the 
comers. Within the fenced compound, the quality of 
housing varied. Seagovfile. a recently constructed federal 
penitentiary for women, had permanent living quarters 
and facifities. The family camp at Ctystal City, formerly 
a Farm Security Administration migratoty labour camp, 
provided detached housing units which the intemees 
often greatly improved with garden work and light 
carpentty. Elsewhere the intemees lived in wooden 
barracks-type structures of CCC construction or design. 
Living in this housing was analogous to living in an 
Army camp. It was a bleak and uncomfortable experience 
that imposed the loss of privacy Inherent in communal 
living. 
Overall, the govemment provided adequately for 
clothing, food, and medical care. Intemees could wear 
personal clothing in their possession as well as that 
issued from govemment stocks.^^ Malnutrition and lack 
of food was not a problem and govemment records 
document the effort made to provide nutritious food. 
Nonetheless, food preferences are subjective and the 
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Japanese typically preferred a diet that differed from the 
standard American diet. Moreover, in an institutional 
setting, the manner of preparation ultimately determines 
the quality ofthe food served. In this regard, problems 
did occur.^* The INS initially provided medical care by 
contracting with local practitioners and by utilizing the 
ships ' doctors from among the intemed merchant 
seamen. When this proved unsatlsfactoty the INS tumed 
to the US Public Health Service for physicians, nurses, 
and specialty hospitals. In some camps, intemee 
physicians also served.^^ Despite the adequacy of what 
the govemment provided, no one would argue that the 
quality of clothing, food, or medical care equalled that 
available to the free citizen in the general economy. 
Psychological hardships at least equalled the physical 
deprivations. In 1942, the median age of all Issel males 
was fifty-five, a vety advanced age at which to have one's 
life uprooted.^® One can catalog the losses: the loss of 
personal autonomy, of freedom of movement, of freedom 
of speech, of material possessions, of career and 
meaningful work, of time and talent wasted, of sexual 
relationships, of privacy and dignity, and of family 
contact. This last point, the separation from family, was 
the most painful loss of all for many of the Issei. 
By the spring of 1942 the intemment and evacuation 
process was producing complex social problems and 
hardships, but it was not clear which agency would be 
responsible for addressing them. In July 1942. the INS 
assumed responsibility for undertaking the custody of 
family units where husband and wife were both ordered 
intemed. This included not only aliens resident in the 
United States, but also families brought here from Latin 
America for intemment. The service estabfished a family 
camp at Ctystal City and the first group of families 
arrived in December 1942. Ctystal City held both 
Germans and Japanese, and of all the camps it 
presented the most complex management problems.^^ 
Intemment camps were complex institutions, with 
often 1.000 to 2.000 people resident in confinement. 
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They featured an extensive organization on both sides of 
the wire. The INS allowed intemees to elect a camp 
spokesman and other leaders, and to take the initiative 
in areas such as recreation, education, religion, and 
activities to maintain morale.^® The INS provided work 
projects inside the camp and sometimes outside the 
camp, for which intemees were paid. And in these camps 
as in any system in which large numbers of people are 
held under mvoluntary confinement, questions of control 
and discipline would be important. 
After the war ended and the camps closed, the INS 
proudly noted that in the camps under its supervision, 
no Italians and only one mentally disturbed Japanese 
had attempted to escape; the Germans were another 
stoty. More importantly, no one had been killed or even 
shot at in the INS camps.^^ Officers in charge of the INS 
camps employed several means of control, including the 
revocation and withholding of valued privileges, such as 
receiving visitors, the use of recreational facifities, or 
more importantly, ruling that the intemee was Ineligible 
to apply for a family reunion transfer to Ctystal City. The 
most serious punishment the INS used was to transfer 
the intemee to the segregation unit at Fort Stanton, an 
isolated sub-camp which met only the minimum 
provisions ofthe Geneva Convention.^" Conflict among 
the Intemees themselves sometimes required transfers 
to, and from, other camps. But those transferred for 
making trouble for the camp authorities sometimes 
brought their trouble with them to their new location, as 
when over 300 members of the resegregationist 
movement from the troubled Tule Lake Segregation 
Centre arrived at Santa Fe in late 1944 and early 1945. 
(Tule Lake was a War Relocation Authority Camp in 
which "tiouble-makers" had been concentrated.)^' On 12 
March 1945. efforts to force compliance with camp 
regulations upon this group produced a riot that 
involved at least 250 intemees throwing stones and 30 
Border Patrol inspectors charging with tear-gas and 
clubs. Four intemees were hospitalised in what was 
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probably the most serious disturbance in any INS 
camp.^^ 
Before the plans for enemy alien control were finalised 
in July 1941. the INS had argued that It was the agency 
best qualified to determine who should be classified as a 
dangerous enemy alien, to arrest those deemed 
dangerous, and to have custody of those to be intemed.^* 
This all encompassing role eluded the INS. but after the 
spring of 1943 the service did hold custody of all civilian 
intemed enemy aliens. Even in this more limited role 
what had appeared simple proved to be complex as 
unanticipated problems arose. A few examples will 
suffice. 
Periodically the INS confronted the charge that it 
coddled the intemees. giving them a variety and quality 
of food unavailable to American civilians, while the 
Japanese and Germans starved and mistreated American 
prisoners. This was a sensitive issue, and the INS 
usually responded with a statement stressing the 
obfigations of the Geneva Convention and the role of 
reciprocity as it might effect imprisoned Americans.^* 
Management and staffing problems arose as when the 
INS took over the federal work camp at Kooskla. and 
absorbed some officials from the Bureau of Prisons, only 
to find that some of these men had inappropriate 
attitudes, formed by their years of dealing with felons, 
that they were unwilling to change.^^ The State 
Department program of bringing German and Japanese 
aliens from Latin America for intemment in the United 
States created another problem when it unexpectedly 
produced a number of German-bom Jews who were 
refugees from Nazi Germany, but who now found 
themselves intemed here as enemies ofthe United States 
and housed with other Germans who often had Nazi 
sympathies.^® And at Ctystal City, camp authorities were 
drawn into a heated cultural conflict between the 
Japanese from Pern and the Japanese from the 
continental United States. The dispute among the 
Japanese focused on the proper social conduct of their 
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children, and specifically on the appropriateness of 
having a high-school prom or social dance.^^ The INS 
found, in short, that a complex system produces complex 
problems. 
In conclusion it seems clear that £m in-depth 
examination ofthe role ofthe Justice Department and of 
two of its agencies, the FBI which made the 
investigations and collected the evidence that led to 
apprehension, and the INS which eventually held 
custody over those intemed. is needed. This program 
was shaped by many things - bureaucratic in-fighting 
and empire building, ignorance and racism, and war-
Ume fears and passions. Important as these forces were, 
there was another factor of equal importance in shaping 
the program - the intemees. The program should also be 
examined from their perspective, or perspectives. The 
Japanese Intemees. the Issei. on whom this essay has 
focused, were not jus t inert material that was acted 
upon. Abehaviourial approach would recognise that they 
were actors who helped shape the intemment 
experience. Their response helped determine what the 
intemment experience would be for themselves at that 
Ume. as well as what role it would assume In their lives 
in later years. 
Chapter 9 
"Taken Away to be Shot?": 
The Process of Incarceration in Australia 
in World War II 
Kay Saunders 
The University of Queensland 
Speaking before an Aliens Tribunal hearing In Februaty 
1942 Lieut. Colonel Sydney Whittington succinctly 
articulated the premises upon which some 7000 
Australian residents were deprived of their liberty, 
humfiiated and. in many cases, financially ruined and 
permanently psychologically traumatlsed -
We [Military Intelligence) may not be able to prove what we 
say in the ordinary sense of evidence, but we can prove it in 
this way. that we know our people are prepared to give the 
tribunal swom evidence that there is reason to believe that 
such-and-such an alien is dangerous; and in time of war 
that should be in itself sufiicient to show that enemy aliens 
should not be allowed at large; that we cannot afford to risk 
it ... He may be innocent in this way; that he has never 
done anything to harm the British Empire; the reason for 
that may be that he has never had the opportunity. We 
have intemed him. not because he has done any overt 
wrong but because he is a potential danger to the 
community.' 
This vague concept wherein an unsubstantiated 
potentiafity to commit an act prejudicial to the Allied war 
effort, or. more pertinently to possess political or 
ideological beliefs suspected of being "anti-British" was 
the comerstone upon which detentions proceeded. But 
the actual policy was extiemely flexible In its operations 
and indeed no clear or unified pat tem is discemible. 
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local factors such as the presence of large 
concentiations of Italians. Germans. Japanese or Finns; 
their existence In strategically cmclal locations like the 
Queensland sugar coast or in mining centres like Mt Isa 
or Kalgoorfie or the progress of the war in distant battle 
zones all bore upon the patterns of incarceration (see 
chapter 7). 
Two distinct perspectives on these processes may be 
discerned: the official and that ofthe subject unfortunate 
enough to be detained. Not unexpectedly at no stage 
were these two components integrated.^ The state police 
and Mlfitaty Intelligence identified both individuals and 
whole ethnic groups like the Japanese as suitable cases 
for intemment and instigated processes to secure 
confinement for varying durations. We can discern their 
vatying attitudes and motives from official documents. 
But for the individual caught up in these secret 
deliberations and processes, the whole experience was 
one of disbefief. shock, humiliation, anger and enduring 
bitterness. We have some insight into their perspectives 
from later oral testimony and from their evidence in their 
appeals in the Aliens Tribunals. In this regard the 
experiences of the Japanese of West Coast Canada and 
the USA provide fruitful comparison. There whole 
families and communities were rounded up and 
Incarcerated, albeit in rough detention camps in harsh 
inhospitable countty (see chapters 8. 10. 12. 13. 14). In 
Australia, apart from the Japanese, individuals, usually 
adult men. were detained and often therefore lacked 
emotional support when despatched to a remote camp, 
as chapter 11 will show. Moreover their families left 
behind had to fend for themselves, thus making the 
processes of healing and reconciliation more difficult to 
achieve later. 
The structure of command whereby policies were 
initiated and translated into action at the local 
community level had a direct bearing upon the 
round-ups. For, although broad policy directions were 
formulated under The National Security Act (1939-41) 
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and Military Intelligence Initiatives, the actual selection 
of Intemees was mosUy effected by the clvifian police 
responding to particular local pressures.^ Lieut. Colonel 
J ames WhiUaw. assessing the inequalities that could 
arise within procedures devised and implemented on an 
ad hoc basis, wrote to the Military Board in July 1940-
It is realised that [regulations 25 and 26 of the National 
Security (General) Regulations incorporating delegatory 
powers]... will involve some risk of a lack of uniformity, due 
to the varying viewpoints of the officers concerned; but the 
risk is offset by the consideration that ofRcers commanding 
are all well advised by well trained stafi". in contact with 
local conditions and fully competent to appreciate the 
repercussions in local public opinion, arising from any 
proposed action.'' 
Given that the civilian pofice in rural locales had often 
not completed primary school. decisions were made upon 
uninformed prejudice and ill-considered ignorance raUier 
than upon consistent criteria. Whitiaw was entirely 
incorrect in his assumption that local officers were 
competent to assess security risks. Sergeant Lock of 
Home Hill reported he was "continually on the look out 
for any disloyal acts or utterances among the two 
Germans. 62 Italians. 240 naturalised British subjects of 
Itafian origin, eight Finns, one Frenchman, eighteen 
Greeks, five Japanese, one Russiem. twelve Spanish and 
two Yugoslavs in the district".^ That Greece was an ally 
and Spain a neutral nation during the war did not deter 
surveillance. Australian patterns of Incarceration, 
especially in the early months of 1942 when an Invasion 
seemed Imminent, witnessed individuals from some 
twenty-seven countries, including those of Allied or 
Neutral Status being incarcerated.^ Indeed any man of 
military age who was not of British origins was 
suspected of "disloyalty" or harbouring dubious loyalUes 
to foreign powers. The largest single round - up in 
Queensland occurred on 13-4 February 1942. In those 
tense days before the Fall of Singapore and the bombing 
of Darwin. The Sydney Morning Herald reported that over 
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2000 aliens had been questioned and 
it is hoped that it will help clear up the spy radio service 
which has been giving information to Japan. The police 
forces in the north have been strengthened largely by the 
promotion of men with an intimate knowledge of the north 
and drafting of special men to assist in the possible drive 
against fifth columnists. The situation in the north has been 
causing the authorities much concem. particularly in the 
areas where Italians predominate.^ 
That most ofthe north Queensland Italians had migrated 
in the 1920s to escape both fascism and poverty was 
now forgotten. Italians simply were portrayed as agents 
of the Axis. 
One of the central problems emanating from this 
selection process was the political naivety and ignorance 
ofthe civil police. In the "List of Italians in the Townsville 
police district who are considered should be intemed in 
the event of hostilities with Italy", prepared as early as 30 
April 1940. Salvatore Galea was described as strong 
communist supporter and who would "no doubt attempt 
to cause industrial trouble in the event of Italy entering 
the war against the Allies". Here two quite separate 
issues were conflated. Communists in Australia did not 
support the war effort untfi June 1941 when the USSR 
was Invaded. The question of Italy's participation seems 
entirely inappropriate given its s tatus as Fascist 
dictatorship. The police report seemingly could not 
distinguish between fascism or communism. Had Galea 
opposed the war effort it would have undoubtedly be due 
to his communist affiliations. Alfio Curcurto was likewise 
confusingly described as a "Strong Communist with 
fascist sympathies".^ In both cases any "foreign" ideology 
such as fascism and communism was regarded as 
dangerous. Thus political ignorance lay at the 
foundation of many decisions to later intem a particular 
Individual (see chapter 2). 
Those who became naturedised were doubly suspect. 
AsDet. Sergeant J . J.A. Browne of Townsville reported on 
6 June 1940-
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On 1st May 1939 Alfredo Ravelant spoke from the platform 
In the Workers' Hall at Ingham in support of a rank 
Communist named Barrato who had jus t retumed from 
Spain. At that time he was apparenUy finalizing matters for 
his naturalization, as he took the Oath of Allegiance on 
14 /6 /39 . This to my mind is too glaring a reversal of form 
to be genuine. I consider he has worked his way Into the 
Retumed Soldiers' Association to find out what he can 
about what Is being done by the retumed soldiers.^ 
Here again diverse factors were conflated in order to 
discredit an individual. Another local Itafian resident, 
Silvio Della-Costa, also a recent naturalised BriUsh 
subject, was described as "of the lowest type ... He ... 
would be the first person to be intermixed with any 
sabotage". No evidence was provided for this 
extraordinary claim. Unsubstantiated allegations of 
sabotage, espionage, fascism and communism were 
indiscriminately employed to describe Italians in the 
sugar district in the early months of 1940. Tragically 
these unfounded suspicions, with no proper evidence, 
were to form the basis of targets for incarceration from 
February to April 1942. Margaret Bevege adds that, 
although the highest risk categories comprising 
members ofthe Fascist Party were initially incarcerated, 
even the lower end ofthe security risks were rounded up 
just prior to the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942. All 
men of enemy origin between the ages of twenty and 
sixty were removed from the Calms district at this time.'" 
Previously there had been round - ups to coincide 
with cmcial events in the progress ofthe war. Guiseppe 
Zammarchi recalled decades later: 
1 hung around Tennant Creek and tried prospecting. It was 
no good at first and then 1 got some gold. J u s t when 1 was 
successful Italy joined the war, J u n e 1940, and they 
arrested me as an enemy alien, seized the gold in the bank, 
about 500 pounds worth and took me back to Victoria. 1 
had to leave my truck in Tennant Creek and I didn't see It 
until after the war ... After this I did 16 months in the iron. 
An enemy alien. They were nuts. I didn't commit nothing. 
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I was an active anti-fascist, a militant... A trial (before the 
Aliens Tribunal) started In May (1941). There was a panel 
of five or six judges, and two from Military Intelligence, who 
cross examined me ... Was I a communist? A Labor Party 
member? What did I have against Australia?" 
On the other hand. Captain J.D. Balfe in preparing the 
Array's case in the Aliens Tribunal of 6 May 1941 
declared: 
At this time (June 1940) feeling among the Australian 
miners against Italians on the gold fields (at Tennant Creek) 
was very strong, and it was discovered that a vigilante 
committee was in the process of formation with the 
intention of running ItaUans out of town ... Owing to 
Zammarchl's communistic affiliations, his general attitude 
of truculence and as an aid to his own personal safety, a 
decision was made to Intern him.'^ 
This case illustrates how local commercial rivalries 
within opposing ethnic communities could be 
inextricably intermixed with dissident political beliefs to 
form the basis of a detention order. In this particular 
case, the subject concerned did not seem altogether 
surprised by his incarceration, although he makes it 
quite clear that he considered It totally unjust and 
unwarranted. 
For the Japanese community their mass round-up 
directly after the bombing of Pearl Harbour came as a 
surprise. Miki Tsutsumi in Broome wrote in his diary: 
After I got up, I heard people were talking about Japan's 
attack on Hawaii and Malaya. I couldn't believe it ... At 
about 10.30, Inspector Lawson and three other policemen 
came euid told us that we were to be taken to gaol. They 
gave us litUe time to pack. At about lam we got to gaol ...'^ 
Masatora Okumura, a diver from Broome, remembered 
that "(Wle had been cofiecting pearl sheUs for a week or 
so when a patrol boat found us ... A few local Aboriginals 
were aboard and told us to return to Broome 
immediately. That was how we found out about the war 
... It didn't really register ...".'" On the other hand. 
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Antonio Gordano. a Sydney joumalls t for an Italian 
newspaper, was not entirely caught unawares when he 
was detained in June 1940 -
We kept hoping Italy would remain neutral ... I refused to 
believe in the outbreak of war between Italy and Great 
Britain and the Commonwealth until the very last minute. 
[When] I was awakened by a very loud thumping on the 
door ... I knew Italy had entered the war. E^'en before that 
there had been some harassment of us being Interviewed by 
Intelligence and having to register as an alien ... the sudden 
arrival of the police rather surprised me. I had actually 
been listening to short wave radio until 1 o'clock In the 
morning and 1 remember hearing the Crown Prince had 
been reviewing troops along the French border and I formed 
the opinion there would be no war that night ... Anyway, 
they come In; they went through all my books, all my 
clothes, looking for arms and ammunition ... looking for 
'fifth column' material - they were very fond of that term In 
those days. They couldn't find anything and they must have 
been disappointed and they then Informed me I was going 
to be Intemed and they would take me to the police station 
15 
Gordano, being highly educated and aware of current 
political events, was more prepared than many other 
Italians. 
In contrast, Joey Anello in Perth recalled "[Hie [older 
brother Frank) lost his job. He was Intemed. He couldn't 
believe why he was intemed. He was naturalised when 
my Dad got naturalised ... I can't remember them when 
talking about Italy let alone doing anything".'® Maria 
Vagetta, a schoolgirl in Warooma in Westem Australia, 
was similarly perplexed: 
Next door the sergeant of the town lived there, see, and his 
wife was talking to my teacher, mumbling about all Italians 
have to go Into camps. I wasn't aware of the situation ... 
when I came home at lunch time I told my mother. She 
didn't understand much about what was going on either. So 
she wanted my father to come home that very night. And 
she told me to repeat to my father what I'd heard. 'Don't tell 
anything to anyone. J u s t keep quiet We don't know what 
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the situation is or what will happen'. It was very dllllcult for 
the mothers to accept what had happened. Some had just 
come to Australia a few months before ...'^ 
In some Instances prior destructive police raids 
warned Italians they were under direct surveillance. Rita 
Costa of Tolga on the Atherton Tableand remembered the 
intimidation local Italians were subjected to-
[The police] would go there; they'd rip up the mattresses ofT 
the beds and empty all the wardrobes, what they were 
looking for no one knows, yet they never took the person -
yet they emptied the houses out And never tidied anything 
up - Just left things as they were, just scattered ... 
everything... They just sat there ... - Jus t why? What have 
we done?' But we'd say, 'Don't worry, at least you're home 
- you're not taken away' [Interned].'® 
Francesca La Spina recalled a raid on the house jus t 
prior to her husband Salvatore's incarceration - "[Tlhey 
(the police) jus t come and t u m everything upside down 
in the house. They looked in the drawers and took some 
photos. E)ven took them. I had started correspondence in 
English. They took those papers too ... Never given them 
back ... They look on us like animals".'^ 
Middle class non-Britishers might be accorded more 
courtesy. Dr Ian Brody, bom in Hungary but trained in 
ScoUand, recalled: 
Somehow 1 discovered Hungary was in the war... Now I was 
not only an alien, 1 was an enemy alien. The sergeant rang 
me and said You are now an enemy alien ... I have to come 
and search your house'. I said Well, help yourself. So he 
came up and he said "What is that?' 1 said 'It's a scout 
knife'. He said Well that Is an offensive weapon. 1 have to 
confiscate that ... that book Is not In English'. I said 'No, 
that it Is in German'. He said TU have to confiscate that'. 1 
said, Well, help yourself. You can read it too. It's a medical 
text book'.^ 
Some, like Tranqulllo Apollonl on the Atherton 
Tableland, were angty because they had migrated to 
Australia to escape political persecution - "My father had 
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left Italy because of fascism and when I was sent to 
school In the old countiy we were told to join the 
Fascists. We left ... Most of the farmers came out to 
escape the Fascists".^' 
lima Martinuzzi O'Brien argues that a position of 
leadership in an ethnic community might render an 
individual fiable for intemment. even when the 
individual was anti-fascist and pro-Labor as in the case 
of Guiseppe Cantanessa of Ingham, a Labor Party Shire 
Councifior and representative on the Queensland Cane 
Growers Council.^^ In the case of the German 
communities in rural Queensland. Lutheran pastors 
were incarcerated because, not only were they suspected 
of pro-German and pro-Nazi tendencies but they could 
influence their communities and propound anti-BriUsh 
sentiment in the pulpit (see chapter 7).^^ 
Adherence to Nazi or Fascist doctrines hardly 
constituted the basis for intemment except for a small 
proportion of political detainees like well known-
Brisbane fascist Dr Angelo Vattuone.^'^ prominent 
members of the Australia First Movement like Percy 
Stephensen and Adela Pankhurst Walsh^^ and pro-Nazis 
like Walter Ladendorff and Dr Neumann.^® Ethnicity 
overwhelmingly overrode ideology as far as Militaty 
Intelfigence was concerned; ethnicity was roughly 
translated as meaning the potentiality to commit 
sabotage, engage in espionage, welcome an invading 
army and generally destroy or. at least undermine the 
Allied war effort.^^ This irrational premise cannot be 
scrutinised or analysed logically, although it informed 
Australian policy and procedures. For instance. Irmhild 
Beinssen of Sydney recalled: 
We didn't have a boat but a young policeman came on day, 
one of the many people who came In and looked through 
the house, and he said he had a complaint from the 
neighbours, and I said, Well, what Is It about?'. 'Oh, that 
you are mnning out to provision German U-Boats'.^ 
That the accusation was ludicrous did not prevent Mrs 
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Beinssen's intennment. 
The details that surrounded an individual's 
intemment have usually been Indelibly imprinted on 
each's mind. Fritz Amdt, a young school boy on the 
Atherton Tableland recalled: 
It was a Friday afternoon. I was at the state school at 
Mirriwlnnie and from 3 to 4 on Friday we had carpentry ... 
and at 3.30 the sergeant of police walked up to the office. 
The kids said 'Look. I wonder what he's here for'. I said 'He's 
coming to get me'. Jokingly. I said this. But I had a 
premonition. Things were happening and the police had me 
called. He said Mum was being intemed and would I go 
home. So I went immediately. The police went on down to 
pick up a couple of men. I got home and we started 
packing. Mum took everything she had. clothes, family nick 
knacks. Had to leave all our books. We left with a couple of 
big chests. So next morning we were put on a train ... and 
we went to Townsville and were put In the lockup. 4 or 5 
days - shocking - the best food we got was from American 
soldiers [In detention) ...^ 
Her sister. Evelyn who was then sixteen, recounted: 
The worst thing I remember about the war Is being taken 
away. They took my father first. At school they said 'they've 
taken your father away ... '. I heard he'd been down 
Buckland's road having a meeting with Germans and others 
- but my father didn't. Then 1 next saw him in Babinda in 
the lock house with 20 other fellows in a lltUe room. I 
thought It was jus t terrible. Most were Italians but they 
spoke English ... It was March 1942. we were jus t left there 
... We knew they were coming - that something was amiss. 
They'd been accusing us of things so It couldn't have come 
as a surprise. It probably was a relief to know that at last 
you're in one category ... we went around the time of the 
Coral Sea BatUe ... I think my father went in February and 
we three went In April 1942. My father was naturalised ... 
there were phone-ins on the radio 'could such a thing 
happening if you were naturalised?'. Well, we were proof 
that it did happen again ...^ 
Their neighbour, Rita Butier remembered, "just all of a 
sudden the Amdts weren't there. They weren't there at 
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school anymore".^' Mr Amdt was a union organiser, 
hardly a sympathiser with Nazi doctrines. 
Some local police did not relish taking respected local 
residents into custody.SergeantTed StockweU hated this 
part of his job -
I was at Babinda when the war broke out, and warrants 
had come out to arrest certain Italians. They couldn't take 
too many at a time because they'd be on one train. Dealing 
with warrants , of course, you weren't supposed to let the 
chap know you had one. You'd go out and arrest him ... 
Because I knew practically every Italian In Babinda ... 
Anyway knowing those Italians like I did, what we did In the 
end was we'd ring them up. 'Hey. Lulgl. You've got to go 
tomorrow.' 'OK. OK' or 'Glno, you've got to go In a couple of 
day's time. Glno.' 'OK'. And we tell them 'Bring a very little 
port [suitcase]. Only have a few things In It'. See we'd get 
this litUe port and put it on as the Prisoner's Property Sheet 
and then we'd tell them 'Now you can tell your wife If you 
want more gear to bring In a big port and jus t as the train 
pulls out she can give it to you'.^^ 
The Italians on Keneally's tobacco farm at nearby 
Mareeba were also warned they were to be taken into 
custody.^^ 
More variations in procedures can be discerned with 
the Japanese internments. Some like Harry Suzuki an 
Australian-bom employee in a Neutral Bay dty cleaning 
business was politely taken into custody by the police. 
However the local reaction was more hostile. The shop 
was burned down soon after the owners were 
Incarcerated.^* Rather than detention conducted by the 
local clvifian police, soldiers brutally rounded-up some 
Japanese. Masuko Murakami from Darwin recalled: 
I took my son to Mum's house and saw two soldiers 
standing in front of the house... They said What are you 
doing? You are not supposed to be out. You are not allowed 
in' .... Back at home there were two soldiers ... They said 
'You are under arrest ... This Is for your protection'.^ 
Armed soldiers entered her parent's house. Masataro 
Okamura. on retuming on 18 December 1941 to Broome 
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after a diving expedition, remembered: "As we came to 
the dock, we saw soldiers standing with guns pointing 
towards us. As soon as we got off the boat, we were taken 
onto a military truck to our divers' house. We were told 
to back up a bag. Then they took us to the Broome 
gaol".^ ® No doubt propaganda about the enemy in combat 
informed the militaty's attitudes towards persons of 
Japanese origin resident in Australia. That the latter 
were civilians and often Australian-bom was 
disregarded. Japanese were frequently detained with far 
more force than Italian and German-bom residents. Ida 
Hasegawa recalled the incarceration of her father-in law. 
Setsutaroo Hasegawa who was living in Geelong - "[M]y 
father-in-law was in his bed. He was crippled from 
arthritis... couldn't move. They [soldiers] took him out of 
his bed. you know, and said You'd better take something 
with you'. So he took a pair of p3Qamas".^^ 
Even when excessive force was not employed the act 
of detention proved traumatic. When Italy entered the 
war. a grocer in Balmain. J im Paloni. was to find his life 
irrevocably shattered. He recalled: 
One night, Maria said to me "You've got a free ticket. Why 
don't you go to the picture show? There's a nice film. Go on. 
I'll look after the baby and the shop.' I went to Balmain 
picture show and almost as soon as I sat down, I saw on 
the screen a notice - 'Jim Paloni wanted at the office'. Hm 
something fishy going on here. I went out and 1 met four big 
policemen in mufti and they said that had a warrant for my 
arrest I said Will you take me home?' 'Oh yes, we've been 
there already . . . I said 'Goodbye' to Maria and said 'Keep 
your chin up!'.^ 
Maria Paloni takes up the stoty: 
I cried all night... I don't like to think back on these days -
they still upset me now 43 years ago ... This Is part of my 
life I really want to forget ... After Jim was Intemed I had 
some very unpleasant experiences in Balmain. Some people 
were very rough with me. One night they threw stones 
through the window and they were trying to get in to rob ...; 
they knew I was very frightened. I was very very 
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frightened.^^ 
For the internee the journey to the camp was often a 
nightmare. Ann Iwanaga recalled: 'The next day all the 
Japanese were put on a train. They didn't know where 
they were going. Mum and Dad thought they were being 
taken away to be shot"."" Miglia Nlgli remembered the 
humiliation endured by two elderly Italians: 
They'd been here for years and years ... In Bablnda... They 
were two old cane cutters. They were getting their horses 
ready to go to work,... They (the police) came and they said 
they'd have to go with them, and they put the handcuffs on 
them and paraded them through the streets of Bablnda." 
Evelyn Beames still saw the joumey from Miriwinnl to 
Tatura camp as traumatic -
We were transported In vehicles with a mark across them 
and then Into Sydney. It was a big whirl to me. If they (the 
military) hadn't held the crowds back I think they would 
have killed us . People knew who we were. When we came 
home - we were away two years - they put on our carriage 
'Released Internees'.''^ 
Many of the informants interviewed by Yuriko Nagata, on 
the other hand, did not find the joumey difficult or 
painful. 
The internment of one member of a family would 
result in devastating consequences for those left in an 
often hostile community. In Innisfail Francesca La Spina 
was very distressed at the way in which the police took 
her husband, Salvatore into custody: 
After the cane was burnt, I had to look for men to cut the 
cane. We have no much money. Three kids. Then the kids 
got sick - got diphtheria. They stay a week in hospital, the 
two boys. They had to do the tonsil, because the germ was 
in the tonsil -1 was worried, nobody was there. Eiven a little 
operation, and they won't suffer - worry, you know. 1 used 
to got with the horse and the sulky -1 Just learn to drive the 
horse. I was afraid because I was not used to the animal... 
We sold the horses because we can't feed the horses 
anymore, no. We don't know when they (the Internees) come 
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home. We sold the horses.'" 
Antonio Gordano recalled: "It was hard with people with 
families, working people with families, wives and 
children were left uncared for, without any means of 
sustenance. I mean, we were kept, fed. We were given 
Army diet and army clothing with a big red patch on the 
bottom and on the shoulder".'*'* 
Like the La Spinas, the Palonis lost every thing 
because of the husband's internment. Maria Paloni 
continued: 
I had to move away from the shop. I couldn't pay the rent... 
I went to my brother-in-law's ... I had to leave everything. 
Then my brother-in-law was taken into a labour camp to 
make charcoal and I was left with two children. Still I 
couldn't pay the ren t It was only £1 a week but all my 
savings were gone ... I went to a poultry farm at Epplng ... 
I didn't see Jim for three years. They were kind enough to 
send him home for Christmas 1944 and that was the best 
Christmas of my llfe.''^ 
Other families suffered major emotional trauma when 
the mother was incarcerated. As part of her appeal 
against detention, Adela Pankhurst Walsh cited the ill-
health of her husband Tom Walsh who was unable to 
care and provide for their three children.'** Angela Wayne 
(nee Travla) from Perth whose brother had enlisted in the 
Australian Army recollected: 
My parents were both Interned during the Second World 
War, although my mother was released after only three 
months. I recall it very clearly because It was such a shock. 
There were four of us children living at home at the Ume my 
mother was taken. My eldest brother Basil was serving with 
the Australian Armed Forces and my next brother Santo 
was with the AlF. My father was interned in 1941, leaving 
my mother and the rest of us to manage as best we could. 
On 2 June 1942 after shopping in Fremantle for my mother 
I returned home and found three large tall strangers at our 
front door. My mother was with them and crying. She said 
They have come to intern me. Angela, get in touch with 
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Father John Ryan', (he was our local parish priest) 'and tell 
him to arrange for the care of the children'. My two younger 
sisters, Katerina and Josephine, were only ten years and 
seven years old respectively and were still at school. Amid 
great trauma my mother was then taken off to Fremantie 
Prison. 
1 find It hard to remember the full sequence of events after 
this. My sisters were placed in a Catholic boarding school 
at Kalamunda In the hills jus t outside Perth. My brother 
Bert, who was fourteen and working, boarded with the 
Jones family in South FremanUe. and I found a home with 
the Amarantl family. We received no financial support from 
the govemment at all.*^ 
None of those intemed were ever convicted of 
espionage, sabotage or aiding and abetting the enemy. 
Undoubtedly a small minority were fervent supporters of 
Nazism and Fascism. Others, whilst abjuring those 
phfiosophies. emotionally supported their former 
homeland and felt tom by dual loyalties to the land of 
their birth and their new residence. The detention of 
7000 individuals in camps, in the name of national 
security, undoubtedly caused extraordinaty hardship, 
trauma, humiliation, finance loss and familial 
breakdown. No crime had been committed. No trial 
occurred, no evidence was heard in an open court. As a 
consequence the processes of reconcfiiation and coming 
to terms with the events remained elusive. Although the 
Premier of Westem Australia. Dr Carmen Lawrence at 
the reconcfiiation dinner for former Italian intemees on 
8 August 1991 concluded a moving speech by stating 
Uiat: 
Indeed the most remarkable aspect ofthe whole Intemment 
experience has been the willingness of the intemees to put 
the past behind them and refuse to be embittered. Through 
your whole hearted committment to Australian society, to 
an economic and social well-being, you have yourselves 
wrought the miracle of reconciliation ... The years since the 
war have been years of heaUng, and of increasing harmony 
between the Intemees and those who intemed them,''* 
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the oral testimony does not accord with this version of 
harmony and forgiveness. For all too often those of 
enemy alien origin, and in a small percentage of cases 
simply those of non-British origin, found their lives 
irredeemably shattered when national priorities 
destroyed individual liberty. 
Chapter 10 
Incarcerating Japanese-Americans: 
An Atrocity Revisited 
Roger Daniels 
University of Cincinnati 
The round-up. expulsion and incarceration of more than 
a hundred thousand Japanese-Americans in the months 
following the outbreak of the Pacific War between the 
United States and Japan is a major blot on the record of 
American democracy, an ironic counterpoint to a war 
that was fought to preserve and establish what Franklin 
D. Roosevelt called the four freedoms.' The event 
attracted littie attention during the war. and. in the 
decades immediately following it. was generally written 
off as an aberration, or. as one scholar put it. America's 
"worst war-time mistake".^ and the mistreatment and 
abuse suffered by more than 100.000 civilian men, 
women and children, more than two-thirds of them 
native-bom American citizens, was usually ignored by 
the nation's historians.^ Since the early 1970s, however, 
historians and others have placed this war-time atrocity 
squarely in the historical canon so that almost every 
textbook carries at least a brief and usually a 
condemnatory account." And. beginning in 1980. the 
federal govemment itself began a process which resulted 
in the passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 entailing 
a pajmient of $20,000 tax-free dollars to each ofthe more 
than 60.000 Japanese-American survivors, and apologies 
from both Congress and the President for war-time 
wrong-doing.^ The investigative body which made the 
recommendations on which the govemment acted in the 
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1980s reported that the Incarceration of Japanese-
Americans: 
... was not justified by military necessity .... The broad 
historical causes ... were race prejudice, war hysteria, and 
a failure of political leadership. Widespread Ignorance of 
Japanese-Americans contributed to a policy conceived in 
haste and executed in an atmosphere of fear and anger at 
Japan. A grave injustice was done to American citizens and 
resident aliens of Japanese ancestry who, without 
Individual review or any probative evidence against them, 
were excluded, removed, and detained by the United States 
during World War II.« 
More recenUy. In a speech commemorating the fiftieth 
armiversaty ofthe Pearl Harbor attack. President George 
H.W. Bush acknowledged that "the intemment of 
Americans of Japanese ancestry was a great injustice" 
and vowed that "it wlfi never be repeated".^ 
This essay will briefly recapitulate the relevant events 
of 1941-42. attempt to explain the changes in the 
climates of opinion which caused Americans to 
reevaluate the significance of this event, and attempt to 
answer the haunting question, could such a thing 
happen again? 
According to the census of 1940 there were almost 
127,000 persons of Japanese birth or ancestry in the 
continental United States who constituted less than one-
tenth of one per cent of the population. Some 47,000 of 
these were persons who had immigrated from Japan 
before 1925 and were, like other Asians, aliens ineligible 
to citizenship.® Their children bom in the United States, 
the Nlsei,^ were, thanks to the 14th Amendment to the 
Constitution, citizens of the United States with, in 
theory, all the rights and privfieges of that citizenship.'° 
In fact, however, their citizenship was. at best, second 
class. This was nowhere more tme than in Cafifomia and 
other West Coast states where almost nine of ten 
Japanese-Americans then lived. In these coastal states, 
where the Incidence of Japanese in the population was 
never as high as one In fifty, a whole panoply of 
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discrimination in employment, housing and education 
was imposed upon them and other Asian-Americans." 
The all but universal prejudice against persons of colour 
was the chief cause of discrimination in America, but for 
Japanese-Americans there was the added factor of the 
trans-Pacific rivalty between Japan and the United 
States and. in the decades after World War I. what most 
Americans saw as Japan 's unjustified aggression in 
China. And. after war came. Americans were much more 
hostile to Japanese than to German soldiers. For 
example. In testing American soldiers during World War 
II. Army psychologists reported that 38 to 48 per cent 
indicated agreement with the statement: "I would really 
like to kill a Japanese soldier", whereas only 5 to 9 per 
cent indicated agreement to the statement: "I would 
reafiy like to kill a German soldier".'^ 
Many Japanese-Americans were aware that they 
might become pawns in a future war between America 
and Japan. To cite jus t one example of such fears, a 
Nisei student at the University of California at Berkeley 
asked, four years before Pearl Harbor: 
... what are we going to do If war does break out between 
United States and Japan? ... In common language we can 
say "we're sunk". Even if the Nisei wanted to fight for 
America, what chances? Not a chancel ... our properties 
would be confiscated and most likely [we would be) herded 
into prison camps - perhaps we would be slaughtered on 
the spot '^  
Although this horrific vision was not generally shared -
many ofthe Nisei believed that although things would be 
very difficult for their alien parents their own citizenship 
would protect them from drastic federal action - most 
Japanese-Americans were aware of the threat to their 
future s tatus in the event of a Pacific war. 
American leaders had been seriously preparing for 
war since the spring of 1940. Many were all too pednfully 
aware ofthe shocking violations of civil liberties that had 
taken place during World War I and many were 
determined to avoid them if and when war came again. 
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The President himself made this vety clear. In a public 
letter to a conference of law enforcement officials in the 
summer of 1940 Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote: 
[Our] common defense should be through the normal 
channels of local. State and national law enforcement The 
untrained policeman Is as Ineffective as the untrained 
soldier. The amateur detective soon becomes a fussy and 
malicious busybody. We must be vigilant, always on guard, 
and swift to act. But we must also be wise, and cool-
headed, and must not express our activities In the cruel 
stupidities of the vigilante.''' 
In one sense this goal was achieved. The anti-German 
hysteria which swept America in 1917-18 was largely 
avoided.'^ Historians of civil liberty in the United States 
have often noted with pride that there were fewer 
violations of civil liberty during World War II, when the 
govemment prosecuted only twenty-six indictments 
under federal security statutes as opposed to more then 
twenty-five hundred during World War I.'^ 
Stfil it is now quite clear that the federal govemment 
in general and its naval and military intelligence 
agencies in particular spent an inordinate amount of 
Ume and effort trying to monitor the Japanese-American 
population, sometimes deliberately violating American 
law to do so. In addition various individuals within the 
govemment, from President Roosevelt down, at one time 
or another expressed a desire to round-up vety large 
numbers of "Japanese". However there is no evidence of 
any pre-war planning to do so in so far as "ordinary" 
persons, whether alien or citizen were concerned. What 
the intelligence agencies did do, with approval at the 
highest levels of govemment, was to prepare lists of 
dangerous aliens of various nationalities who were to be 
Intemed at the outbreak of war. In the event, as John J. 
Culley's essay in this volume shows, some 8,000 
Japanese aliens were intemed. Although many, and 
perhaps most, of the individual internments were ill-
advised, and some persons were even put behind barbed 
wire as a result of mistaken identity, the intemment of 
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enemy aliens was traditional and wefi within the usages 
of nations, ff some ofthe internments, such as those of 
elderly and Infirm Buddhist priests, were stupid, they 
were wefi within the limits of American law.'^ But what 
happened to most ofthe rest ofthe Japanese-Americans 
can only be described as lawless, even though it was 
eventually sanctioned by a majority of the justices ofthe 
United States Supreme Court.'® 
Much has been written - and properly so - about the 
shock of Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto's surprise raid on 
Pearl Harbor, but not enough has been written about the 
numbing series of defeats which followed as Imperial 
Japanese forces "ran wild", as Yamamoto put it, in 
Southeast Asia and the Central Pacific. While it is now 
clear that American forces were simply unprepared to 
resist effectively, some American officials and many 
politicians, journalists £md broadcasters were quick to 
claim that sabotage by resident Japanese was 
instrumental in the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Secretaty of 
the Navy Frank Knox, in a Los Angeles press conference 
held on his return from Hawaii jus t eight days after the 
Pearl Harbor attack, claimed that there had been 
"treachery" in the Islands and insisted, mendaciously, 
that much of the disaster was caused by "the most 
effective fifth column work that 's come out of this war, 
except in Norway".'^ 
Journalists and politicians were already sowing seeds 
of suspicion. The day after the attack the Los Angeles 
Times, one of the leading papers of the region, invoked 
California's vigilante tradition, calling, editorially, for 
... alert, keen-eyed civilians [who could be] of yeoman 
service in cooperating with the military authorities against 
spies, saboteurs and fifth columnists. We have thousands 
of Japanese here .... Some, perhaps many, are ... good 
Americans. What the rest may be we do not know, nor can 
we take a chance In the light of yesterday's demonstration 
that treachery and double-dealing are major Japanese 
weapons.^ 
Other West Coast newspapers, broadcasters and some 
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nationally-sjmdlcated columnists kept up a drum beat of 
stories and commentaries, often with invented tales 
about Japanese espionage and fifth column activities.^' 
These covered the political spectrum from right-wing 
gutter journalists such as Westbrook Pegler to the 
editorial stalwarts ofthe conmiunist People's Daily World 
of San Francisco. A rising liberal star of the airwaves, 
Edward R Murrow. told a SeatUe audience that: 
I think Its probable that. If Seattle ever does get bombed, 
you will be able to look up and see some University of 
Washington sweaters on the boys doing the bombing.^ 
It was all chimerical. Not one single case of espionage 
or sabotage by an ethnic Japanese was ever detected in 
the United States after war came, but few American 
officials or political leaders chose to make this point,^^ 
which is what the 1981 presidential commission report 
meant by "a failure of pofitical leadership". Added to that, 
some important federal officials fanned the fires of 
prejudice. Fiorello La Guardia, an outstanding liberal 
who served for a time as the director of the Ofilce of 
Clvifian Defense, made appeals for decent treatment of 
German and Italian aliens, but pointedly omitted to ask 
for tolerance toward Japanese.^"* To be sure, Francis 
Biddle, Roosevelt's fourth Attomey-General, asked for 
calmness and fair play, but his voice was easily drowned 
out.^ ^ In retrospect, only the President himself might 
have been heard above the patriotic racist roar, but he 
was sfient. Franklin Roosevelt was not prepared either to 
risk rupturing war-time unity by taking an unpopular 
stand or. as we shall see. to oppose the political 
pressures for incarceration that came from within his 
own govemment. 
Those pressures began to build in December and early 
Januaty. Their most persistent sources were West Coast 
politicians, certain second-echelon military officials, 
particularly Major General Allen W. Gullion. the Army's 
Provost Marshal General, and. after some hesitation. 
Lieut. General John L. De Witt, in charge of the Westem 
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Defense Command, the ranking militaty officer on the 
West Coast. The latter, after a good deal of backing and 
fiUing. supported proposals for mass evacuation that had 
been drawn up by Gullion and his subordinate. Karl R 
Bendetsen. who rose from major to colonel in a few 
months. The civilian heads of the army. Assistant 
Secretary John J . McCloy and War Secretary Henry L. 
Stimson. were persuaded in early Februaty that there 
was a "military necessity" which justified mass 
evacuation. The great fear was sabotage of the West 
Coast aircraft factories whose output was cmcial to 
American war plans as both contemporary archival 
documents and Stimson's personal diaty demonstiate. 
That there had been absolutely no sabotage either before 
or after Pearl Harbor seemed irrelevant. Stimson sent to 
Roosevelt a draft executive order to authorise the militaty 
to move civilians without declaring martial law. The more 
realistic top mifitary leadership - Chief of Staff George C. 
Marshall and his planners - did not think that a mass 
evacuation was necessary but did not actively oppose 
Stimson's decision. 
At the same time congressional pressure - in part 
abetted by prodding from the Provost Marshal's men -
mounted. The senior West Coast senator - Hiram W. 
Johnson who had represented California since 1917 -
organised the entire congressional delegations of 
Calffomia. Oregon and Washington which unanimously 
forwarded a recommendation to the president on 13 
February recommending: 
The immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese 
lineage and all others, aliens and citizens ahke. whose 
presence shall be deemed dangerous or Inimical to the 
defense of the United States from all strategic areas .... 
such areas [should] be enlarged ... until they encompass 
the entire strategic areas ofthe states of Callfomla, Oregon 
and Washington, and the Territory of Alaska.^ 
On 19 February 1942, Franklin Roosevelt signed an 
executive order, numbered 9066, in the form that the 
Army had submitted it to him. The executive order, 
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based on a war powers act passed in 1918 and amended 
in 1940 and 1941, was a sweeping grant of power. It 
authorised "the Secretary of War, and [subordinate] 
MlUtary Commanders" to designate "military areas" from 
which "any or all persons may be excluded" and to 
provide "such transportation, food, shelter, and other 
accommodations as may be necessary". No ethnic group 
was named and in theory any American, anyovhere. could 
have been affected by it. We know that some in the 
militaty considered using it on the East Coast and 
against large numbers of German and Italian aliens, but 
that was never done. Although individual German and 
Italian aliens on the West Coast were forced to move.^^ 
the order and almost all of the subsequent execution of 
it was directed against Japanese-Americans fiving on the 
West Coast. As defined by the United States Army it 
affected all persons of Japanese birth or ancestty living 
in California, the westem halves of Oregon and 
Washington, and a small portion of Arizona. A few 
thousand Japanese-Americans - both native and foreign-
bom - living east of the excluded zone were left in 
nervous liberty throughout the war. After the summer of 
1942 they were joined there by tens of thousands of 
others who were first incarcerated and then selectively 
released.^ ® And. ironically, the largest Japanese-
American community - the 150.000 living in Hawaii who 
constituted about a third of its population - was not 
affected by E.O. 9066. although a few individuals had 
been intemed earlier.^^ 
Roosevelt did not initiate the incarceration of 
Japanese-Americans. Stimson. McCloy and the 
paperwork soldiers who egged them on were self-starters. 
But. of course, the ultimate responsibility was the 
President's. He never explained why he did it. although 
he was willing later to mitigate his order in a number of 
ways. Roosevelt shared, at least in part, some of the 
national prejudice against Japanese, but a much more 
important causal factor. I believe, was that indulging in 
"revenge" EigainstJapanese-AmeriCcms was good politics. 
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This helps to explain, but does not exculpate, FDR's 
willingness to let his subordinates round up the West 
Coast Japanese-Americans. We must also rememberjust 
how badly the Pacific War was going. The United States 
and its allies were suffering a terrible series of defeats in 
the Far East. Hong Kong. Wake and other mid-Pacific 
Islands fefi to Imperial Japanese forces In December; 
they took Manila in early Janua ty and overran Malaya 
and much of what is now Indonesia later that month. In 
early Februaty Japanese troops landed on the island of 
Singapore, on New Britain, and were menacing Burma 
and Australia; most of the American forces in the 
Philippines were hemmed in on the Bataan peninsula 
and on the fortress island of Corregidor. Thus Roosevelt 
gave the green light to Stimson during a brief telephone 
call. As McCloy later retailed the conversation to his 
colleagues, the President's only proviso was to "be as 
reasonable as you can". 
But the mid-Februaty executive decision could not be 
rapidly translated into action. No detailed plans had 
been made by the Army, and its lawyers soon discovered 
that positive legislation was necessaty before citizens 
could be forced to move. The War Department drafted a 
statute which made it a crime punishable by a year in 
jail and a $5,000 fine for a citizen to fail to obey a 
mfiitary order and a compliant Congress passed it 
without a dissenting vote on 19 March and FDR signed 
it into law two days later. On 24 March General DeWitt 
issued his first two restrictive orders. Public 
Proclamation No, 3^° established an 8pm to 6am curfew 
on the West Coast for all alien Japanese. Germans and 
Italians and "all persons of Japanese descent" (ie United 
States citizens, although the Army almost never used 
that term. It sometimes referred to them as "non-aliens"). 
It also forbade "any person of Japanese ancestry" from 
possessing or using firearms or other weapons of war. 
ammunition, bombs, explosives, short-wave radio 
receiving sets, radio transmitters, signal devices, codes, 
ciphers or cameras. 
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The other order was a "Civilian Exclusion Order", 
ominously numbered "I'-.^i it applied to only some fifty 
Japanese families living on Bainbridge Island in Puget 
Sound directly west of Seattle, Washington. The 
Bainbridge Islanders, given five days notice, were ordered 
to report to the ferry slip on 29 March bringing only what 
they could carry. Although they were not told where they 
were going most adults assumed, correctiy, that they 
were en route to some kind of concentration camp, 
although, to be sure, the Army never used that term, but 
created the euphemisms "Assembly Centers" and 
"Relocation Centers" instead.^^ The Bainbridge Islanders 
were surrounded by soldiers armed with bayonetted 
rifles, ferried to the mainland, loaded onto railway 
carriages, and shipped more than 1,000 miles to 
Southern California. Other Seattlites would later be sent 
to the nearby fairgrounds at Puyedlup, but in March 
there was no Assembly Center in Washington. 
We can now see that it was a dress rehearsal. Using 
punch cards supplied, contrary to law, by the Bureau of 
the Census, the army bureaucrats with the help of an 
expert on loan from the census, divided the area to be 
cleansed of Japanese-Americans into 107 other 
"Exclusion Areas" - geographic units calculated to 
contain about 1,000 Japanese - some 250 families -
each.^ ^ Although the deportations began in March, large-
scale movements to the sbcteen Assembly Centers, most 
of which were at fairgrounds, race tracks and other 
facilities originally intended to house livestock, 
continued into June.^"* These camps were only temporary 
way stations, located reasonably close to where most 
Japanese-Americans lived. Most of those from San 
Francisco, for example, went to nearby Tanforan, a race 
track. Despite the continued use of armed soldiers the 
army bureaucrats assumed, correctly, that Its victims 
were law abiding persons who would obey orders. In 
each exclusion area a control point for registration was 
established, notices were placed in prominent places, 
ethnic community leaders were notified, and the persons 
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affected reported as they were ordered, usually five days 
after the notices went up.^^ Only a handful of Japanese-
Americans in an evacuation area even attempted to hide, 
and, as Donald and Nadine Hata relate in this volume, 
jus t a few resisted.^^ The exodus to Assembly Centers, 
although traumatic, was orderly. 
Whfie this initial removal was going on the federal 
govemment created a civilian agency, the War Relocation 
Authority.^^ to administer and supervise the more 
permanent camps, which the govemment called 
Relocation Centers.^® Unlike the Assembly Centers, the 
more permanent camps were far away in desolate 
locations, where almost no one had lived before and 
where no one fives now. Even the two camps on Indian 
reservations in Arizona, were located in their 
unpopulated portions. Two other camps were in eastern 
California, two were in Arkansas, and there was one each 
in Idaho. Utah. Colorado and Wyoming. Since Sandra 
Taylor's essay in this volume treats the camps 
themselves, it suffices to point out here that whfie some 
Japanese spent the whole war. and more, in camps - the 
last camp (Tule Lake. California) closed only on 20 
March 1946 - many thousands were released beginning 
in the summer of 1942.^^ By the first week of Januaty 
1945. thanks to the Supreme Court ruling in Ex Parte 
Endo, "loyal" Japanese-American citizens could return to 
the formerly forbidden West Coast over the protests of 
California Governor Earl Wsirren and other westem 
pohticians. 
During and immediately after the war. the 
incarceration of most of the Japanese-Americans was a 
popular move. Indeed, many politicians complained 
about "coddling Japs" and public opinion polls Indicated 
not only support for what the govemment had done, but 
a willingness to support even more draconian actions, 
such as the post-war expatriation of all ethnic Japanese. 
This obviously did not happen although a Ilttle-known 
post-war program did result in sending some 4,700 
Japanese persons to Japan, more than 3.000 of them 
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American citizens.'*" 
But even before the war was over, the improvement of 
the image of the Japanese-Americans had begun, 
promoted largely by civilian liberals within the 
government.'*' Agencies such as the Office of War 
Information and the War Relocation Administration 
issued reams of pro-Japanese-American propaganda, 
stresshig the war-time heroism of Japanese-American 
troops in Italy and the quiet good-citizenship ofthe Nisei 
generally. In addition, even though the United States 
fought World War II with segregated armed forces, the 
notion was beginning to prevail that equal opportunity -
or something approaching it - ought to have a place on 
the national agenda. Eight months before he issued E.O. 
9066. Franklin Roosevelt had put out EO 8802 
establishing a Fair Employment Practices Committee "to 
encourage full participation in the national defense 
program by all citizens regardless of race, creed, colour, 
or national origin".''^ 
In July 1946 Roosevelt's successor. Harry S. Truman, 
who as a senator had silently acquiesced in the 
incarceration, held a special ceremony on the Ellipse 
behind the White House for members of the 442nd 
Regimental Combat Team composed of Japanese-
Americans and told them that they had "fought not only 
the enemy, but [also] prejudice - and you have won"."^ 
Nineteen months later, he sent Congress a ten-point civil 
rights message whose last three points were of special 
concem to Japanese-Americans. Point eight called for 
HawEdian (and Alaskan) statehood, point nine for 
dropping racial bars In naturalisation, and point ten for 
providing some compensation for property losses 
Japanese-Americans had sustained when they were 
forced to abandon their property. 
The last point was quickly achieved. The President 
pointed out that "more than one hundred thousand 
Japanese-Americans were evacuated from their homes in 
the Pacific states solely because of their racial origin" -
he made no mention ofthe fictitious "militaty necessity" 
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- and urged Congress to pass legislation which was 
already before it.*'* On 2 July 1948 Tmman signed the 
Japanese-American Claims Act which appropriated $38 
mifilon to setUe all property claims, a figure which 
almost all commentators now agree was not nearly 
enough.'*^ 
The other objectives took longer. Full equality in 
naturalisation came first. The first t u m of the tide had 
occurred back in 1943 when Congress repealed the 
fifteen separate pieces of legislation which had enforced 
Chinese exclusion and granted Chinese persons 
naturalisation rights. Separate pieces of legislation in 
1946 had made similar grants to Filipinos and "natives 
of India", but other Asians remained "aliens ineligible to 
citizenship" until 1952. In that year Congress enacted 
the McCarran-Walter Act over Truman's veto. The 
President's veto message praised those parts of the law 
which made naturgJisation colourblind but found "this 
most desirable provision ... embedded in a mass of 
legislation which would perpetuate injustice"."*^ The 
admission of Hawaii as the 50th state was delayed even 
longer, until near the end of Dwight D. Eisenhower's 
term in 1959. It was significant for Japanese and other 
Asian-Americans because the heavy Asian-American 
majority in the new state made Asian-American 
legislators in Washington a certainty.'*'' 
Although much h a s been written "explaining" the 
practical benefits Truman sought to gain from his 
general civil rights program, it is difficult to imagine what 
domestic pofitical gains he can have hoped for by 
advocating legislation to benefit Japanese and other 
Asian-Americans.'*^ The president himself gave two 
reasons which can be taken at face value. He said that 
he believed in it as a matter of justice and fairness and 
as he put it 
If we wish to inspire the peoples ofthe world whose freedom 
is In jeopardy. If we wish to restore hope to those who have 
already lost their civil liberties, If we wish to fulfil the 
promise that Is ours, we must correct the remaining 
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Imperfections in our practice of democracy.''^ 
Thus, both a desire to improve democracy at home and 
certain cold war imperatives explain the steps that the 
United States took in the post-war decades to improve 
the status of Japanese-Americans. 
To explain the passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 
1988 other reasons must be considered, although a 
conOnulng struggle for ethnic equality is a constant. The 
combined effects of the Great Society programs of the 
mid-1960s and of the eventual rejection of the 
misbegotten war in Vietnam contributed to a climate of 
opinion in which the acts of the 1940s could be 
reconsidered. In 1976 President Gerald R. Ford, hardly 
a radical, repealed FDR's Executive Order 9066 and, in 
a proclamation noting that the nation was celebrating its 
200th birthday, insisted that "an honest reckoning" must 
take account "of our national mistakes as well as our 
nafional achievements": 
We know now [the president continued] what we should 
have known then - not only was that evacuation wrong, but 
Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans. On the 
battlefield and at home, Japanese-Americans ... have been 
and continue to be written into our history for the sacrifices 
and contributions they have made to the well-being and 
security of this, our common Nation.^ 
Four years later, at the urging of Japanese-American 
activists and ethnic organisations, and with the guidance 
of Japanese-American legislators. Congress passed and 
President Jimmy Carter signed legislation creating the 
Presidential Commission on the Wartime Relocation and 
Intemment of Civilians (CWRIC) whose mission was to 
"review the facts and circumstances surrounding" EO 
9066 and its sequelae and to "recommend appropriate 
remedies". '^ A detailed investigation confirmed what 
most scholars had been saying since 1959,^ ^ and a series 
of hearings held in Washington and in midwestem and 
far westem centres of Japanese-American population 
produced unexpected and unprecedented displays of 
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anger and other emotions by survivors and their 
descendants nearly forty years after the event. In 1983 
the CWRIC, as noted above, recommended a tax-free 
payment of $20,000 to each survivor and a formal 
apology. Five years later Congress enacted, and President 
Ronald W. Reagan signed, the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 
but it was not until well into the Bush Administration 
that payrments were actually made. After nearly half a 
century the legal and legislative ramifications of 
Executive Order 9066 seemed to have been played out 
What, however, ofthe future? Could it happen again, 
or was what happened to Japanese-Americans, as 
George Bush believed, something that "wlfi never be 
repeated"? Prediction is not the historian's primaty task, 
but those of us who study the past have leamed that 
although the precise circumstances which trigger any 
specific historical situation are unique, similar forces 
acting within a society can produce similar results. 
Racist and xenophobic forces still exist in American (and 
most other) societies. An extended external or internal 
crisis somehow associated with a minority group, 
whether political or ethnic, could produce similar 
results. Rather than ttying to imagine what such future 
crises might be, I will note several separate occasions 
since the end of World War II in which the United States 
has seemed to be the verge of effecting mass 
incarceration. 
At the height of the Cold War Congress passed the 
Emergency Detention Act which after a great deal of 
rhetoric about a monolithic worldwide Communist 
conspiracy, authorised the president to declare, by 
executive order, an "Internal Security Emergency". In 
such a circumstance, the Attomey-General was then 
empowered to "apprehend and ... detain ... each person 
as to whom there is reason to believe that such person 
probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with 
others to engage in, acts of espionage or espionage". The 
statute also provided for the creation of a number of 
stand-by concentration camps. Although the law was 
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clearly aimed at ideological rather than ethnic "enemies" 
ofthe republic, it was clearly modeled on the procedure, 
upheld by the Supreme Court, under which the 
Japanese-Americans had been incarcerated.^ The 
statute, happily never triggered, remained on the books 
unHl 1969 when it was repealed.^ 
Evety recent American administration has at least 
considered some kind of massive incarceration of 
individuals. During the hostage crisis growing out ofthe 
seizure of the American embassy in Teheran the Carter 
administration took preliminaty steps against Iranians -
mostly college students - living in the United States. 
When the Immigration and Naturadisation Service's filing 
system proved so chaotic that it could not provide the 
White House with even approximate numbers no less 
names and addresses, the administration instructed the 
nation's colleges and universities to provide them and 
most complied. Happily, no mass incarceration resulted, 
but it is clear that the White House was at least 
contemplating some punitive action. There was also 
sporadic mob violence against Iranians. 
The Reagan administration caused the detention of 
large numbers of Illegal Haitian immigrants - while 
welcoming illegal Cubans with open arms - although 
some of the worst aspects of their treatment were 
modified by federal judges unconstrained by a war-time 
crisis. Partly to avoid both federal courts and 
Immigration lawyers the Bush administration set up a 
camp for Haitian refugees inside the American militaty 
base at Guantanamo Bay. Cuba, a policy the Clinton 
administration continued and used for Cubans as well. 
The Bush administration, jus t before and during the 
brief hostifities in the Persian Gulf in 1990-91. had some 
of its agents interrogate Arab-American leaders, both 
citizen and alien. When spokespersons for Arab 
communities and some civil liberties organisations 
protested, the interrogations were stopped; the 
govemment made the lame excuse that the federal 
agents were only ttying to protect those whom they had 
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questioned. And there was sporadic violence against 
Arab-American individuals and busftiesses. 
These events, spread across nearly half a centuty. do 
not amount to vety much when contrasted to what was 
done to Japanese-Americans. But. sinfilarly. no crisis 
comparable to World War II has occurred. AH of these 
events were violations of the spirit of the Constitufion 
and they did happen even in a society in which both 
racial prejudice and xenophobia have been reduced. 
What might have happened had they been accompanied 
by some great crisis or outrage - suppose, for example, 
that Iran had decided to execute the American hostages 
on television, say at the rate of one a day -no one, of 
course, can say. But these "minor" events do 
demonstrate an on-going American propensity to react 
against "foreigners" in the United States in times of 
crisis, especially when those foreigners have dark skins. 
Despite the amelioration of American race relations, 
there are stfil huge Inequities between whites and non-
whites, and potentially explosive emotions exist in both 
the oppressed and the oppressed populations. While 
optinfists claim that American concentration camps are 
a thing of the past - and I certainly hope that they are -
many Japanese-Americans, the only group of citizens 
ever incarcerated en masse because of their genes, would 
argue that what has happened in the past can happen 
again. This student of Japanese-American histoty can 
only agree with them. 
Chapter 11 
"A Little Colony on Our Own": 
Life in detention camps in Australia 
in World War H 
Yuriko Nagata 
The University of Queensland 
During World War II there were eighteen POW and 
Intemment camps throughout Australia.' The camps at 
Tatura (No. 3) and Rushworth (No. 4) in Victoria. Hay 
(Nos. 6. 7 and 8) in New South Wales and Loveday (Nos. 
9, 10 and 14) in South Australia held the bulk of the 
intemees and consequenUy dominate Intemees' 
accounts of camp life. Family groups were held in 
Victorian camps, with Germans and Italians at Tatura 
and Japanese and Formosans at Rushworth. Single men 
only were intemed at Hay and Loveday. In July 1943 
some 500 Japanese male intemees previously engaged 
in the pearling industty around the Australian coast 
were reclassified as "prisoners of war Japanese merchant 
seamen" (PWJMS) and concentrated at Camp No. 6 at 
Hay.^  Although they were technically POWs, their 
accounts are included in this chapter. The intemment 
camps were usually erected in arid to semi-arid countty 
far away from thickly populated areas. They were 
basically Army camps designed to last only a few years 
and consisted of galvanised iron and timber buildings 
surrounded by barbed-wire perimeters. These were 
monitored by watch-tower guards equipped with 
machine guns and searchlights.^ The Garrison 
Battalions comprised ex-World War I diggers. Class B 
medical conscripts and the retumed wounded.'* The 
barbed-wire fences left a strong Impression on many ex-
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Intemees. For Hisako Shibasaki the first sight of the 
camp left a recurring image which was still clear almost 
fifty years after the event. She was five when she and her 
family were intemed for a short time at the GaydJiome 
Intemment Camp in Brisbane. Her Japanese father, a 
pearl diver from Thursday Island in the Torres Strait, 
was intemed separately as a PWJMS at Hay for the 
duration of the war. She said that "I will never forget... 
the stretch of wire fence surrounding the camp which 
seemed to go up endlessly into the sky".^ Josephine 
Cabassi spoke of the day when she visited her father at 
the Harvey intemment camp where Italians arrested in 
Westem Australia were held until they were moved to 
Loveday: 
I've never forgotten the feeling when we got to Harvey the 
first time and saw the big tower and the machine guns 
sticking out of every window. I remember we asked each 
other in whispers, "What have they got guns here for?'We 
wondered why they had Dad in there, surrounded by a 12-
foot barbed-wire fence.^ 
Aff Shiosaki. son of Japanese laundty man and an 
Aboriginal mother from Broome, recalled the time when 
he walked into the camp at Rushworth. He was twelve 
years old and remembers: "I was standing at the big gate. 
I think it was the entrance to the compound. There was 
barbed-wire everywhere. A Guard patted my head and 
said. 'Hey son. this is going to be your home for a 
whfie'".^ 
When Intemees arrived at a camp, they were 
photographed and had their fingerprints taken. Medical 
examfiiations were carried out and their medical records 
were kept along with other personal documents.^ The 
camp authorities took special measures to prevent the 
Introduction of Infectious or contagious diseases, and 
intemees from northem Australia were dewormed and 
screened for parasites.^ Intemees and their baggage were 
searched and all prohibited items, including money, 
valuables and weapons were removed.'° Miki Tsutsumi, 
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secretaty of the Nihonjin-kal (Japanese Society) in 
Broome, noted in his diary: "Even women were stripped 
off thehr clothes and checked inside the shoes, between 
the legs everywhere like they were criminal or something. 
I was vety upset with this"." Europeem women detainees 
were not subjected to these indignities. 
All Intemees were treated in accordance with the 
Prisoners of War Convention signed at Geneva in 1929.'^ 
All male intemees were issued with Australian Militaty 
Forces (AMF) uniforms dyed burgundy to be wom 
outside the camps. They were not permitted to wear 
civilian or khaki clothing for security reasons, but it was 
permitted for them to wear their own clothes inside the 
compound. The intemment camp Rules and Camp 
Orders of National Security Regulations No. 14 laid out 
various restrictions and rules of conduct which intemees 
had to observe. Each compound was run by an intemee 
committee which usually consisted of a compound leader 
and deputy, a secretaty. quartermaster, banker, 
librarian, canteen supervisor, works manager and one 
hut leader from each sleeping hut. '^  They met frequently 
to ensure the smooth running of the compound. 
Intemees charged with contravening any regulation were 
brought before the Army's Camp Commandant. If they 
were found guilty, punishment could be imposed. This 
ranged from confinement in the camp detention block for 
a maximum of twenty-eight days, to suspension of 
privileges. 
Intemees' sleeping quarters were regularly searched 
by officers.''* Inward and outward mall was censored by 
camp interpreter officers in the same way as Army mail. '^ 
The general censorship poficy limited access to news 
which might cause unnecessary disturbances among 
intemees; but it seems that almost all the war news 
printed in local newspapers was available to them.'^ 
Taishiroo Mori, an intemee at Rushworth. noted various 
war news in his diary, including the bombing of Darwin 
and the BatUe of the Coral Sea. Chinenji Kaino. a 
PWJMS at Hay. remembered: "In a local newspaper, there 
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was a cartoon of MacArthur squeezing a glass botUe wlUr 
the Emperor inside. We thought it was really bad 
propaganda".'^ 
Camp life was highly regimented and followed an 
artificially imposed rhythm. Although shelter, food and 
other basic needs were provided, being crowded together 
in the limited space demanded considerable tolerance. 
Personality clashes and petty fights were Inevitable. 
Some suffered and failed to adjust to the new life. By 
November 1942 at Loveday there had been seven suicide 
attempts by two Germans, four Japanese and one 
Italian.'^ Tatsuzo Tmalzumi. an intemee from the 
Netherlands East Indies (NEfi remembered one of the 
Japanese cases: 
Various problems of dlflferent characteristic nature could be 
expected In such misplaced surroundings ... A person who 
suffered from some kind of frustration and who attempted 
to commit suicide by taking creosote, but was fortunately 
saved through the quick action taken by the Medical 
Service.'^ 
Many Italian men who were taken away from their 
families in Westem Australia and Queensland were 
extremely distressed. Wives and children were able to 
visit them occasionally if they could travel to camps (see 
chapter 9). Otherwise, the separation lasted for the 
duration of intemment. J im Paloni of Balmain was 
intemed at Orange Intemment Camp in NSW. His wife 
Maria talked about the day when she went to say 
goodbye as he was to be moved to Loveday, South 
Australia: 
I left my baby with some friends and I went to Orange Just 
to say goodbye. That was the first time I saw him In 
uniform. I was only allowed to see him a quarter of an hour. 
First we had to look at each other through a grille. I cried all 
my way back to Balmain ... I was never able to see him In 
South Australia, because It was too far away and for lack of 
money ... I couldn't see Jim for three years .^ 
Kay Saunders found that families who were intemed 
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togetherwere. in some regards, "more fortunate" because 
at least families remained intact.^' Antonio Gordano. a 
Sydney joumallst. was intemed at Orange Intemment 
Camp before being sent to Hay. He observed: "It was bad 
with people with families, working people with famifies. 
wives and children were left uncared for... we were kept 
well fed".^ ^ Maria Paloni described the hardship: "I had to 
move away from the shop. I couldn't pay the rent ... I 
went to my mother-in-law's house ... I had to leave 
everything. I lost everything".^^ 
Japanese men were usually intemed with their wives 
and families. As in most cases no one remained in their 
houses, they frequently lost everything. However, some 
Japanese men who were married to non-Japanese were 
intemed without their families. Under the earlier 
intemment policy, no women were to be intemed. except 
where the interests of public safety so demanded (see 
chapter 7). However, all Japanese women were intemed 
and some Aboriginal and other non-white wives of 
Japanese men were also intemed. The Nationality Act 
1920-30 stated that: "the wife of a British subject shall 
be deemed to be a British subject, and the wife of an 
alien shall be deemed to be an alien".^'^ Under this Act. 
wives of non-Japanese origin who had lost their British 
subject status by marrying Japanese men were 
automatically classffied as enemy aliens. However, policy 
allowed wives of Japanese who were of "White European 
race" to regain their British nationality. In accordance 
with this poficy they were not intemed unless they were 
deemed specifically a security risk.^^ Suegoro Kawata. a 
laundty owner from Calms who came to Australia in 
1898. married Miss Grace Mitchefi in 1916.=^^  He 
appealed for release in 1944: 
1 called my shop the Central Laundry, which is still opened 
under the care of Mrs Kawata ... My wife has stated me that 
her physical condition is always bad and wants someone to 
help her ... As I left my only daughter aged 28 Is still 
unmarried. 1 would like to celebrate her marriage at my 
release.^ 
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His release was considered by the authorities but did not 
eventuate as his Avife could not find accommodation for 
him in an approved locality outside Cairns.^® 
As the Australian govemment was reluctant to allow 
Japanese their freedom, their rate of release was 
considerably lower than for European intemees. Noel 
Lamidey. secretary of the Alien Classification and 
Advisoty Committee which dealt with intemee affairs 
during tiie war, said in 1987: "Our govemment was firm 
about the Japanese. As far as I remember, we interned 
the lot and as a principle, we didn't intend to let anyone 
out. It was for their protection".^^ 
Australian policy was to segregate nationalities where 
possible. However, it was considered most economic to 
bufid and run camps with a capacity of 1,000 so 
segregation was not always practical.^" This allowed 
some serious internal friction to develop particularly in 
the German and Itafian camps. There were anti-Nazis 
and anti-Fascists who found themselves in the same 
camps as the Nazi and Fascist Intemees. Charles 
Wfilyan, a sixty-four year-old Australian of Welsh 
parents, was Intemed in 1942 because of his 
membership of the radical nationalist organisation, the 
Australia First Movement. He recorded in his memoirs: 
Every German-bom prisoner in the camp was a declared 
Nazi sympathiser. He had to be - or pretend to be - or live 
in hell ... I have seen a man bashed by a gang, trying to 
throw him over a fence with his belongings and mobile 
machine guns brought up and trained on the mob by order 
ofthe only Australian officer present, while he rescued the 
victim at revolver point.^' 
There were several serious incidents, including murder. 
At Loveday on 16 November 1942 Francesco Fantin, an 
anarchist, was murdered by Giovanni Casotti. a Westem 
Australian Intemee. Casotti was charged with murder 
but the charge was reduced to manslaughter and he was 
sentenced to two years hard labour in a civilian prison.'^ 
Richard Bosworth writes: "Fantin's death was described 
in one file as 'the culmination ofthe unequal stmggle of 
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anU-fasclsts against fascists in the Compound'".^^ 
The Japanese were never mixed with "European" 
intemees. and only occasionally with other "Asiatics". 
Formosan Intemees who were Intemed as Japanese in 
NEI had their own compound at Rushworth. but at 
Loveday they were in the same compound as the 
Japanese.^"* As a result, some friction developed between 
Japanese nationals and Formosans. Including those of 
mixed Japemese-Chlnese descent. The Loveday camp 
authorities reported an interview with a Formosan 
intemee. Ang Poo Hok: 
The internee claims that he Is always bullied by the 
Japanese and encounters a great deal of 'pinpricking*. His 
expressed hatred of the Japanese is such that he would 
gladly join Gen. Chiang Kai Shek's Army or the Australian 
Army. Ang Poo Hok quoted several illustrations of ill 
treatment to show that the Japanese always took priority 
over the Formosans and considered themselves superior, 
frequently using the remark contemptuously, "You are a 
Formosan'. Ang Poo Hok carried In his 'home made' puttees 
a knife of dangerous proportions with which he says he is 
prepared to defend himself If the occasion arises.^ 
According to Ang Poo Hok, the Formosans were divided 
into two groups, those educated in Japan and pro-
Japanese, and those anti-Japanese. Some of the latter 
formed a Formosan Society and Ang Poo Hok was one of 
its leaders. This division also existed at Rushworth and 
caused some friction there. Zenichiroo Satonaka and 
Torakatsu Takamura, bom in Surabaya and Tegal 
respectively, talked about the Japanese attitude towards 
the Formosans at Loveday: "The expression, Taiwanjin 
no kuseni' (You are only Formosan, so how dare ...) was 
often heard in the camp ... We didn't speak Japanese, so 
we weren't quite accepted either".^^ 
Among the younger "Japanese" were many of mixed 
Japanese descent. Some Australlan-bom Japanese at 
Woolenook. a wood cutting camp near Loveday. had 
problems with Japanese nationals. A former chaplain at 
Woolenook remembered the group of Australian-bom 
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Intemees: 
When we (AMF personnel) had a quiz night, they joined us. 
They knew everything and spoke good English. They were 
different from other Japanese ... They had trouble with 
other Japanese so they were put into a special tent They 
refused to sign allegiance to the Emperor.^^ 
Most of these intemees Identified themselves as 
Australians and resented Intemment. One who was bom 
in Darwin to a Japanese father and an Australian-bom 
mother of German extraction, wrote that "[Tjhe Japanese 
... resented our attitude towards their customs and 
beliefs and as we maintained our nationality, and our 
loyalty to this countty. they became antagonistic towards 
^g" 38 jj^g authorities, however, were more concerned 
with this group's "Japaneseness" than any loyalty based 
on birth or cultural affinity. 
Despite evidence of internal friction among the 
Japanese at Loveday. the compounds appeared calm to 
camp personnel and problems did not develop as much 
as in the German and Italian compounds. Bob MargiUch, 
an orderly room corporal at Loveday, recalled: 
I was not very aware of such a problem ... Let's say there 
was friction which became a fight in 14C (a Japanese 
compound)... By the time we got there, they were all poker-
faced. There was nothing wrong anywhere. I got the idea 
that It was the Japanese way of saving face, "we are good 
intemees, we don't fight, we don't do anything'. If you went 
into the German or Italian sides, there would be one group 
on this side and one on the other swearing at each other In 
their own language. But If you went Into 14C, everything 
was dead quiet There was no way that I could read their 
faces. It was a bit scary ...'^ 
Some other former Australian guards felt that there had 
been no problems in the Japanese compounds. They had 
the impression that the Japanese were a cohesive group 
with lltUe friction. One guard from Hay said that "lH 
would say conditions were good. Although hostility may 
have existed, it never showed. Perhaps there was silent 
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contempt for each other".'*" This impression was probably 
gained because relations between Japanese and camp 
authorities were largely conducted through the camp 
committees which tried strongly to control any outward 
signs of discontent. 
The inspection report of the Loveday Intemment 
Camps for 5 January 1943 reads: "the demeanour of 
intemees varies between compounds. In the Japanese 
compounds it leaves nothing to be desired"."' A Loveday 
camp official described the Germans as "arrogant and 
appreciative of strict discipline and firm control". The 
Italians, on the other hand, were described as naturally 
temperamental, needing firm handling and having to be 
"led fike a schoolboy". The Japanese were felt to be model 
prisoners. It was reported that "their fanatical desire to 
medntain 'face' made them easy to handle in their 
eagerness to obey all orders and instructions to the 
letter"."^ Bob Margltich commented: 
1 thought they (the Japanese) were very sensible, which 1 
think Is very important if you are an Intemee ... You 
couldn't be stupid like Italians or some ofthe Germans who 
were that stupid they used to do things that worked against 
them.-^ 
Shigeru Nakabayashi, an intemee from NEI occasionally 
observed the Italians through the fence: 
They looked so easy-going. They were sent to the detention 
block very often ... carrying a blanket over their shoulder 
and happily singing a song as they went ... Compared to 
them we were very serious, I suppose. There weren't many 
who broke camp rules to begin with. I think most Japanese 
thought they should obey rules when captured. That was 
the education in Japan."*^ 
The guards were usually seen to be friendly and 
relaxed. An ex-guard at Rushworth said that "[TJhe 
guards were never nasty to intemees. They were either 
old men or not the gung ho type. They were quiet 
types".'*^ One intemee, a Jewish German refugee 
deported from the UK, recalled his amazement when a 
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guard said to him, "Hey, mate, hold my rifle while I roll 
a cigarette"."^ One Japanese intemee found some guards 
at Loveday too relaxed over their duties. He recalled that 
"(Tlhe Camp Commandant was a proper man. but some 
were too easy going ... Captain Brown often smelt of 
alcohol when he came to do the morning call... I couldn't 
believe it".'*^ There were no known incidents of theft or 
brutality and guards were seen as tolerant but effective. 
According to Margaret Bevege: "It was the Garrison's 
adherence to the letter and spirit of the Geneva 
Convention, this sense of fair play, that maintained the 
intemees' morale it gave them physical security and 
freedom from fear of their captors".'*^ In fact, many ex-
intemees spoke well of the Australian guards and 
expressed gratitude for their humane treatment. In 1985 
Tatsuzo Imalzumi, an intemee from NEI, at Loveday, 
wrote: 
Those years could be considered as a tough life of 
endurance In such an environment... we as a matter of fact 
were quite happy and satisfied for being given the 
protection by the Australian govemment and being supplied 
with all the necessities to sustain life In such condition.*® 
Intemees were given the same amount of food and the 
same number of blankets as AMF personnel. Luigi 
Camporeale, a fisherman from Fremantie, was first 
intemed at Harvey and later moved to Loveday.^ He 
spoke of the camp: 
We had everything and even Australian soldiers treated us 
well ... One day the Inspector came through our kitchen 
and he found we had a lot of left-over food. So he told us 
that If we didn't use It all we should throw It away otherwise 
the next day we wouldn't get any more.^' 
Shigeru Nakabayashi, who was intemed at Loveday, had 
a similar stoty: "We had eggs, bacon, meat - so much 
food! If you ate more, they gave you more. After a while, 
we began eating less, but didn't want to have our rations 
cut down. So we buried some ofthe unused food".^^ Bert 
Whitmore, an officer in charge of engineering at Loveday, 
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said that "|T]here was enough food. For example, when 
the camp was closed I was there. I saw a lot of dried food 
and other foodstuff left lying around the Japanese 
compounds".^ 
The camp staff were flexible in meeting intemees' 
requests for food. At Loveday the Italians wanted more 
bread, flour and spaghetti, whereas the Japanese 
requested less meat but more rice. At Hay there were 
about 200 orthodox Jewish residents and they were able 
to supplement the vegetable and dairy foods with mutton 
killed in the prescribed kosher manner .^ Alcohol was 
prohibited, but intemees of all nationalities illegally 
made alcohol in the compounds at Loveday. Itafians 
distified spirits from grapes and currants sold in their 
canteen and the Japanese copied this method.^^ At 
Christmas the Intemees were able to enjoy a class of 
beer supplied by camp administrations. 
Inside the perimeter, camp authorities allowed 
intemees to practise religious ceremonies and, to a 
limited extent, patriotic activities. Tatura contained a 
dominant hard core of Nazis. According to Paul Goener: 
"the camp was 'ruled' by members of the [National 
Socialist] Party ... and at the centre ofthe back wall [of 
compound A] hung a huge swastika".^ They celebrated 
Hitler's birthday along with the anniversary ofthe Nazis' 
accession to power. The Japanese celebrated almost all 
Japanese holidays, including New Year's Day, the 
Emperor's birthday and National Foundation Day. On 8 
December 1942 the Japanese in all camps had a 
ceremony on the first anniversary of Japan 's entty into 
the war. The Loveday war diary recorded that Japanese 
in I4B Compound refused to go to work because they 
wanted to celebrate Pearl Harbor Day.^^ At Rushworth 
Taishiro Mori noted in his diaty: "At 7 a.m. we all 
gathered and paid respects to the dead soldiers and 
wished good luck and success to the Imperial Army. We 
had a special concert at 6 p.m.".^ The Japanese at 
Loveday had Shinto shrines in the Japanese gardens in 
their compounds. Bob Margltich remembered these 
196 Allen Justice 
shrines: 'There were probably two reasons for doing that 
(gardens and shrines). One is that they wanted to 
worship and the other is that it gave them something to 
do".^^ At Hay, Jewish refugees observed religious feasts 
and religious s tud i e s con t inued throughout 
internment.^" 
Intemees worked at Improving their environment from 
the beginning of their intemment . Gardening was vety 
popular In all camps - Japanese, Itafian and German. 
Many were skilled at crafts and made basic Items for 
themselves. There were professional carpenters, builders, 
blacksmiths, tailors and cooks. At Hay Jewish intemees 
had a watch repair shop to maintain the few surviving 
watches held by Intemees. They also set up a "recreation 
department" and organised handball tournaments.®' The 
Itafians at Hcuvey organised soccer, tennis and bowfing 
competitions which gave them rest from trade courses 
which they organised.®^ Sumo and baseball were popular 
sports for the Japanese at Loveday. At Tatura classical 
music was played on a gramophone while an intemee 
waiter served coffee to the audience. Some intemees even 
managed to keep pets in the camps, including lizards, 
magpies, rabbits and the more usual dogs and cats.®^ 
According to Konrad Linsenmeier, son of a German 
Lutheran missionaty from New Guinea, children found 
camp life interesting as "it was all they had known".®'' Joe 
Murakami from Darwin, an Australian-bom of Japanese 
parentage, was fourteen in 1942: 
The camp life served to broaden the hitherto narrow 
horizons of the children brought about by the lack of 
cultural amenities and opportunities in such places as 
Broome, Darwin, Thursday Island, etc. I think we children 
rather enjoyed this new Interesting communal llfe.^ 
Former guards remember that there was no trouble at 
either family camp. Children looked forward to picture 
nights in the camps and picnics at the Waranga Basin. 
Joyce Hammond writes: "The children worked out their 
own escape route".®® Konrad Linsenmeier sneaked out 
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with friends and used a bath-tub from a deserted house 
to float In a dam.®^ Aff Shiosaki climbed through the 
barbed-wire fence with two other friends and went to a 
local Ice cream shop: 
We had a few shillings ... went in the shop ... The man at 
the counter was suspicious about us and said, "Where are 
you boys from?" ... But the man sold us ice cream ... We 
went back to the camp and the next day we had to face the 
Camp Commandant. He said, Tou know those men In the 
sentry box. They are good shooters'.^ 
Education was an important part of the 
administration of each compound, although it took a 
variety of forms in different camps depending on the 
needs and Initiatives of the intemees themselves. In the 
family camps kindergartens and schools were 
established. Classes were taught by suitably qualified 
persons selected from among the intemees, and 
supervised by a militaty officer. Fritz Amdt felt that he 
was educationally advantaged while in the camp: 
We could speak German but couldn't write it... I spent six 
months being tutored In German by a professor from 
Sydney University ... He taught me the secrets ofthe cases, 
the articles and the script as well ... Then I went into the 
German school in camp. There was an Italian school as well 
... We did ordinary things - History, Geography, Maths, 
Latin and French - at the same time 1 was learning German 
with the German professor.^® 
Rita Vandanega from Texas in Queensland recafied: 
... while we were in compound A, one of the Intemees was 
a school teacher, she run classes for the kids. That's when 
I first learnt to write and speak proper Italian, and although 
1 could speak Italian fairly well and understand all, I can 
also write. I can remember going to school there, and 
learning things, I remember, there was just a little bit of 
groundwork in writing and speaking mainly.^° 
Policy permitted state school correspondence courses 
for children up to eighteen years of age^' and allowed 
some children of overseas intemees to be transferred to 
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approved schools and other Institutions. However, 
Intemment limited the opportunities for some chfidren 
to receive a good basic education. Those intemed as 
Japanese were not allowed outside and all of their 
classes had to be provided in the camp. Unlike other 
groups, intemment of Japanese applied to all women 
and children and so there were larger numbers of 
children requiring education.^^ Their native languages 
included Japanese, Chinese, English. Indonesian. Dutch 
and French. There were Japanese. English and Chinese 
schools.^^ Children of Japanese nationals were given 
basic Japanese education in the Japanese school in C 
Compound at Rushworth. The teachers were Japanese 
nationals. mosUy from NEI. who stricUy observed the 
ideology of nationalism and mfiitarism prescribed for 
elementary schools in Japan.^'^ Mari Kai from New 
Caledonia talked about her teacher. Taishiro Mori: "He 
was a vety strict teacher. I only knew a few words of 
Japanese when I first went to the camp school. I used to 
speak French with my friends from New Caledonia... He 
hit me on the head when I spoke French at school".^^The 
textbooks were written by the teachers. By 1945 Mari 
was able to read advanced Japanese, including poems by 
the Emperor Meiji. Taishiro Mori, who was instrumental 
in producing the textbooks, still treasures those he wrote 
in camp. In 1987 he said that "[I] taught shushin [moral 
education] to the children through various readings and 
talks. I taught them that one nation is a big family. This 
was helpful for them to understand the relationship 
between the state and the individual".^® Policy recognised 
Uiat: 
Instructors would have to be drawn from the ranks of the 
intemees and that such instructors would tend to postulate 
nationalistic doctrines and patriotism. From time to time 
the scheme was criticised on that account, but such a 
defect was unavoidable and was best controlled by local 
camp authorities using their common sense.^^ 
Children of local intemees who were often part-Japanese 
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did not adapt to the Japanese school. One intemee of 
Japanese-Spanish descent said that "[I] couldn't adapt to 
the Japanese way of doing things. I missed out all the 
education. There was no schooling, nothing for people 
like me. There was correspondence school up to primary 
school, but nothing after that".^® With the camp 
commandant's approval, adult intemees could study, 
borrow books and textbooks, and take university and 
correspondence courses. Again this did not apply to 
Japanese.^^ but they were allowed to conduct some 
educational activities by themselves in their 
compounds.®° Intemees with special knowledge or skills 
gave occasional lectures. Glno Cava from Adelaide was 
seventeen when he was intemed at Loveday. He said that 
"[I] was only a kid ... I met some great people there, 
professors and teachers, who opened my mind",^' At 
Rushworth a Japanese professor from the University of 
Queensland held a weekly lecture for adult Japanese 
intemees on world and Japanese history. An 
outstanding example of such educational enterprise was 
the "camp university" initially established at Hay and 
later continued at Tatura. Among the Jewish refugees 
were a number of talented academics who conducted 
courses on evetything from philosophy to inorganic 
chemistry and classes in fifteen different languages.^^ 
Later some of these courses were given recognition by 
the Victorian Education Department.^ Many intemees 
had fitUe or no English emd were often tutored by those 
who had a better command of the language. For many it 
was their first chance to Improve literacy in their own 
language.*^ 
Despite the fact that intemees were able to join in 
various educational and leisure activities, it was 
impossible to completely relieve boredom. Many 
intemees missed steady work. Lieut. Colonel Dean. 
Loveday Camp Group Commandant, "saw the need to 
satisfy this lack, as crucial to camp harmony and 
morale".®^ According to the Geneva Convention, 
intemees were not obliged to work, but could volunteer. 
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The general policy for the use of POW and intemee 
labour reads: 
The manpower position of the Commonwealth requires that 
the maximum used be made of all available POW and 
Intemee labour. The product of such labour can be a 
valuable contribution to our national war effort and can also 
help to offset the loss of manpower occasioned by garrison 
personnel having to be allotted duty at POW and Intemee 
Camps.^ 
In June 1941 Italian intemees at Loveday began work on 
projects outside the compound even before one shifiing 
a day rate was agreed to.®^ Paid emplojmient projects 
included market gardening, camp construction and 
improvement, tailoring and mending, boot repair, 
firewood cutting, and keeping pigs and fowls.^ Because 
cleanfiness was so important, cooks and sanitaty 
workers were always paid, but all other camp work, 
excepting teaching chfidren In camp schools, was not 
paid and was rostered.®^ Loveday and Hay, where many 
intemees were available for such labour, had large and 
varied programs of agricultural production. All were paid 
at the rate of one shilling a day.^° At Rushworth about 
180 Japanese women were employed in a clothing 
factoty set up inside the compound. As female intemees 
and children were not supplied with Army uniforms, they 
made their own garments from second-hand clothes sent 
from weffare organisations such as the Salvation Army.®' 
The work scheme at Loveday was the largest. The 
Adelaide Advertiser reported: 
The story of the Loveday Intemment Camps is much more 
than a record of Army life Inside a barbed wire enclosure.... 
Altogether there are about 40 projects in which Intemees 
are engaged at Loveday, and each has made a substantial 
contribution to the group's success ....^ 
Not all intemees were willing to be employed. Some took 
the view that any work was Indirectly giving assistance 
to the enemy and refused to take part. 
The authorities felt that "Employment projects help to 
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prevent mental and physical deterioration of POWs and 
Intemees".^^ One former PWJMS, a pearl diver from 
Broome, worked at a wood cutting camp at Loveday 
before being moved to Hay. He recalled that "[L]ife in the 
camp was not bad. We worked during the day cutting 
firewood. Because we were working, our minds were 
occupied. The work kept us going ...".^'' A post-war report 
on Japanese POW and intemee labour stated: 
In the Loveday area. South Australia, Japanese Intemees 
were employed ... on the large scale farming projects ... and 
they performed their tasks satisfactorily. Mounted and 
unmounted guards were used to maintain security but the 
Intemees showed litde Inclination to escape.^^ 
Some Italian and German intemees did, however, 
attempt to escape. At Loveday a few intemees escaped 
from working parties outside the compounds and one 
intemee escaped through the fence. None remained at 
large for more than three days. German intemees 
planned a mass escape through a tunnel, but it was 
discovered before completion.^® No Japanese intemees 
attempted to escape.^^ Frank Main, a former guard at the 
Woolenook Wood Camp, accompanied Japanese 
intemees engaged in wood cutting. He recalled: 
One day when we came back from the day's work, we found 
one intemee missing from the work group we accompanied. 
We got really worried. I thought he had escaped. But soon 
we saw him at the gate calling out, 'Let me in. Let me in'. 
The chap was almost in tears. Later I was told that he went 
to relieve himself and when he came back we were all 
gone.^ 
Bob Margltich believed "there was no need for them (the 
Japanese) to escape". He commented: 
The Japanese were prepared to accept for many reasons. I 
don't know what their life style was before they were 
intemed, but they had security and don't forget they had 
plenty of medical care. Spectacles were given by the Red 
Cross. Their life style in there would have been in most 
cases much better than the life they had before.^ 
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The surrender of each of the Axis powers In t um was 
received with mbced emotions by Intemees. In September 
1943 the Italians at Loveday received the news of Italy's 
capitulation in silence. The compound at No. 9 at 
Loveday "observed a day of mourning and 'had never 
been so intensely quiet before'".'°° Although the majority 
accepted it and were relived, the Fascist element thought 
it was a false report.'"' Crescianl writes: 
The vast majority of them, although still Fascist in 
sympathy, were loath to be caught again in any form of 
political activity and seemed to be mainly preoccupied with 
re-establishing themselves and adjusting their private 
affairs as soon as they were released from Intemment. '"^  
In mid-1945 when the German defeat was evident, the 
hard-line pro-Nazi at Tatura believed that: "the Allied 
Armies are stifi being lured on until such times as the 
Nazis are able to apply a pincer movement and bring a 
new secret weapon into action to end the war in their 
favour".'"^ On 15 August 1945, the Japanese intemees 
were told of the Japanese surrender. "It had never been 
so quiet before," recalled Bob Margltich.'""* There were 
mixed reactions among the Japanese. Most received the 
news with relief. Some rejoiced at the news. One 
Australian-bom recalled: "We were so glad that the war 
finally ended. We shouted by saying. They lost the war. 
Hooray!' The Japanese didn't like it".'°^ On 15 August 
1946 Harry Liang, a Formosan intemee wrote: "It is a day 
to remember. Thinking back a year ago today, before I 
listened to the news ... in a happiest mood. The 
surrender of the J a p s indeed was my happiest 
moment".'"® Some did notbefieve that Japan had lost the 
war. Bunji Mori, an intemee at Loveday, was quoted 
saying: 
Japan had won the war. It was not possible for the nation 
to be beaten after she had conquered so often and after she 
had, by the admission of even the Australian press (which 
was normally 90% lies), occupied nearly all of the Pacific. 
He knew the truth, he said because he knew Japanese."" 
"A Little Colony On Our Owh' 203 
At both Loveday and Hay. many were not able to show 
their feelings. Chinenji Kaino. a former pearl diver from 
Broome, described the atmosphere at Hay: "I think many 
of us actually did believe deep in our hearts, that Japan 
had lost the war. But we were all afraid of the reactions 
of others, particularly the militaristic ones ... we couldn't 
say anything unpatriotic".'"^ For some of the long-term 
residents of Australia, the news ofthe end ofthe war was 
yet another disruption. An intefiigence report of 5 
Februaty 1946 stated that a number of old intemees 
believed that: "the world Avill be an unfriendly place for 
all Japanese wherever they go" and that they "would be 
content to stay Intemed indefinitely".'"^ Some had been 
in Australia for up to fifty years and many of them 
appealed to the Australian govemment to be withheld 
from deportation. Chootaroo Sugie. 85 years old in 1946. 
had been a fisherman at Port Headland. Westem 
Austialia. He said that "[I] have nobody in Japan and 
have no intention to go back to Japan. My second 
homeland. Australia, is the only place as for me to live in 
future"."" He was deported together with other Japanese 
in Februaty 1946. The only exceptions were 162 
individuals who were Australian-bom or families where 
the husband or wife was bom in Australia. '" Formosan 
intemees left Australia in the following month. Those 
withheld from initial deportation were gathered at 
Rushworth for further investigation and remained 
intemed for another two years. As a result of these 
Investigations, nineteen individuals were deported to 
Japan and the rest were released in Australia."^ Some 
intemees died due to old age. Long term residents of 
Japanese origin represented some eighty per cent of 
deaths in camps. "^ 
After the imtial trauma ofthe round-ups. the journey 
to a compound and long incarceration, intemees lived in 
a world limited by camp routine and daily chores which 
contrasted strict official discipline with some degree of 
self-determination. Prisoners had the choice of engaging 
in paid emplo3nment or making the most of the boredom 
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of prison Iffe. Joe Murakami wrote: "We were a little 
colony on our own. with the barbed wire barricades 
serving as a buffer against the reality that existed on the 
outside"."* 
Chapter 12 
From Incarceration to Freedom: 
Japanese-Americans and the 
Departure from the Concentration Camps 
Sandra C. Taylor 
University of Utah 
One of the most poignant images of the War Relocation 
Authority's camps for Japanese-Americans is that ofthe 
forlorn elderly Issei and other dependent inmates ofthe 
camps, terrified of being thrust out into a hostile world, 
faced with the closure ofthe camps and with no place to 
go. They had assumed that the govemment which had 
deprived them of freedom and condoned the loss of most 
of their worldly goods would at least take care of them, to 
the end of the war. and perhaps to the end of the fives of 
those who had no job skills and were too infirm to care 
for themselves. But such was not the case. As the camps 
closed, the inmates were thrust out into the world to 
fend for themselves. 
In fact, residents had been leaving the camps since 
the moment they arrived, for Dillon Myer. Director ofthe 
War Relocation Authority (WRA). had intended the camps 
to be temporaty way stations for people who would 
resetUe elsewhere. One of many goals ofthe govemment 
was to move the Nikkei away from the West Coast and 
disperse them throughout the countty. and a policy of 
continuous resettiement could achieve that, he believed. 
There were a variety of ways Myer promoted this, 
beginning with college s tudents going east to school, 
temporaty farm workers leaving on seasonal 
employment, volunteers who were, beginning in the 
summer of 1942. enlisted for the armed forces, and those 
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who were drafted.' But as early as the end of 1942 the 
WRA also sought to encourage indefinite leaves, moving 
eligible people out to new homes away from the West 
Coast. 
The stoty of the relocated students and the men and 
women who joined the armed forces has been ably told 
elsewhere. In this essay I will deal with those who settled 
permanently or temporarily in the mountain west. This 
group can serve as a case study of what, to a greater or 
lesser degree, happened elsewhere. The resettlement was 
handled both in camp and outside: the War Relocation 
Authority established offices in the camps themselves 
where applicants could be encouraged to depart, their 
loyalty checked and files established, and irfformafion 
disseminated to them about jobs and localities where 
they would be welcome outside. At first, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation did background checks on those 
who wished to leave, to determine if they were security 
risks or not. Later a questionnaire was devised to 
ascertain this information; it backfired, however, and 
split the Nikkei community into the "no-no's" and "yes-
yes's", those willing to give up a presumed loyalty to 
J a p a n and serve the US mfiitary, and those who, for 
many different reasons, refused. 
The WRA also set up field offices to assist Nikkei in 
resettfing. These offices dealt with people out on 
seasonal leaves and those who began to depart on 
indefinite leaves, open to the majority of camp 
inhabitants once the question of loyalty had been 
resolved. The field office that will be the focal point of 
this study is Denver: the region it served extended from 
Wyoming to Colorado, northem Texas, Kansas, and New 
Mexico. The Japanese-Americans who were under the 
purview of this office were primarily Inmates ofthe camp 
at Amache (Grenada). Colorado, but also included were 
former residents of the camps in Arkansas (Jerome and 
Rohwer). Heart Mountain. Wyoming, and Topaz (Cential 
Utah.) Although the majority of camp residents 
eventually retumed to their former homes on the West 
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Coast, many others looked for new opportunities 
elsewhere, or sought temporaty homes in the interior 
until the West Coast was reopened to then and/or they 
felt that It was safe enough for the postwar Japanese-
Americans to return. 
The question of where to locate those who wished to 
leave immediately brought up the issue of possible 
locations for setUement. The Emplojmient Division ofthe 
WRA in Washington handled this matter until regional 
centies were established. The Colorado centre fielded 
inquiries from as far away as Chicago, as prospective 
employers sought to locate available labour for work, 
often menial, at the lowest possible wages. In 1942 Myer 
was asked by Thomas W. Holland about prospective 
sites, and the director indicated that the Midwest was 
the preferred location to resettle Nikkei, away from the 
defense commands on the East and Gulf coasts as well 
as the West Coast.^ Myer recognised that re-establishing 
the residents in the war-time economy was essential, yet 
he feared releasing "troublemakers". Not only was that a 
problem to his way of thinking, but an even greater one 
was that of estabfishing a mechanism for placing 
workers. Some could find jobs on their own. many would 
be handled by private agencies, but others would need 
assistance from the government.^ 
By November 1942 regional offices had been 
established, and requests for labour were referred to 
them. The Denver office at once began to receive requests 
for sugar beet workers. Farm labourers were easily 
recmited; they were unskilled seasonal workers and 
supervision was a simple matter, necessary to allay local 
fears ofthe supposed danger of these people whose faces 
looked liked the enemy. The employer provided housing 
and food, and at the end of the harvest the workers 
retumed to camp. Not so easily managed were workers 
released to go to a large city like Chicago. One complaint 
that reached the director of the Minidoka Relocation 
Centre was that Nisei who went to Chicago often did not 
stay on the job for which they were recruited; they were 
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"playboys" who had come merely for a good time, and 
wanted to re tum to camp once the money rem out. He 
noted that, of course, the regional office had refused to 
do this. It is interesting to note the theme here: the goal 
was to get people out of the camps, and once out, they 
should not come back. If mral people feared Nikkei, that 
was much less a problem in a metropofitan area, where 
the govemment's desires for dispersal took precedence.'* 
However, the ongoing problem of the WRA was not 
usually that of the so-called "playboys", but that of 
stimulating what it liked to call the impounded people to 
leave the security ofthe camps for any kind of job and to 
accept Indefinite resettlement. In October 1943 Dillon 
Myer advised all camp directors that since relocation was 
the ultimate aim of the WRA, all the camp personnel 
should encourage and educate the inmates about 
prospects of leaving and help them to plan their own 
resettlement. Part of this could be done by project 
relocation divisions and part by Washington, which 
would coordinate efforts and send out teams to each 
camp to publicise certain areas for resettlement.^ By 
October 1943 inmates on seasonal leave were being 
given permission to obtain indefinite leave in Denver and 
Greeley, If they had relatives in the area; they could also 
obtain leave if they had plans to move further east. 
The matter of relocation was a two-edged sword. On 
the one hand, most ofthe inmates did not wish to leave 
the camps, as became increasingly apparent. Those who 
did wanted the ability to come and go, to retum if 
conditions on the outside proved to be too difficult. For 
them, seasonal leave was the ideal, since they could earn 
more money than they could in camp, where wages were 
fbced at between $16-$21 a month. Some who did leave 
were hard to follow; complaints were voiced of Issei 
leaving camp too soon, or moving without authorisation, 
and this was true of Nisei as well. The WRA lacked the 
manpower to track people once they had left camp, and 
in a sense tracking ran counter to the goal of 
resetUement anyway. Finding situations where Nikkei 
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could be persuaded to go was a more fundamental 
concem, despite the best propaganda efforts ofthe WRA 
relocation divisions in the camps or outside. Added to 
fear of persecution was increasing concem about money: 
that famifies or Issel simply would not have enough 
money to survive on once they left the security of the 
camps. The Nikkei themselves pointed out that it cost 
the govemment about $500 to keep them in camp. Why 
could they not have the money as insurance to help 
them overcome the difficulties inherent in reestablishing 
themselves outside? Of course, any such thing was out 
of the question to Washington.® 
As 1944 progressed the various camps advised 
Washington about the ongoing relocation problem. John 
Rademaker of Amache noted that Issel were beginning to 
relocate, but that the draft s tatus ofthelr sons concerned 
them, especially since it exacerbated the problem of 
insufficient family income on the outside, ff their sons 
were drafted, who would provide for them, since they 
were less employable? They needed contacts In the area 
to which they were going, and wives needed help with 
mundane tasks such as packing and shipping their 
goods. Prospective farmers would need loans to purchase 
equipment. The Farm Security Administration was urged 
to waive its one-year residency requirement to facifitate 
this, enabling the resettled Nikkei to purchase needed 
tools. Changing bureaucratic procedures almost never 
happened, however. Credit was also a necessity for 
businessmen wanting to reestablish themselves. Since 
the West Coast was likely to remain hostile to retuming 
Nikkei, the resettlement offices were urged to encourage 
the inmates to take other opportunities to leave the 
camps prior to the opening of the West Coast. Families 
posed more problems than did single Nisei, and to urge 
them out a more flexible poficy of going out and 
retuming might help, as would establishment of hostels 
for temporary stays.^ 
The second, and growing concem, was that of public 
acceptance of the Japanese-Americans who were 
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released. The fears ofthe inmates that they would not be 
accepted were based on fact. Places they deemed 
desirable, such as Denver, Greeley, and Salt Lake City, 
soon became "impacted", in the eyes of local residents, 
and allowing more Japanese-Americans to settle there 
only stirred up antagonisms. In the case of Colorado, it 
led to the proposing of an alien land law designed to 
keep Issel from purchasing farm land. The controversy 
over land purchase was all the more extreme, when one 
considers that Colorado had been the one westem state 
willing to accept voluntary evacuees before the forced 
concentration into the assembly centres under militaty 
auspices began in March 1942. In Janua ty 1944 the 
WRA began to discourage any further relocation in the 
Denver, Brighton, and Greeley areas. At the same time, 
it tried to avoid any publicity on this issue for fear of 
fuelfing the animosity against land sales.^ 
The Final Report ofthe Westem Plains area ouUined 
fully the situation and the achievements of the regional 
offices in that area. Geographically the area was huge, 
reaching from the Canadian border to Mexico, but in 
reality the area of concem it focused on was Denver, with 
"spokes" running north and south to Greeley and Pueblo. 
The growth of the population of Japanese-Americans 
gave some testimony to the success of relocation in that 
area - the 2,500 Japanese-Americans in 1940 had 
become 12-15,000 by 1947. The situation varied greatly 
from state to state. Montema was uniformly hostile and 
offered few jobs and an inclement climate as well. 
Nebraska was fairly liberal, the Dakotas largely 
indifferent, as were the Spanish-American residents of 
New Mexico. There was more overt hostility in the latter 
State, however. 
The situation in Colorado itself was both positive and 
negative. Since Denver was the major destination of 
Japanese-Americans seeking to remain in the westem 
plains, they were much in the public eye. The major 
newspaper. The Denver Post and the Govemor who 
defeated the liberal Ralph L. Carr. John C. Vivian, were 
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strongly anti-Japanese. The anonymous writer of the 
Westem Plains report attributed success to the practical 
atfitude of the population, the influence of other 
community leaders and the constant efforts of WRA field 
personnel. One helpful factor was that there was a 
prewar Japanese-American community that had been 
Increased in size by the influx of voluntary evacuees: 
some 1500-2000 had come during the voluntary period 
in March 1942.^ This group had proved to be hard 
workers, and were generally accepted, especially in 
agricultural Weld county. 
In Denver Itseff Japanese-Americans were segregated 
to a Japan town on Larimer Street, but they faced 
hostifity there because of their visibility. At one time 
during the war Denver was "closed" even to citizen 
Japanese-Americans leaving the camps because of a 
feeling that the city was impacted and more population 
would increase hostility, especially that voiced by the 
press. But the issue was largely moot anj^way. since the 
Nikkei continued to come, slipping into in the city from 
other nominal destinations like Cheyenne or Colorado 
Springs, their stated destinations when they left camp. 
Denver was popular with the Japanese-Americans 
because ofthe availability of jobs, both in the city and in 
adjacent Weld County, which offered the type of 
agriculture with which the Nikkei were most familiEU". 
Professional people did not fare as well as agricultural 
workers or small businessmen. Colorado did not have a 
reciprocal arrangement with California concerning 
licenses to practice medicine, dentistiy. and law. and the 
state medical board and bar made the examinations 
almost Impossible for the newcomers to pass. Federal 
agencies also avoided hiring Nikkei, despite the executive 
order calUng for "fair employment practices"; the Nikkei 
were deterred by extensive investigations required of 
them and intentionally drawn-out procedures 
administrators put them through.'" 
Although the political leadership was not friendly, the 
Denver and Colorado Council of Churches did provide 
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assistance in relocation and in combatting the 
discrimination fostered by the leading newspaper. Since 
the evacuees went into small businesses, primarily 
hotels and restaurants, as well as the myriad of other 
types of work they had pursued before the war, they did 
not run into active union opposition. They also served 
members ofthelr own community, which welcomed their 
presence. 
Rocky Ford. Colorado, was the most outstanding 
town in the entire region offering active cooperation 
between community leaders and evacuees. The secret to 
success there lay in the active advocacy of leading 
citizens of the town, plus the desperate need it had for 
Japanese-American labour in the sugar beet industty. In 
Rocky Ford, as elsewhere, the key to community 
acceptance was the degree to which manpower was 
needed." The help of churches and other humanitarian 
groups paled before sheer economic need. 
The pattem of resettlement followed the trend 
elsewhere. First seasonal workers left the camps to work 
In sugar beet fields. Then these workers moved into other 
types of unskilled and semi-skilled labour: domesUc 
labour for the women, restaurant work for the men. 
Agriculture and food processing provided the majority of 
jobs, however. The WRA found that locating evacuees 
with particular talents and having them interview 
potential employers was the most effective way to match 
the workers with jobs. Often that process took place In 
the camp. As Japanese-Americans attempted to find 
work in unionised trades, they encountered considerable 
difficulty. It was only with the assistance ofthe WRA and 
the Fair Employment Practices Committee that the 
situation was eased, especially when the head of the 
district WRA office suggested to the AFL that they might 
lose out to the CIO in recruiting union labour in the egg 
industiy. as the latter union was accepting Nikkei 
members.'^ 
Community acceptance was a critical issue 
throughout the region. Help provided by churches, both 
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Christian and Buddhist, was vety Important, especially 
in the fight against the proposed alien land law. The 
Japanese-American Citizens League, under the 
leadership of Joe Grant Masaoka. was also helpful, 
especially in developing social activities (although his 
hostility to the WRA itself provoked some "harmful 
reactions", the head ofthe regional office noted). Housing 
was the area of greatest difficulty, but there was more 
available in rural areas than urban, since Caucasian 
farm workers had left the fields for better-paying war 
work. In Denver the YWCA and YMCA were vety helpful 
in finding jobs and housing, as well as in promoting 
social activities and community acceptance. Families 
were crammed into one and two-room apartments, and 
the situation seemed to get worse, not better, as more 
people left the camps. Added to the problem of housing 
in urban areas were restrictive racial covenants, 
designed to keep people of colour out.'^ 
Despite the positive efforts of those well-disposed 
towards the Nikkei, prejudice continued. One Incident 
that attracted wide attention was the case of three Nisei 
women, members of the Shitara family and former 
residents of the Amache centre, who helped some 
German prisoners-of-war who were working as farm 
labourers escape from a farm near Trinidad. Colorado. All 
three were charged with treason and sentenced to the 
penitentiary. The Denver Post gave the incident wide 
pubficity. especially through pictures it located showing 
the women in "amorous poses" with the Germans. Added 
to this was the effort by farming Interests In Greeley. 
Pueblo, and Grand Junction, Colorado, to enact an alien 
land law. Although a special session of the state 
legislature was called and the bill passed in the lower 
house, the upper house defeated it soundly. An 
interesting sidelight to this incident was that when the 
issue was brought to the public as an amendment it was 
defeated, largely by the absentee ballots of American 
servicemen.'* The report concluded that insofar as 
Colorado was concerned, Japanese-Americans there had 
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enlarged their opportunities and gained in public 
understanding and acceptance, in large part due to the 
beneficial efforts of the local War Relocation Authority. 
The head of the Denver regional office noted that with 
the ending of the war, a more tolerant attitude had 
begun to prevail. He attributed this to the efforts of the 
Denver regional WRA, naturally, as well as to other 
private agencies and the more tolerant att i tudes of the 
press and radio. He found litUe good to say about the 
Washington headquarters ofthe WRA. which did little to 
inform the public of its plans and policies and did not 
attempt to refute false statements. '^ 
Other regions of Colorado had similar experiences: 
where labour shortages were acute, especially in 
agriculture, the skilled Japanese-Americans were needed 
and welcome. Pueblo had welcomed Nikkei as 
sharecroppers beginning in 1942. By the next year they 
had begun to purchase or lease farms, and with the war's 
end it seemed clear that some two hundred families 
intended to remain in the area. These residents had been 
unable to lease or buy land in California, and they 
welcomed the greater opportunity in the rural areas 
around Pueblo. Pueblo and Colorado Springs also offered 
some urban jobs. Colorado Springs was not an 
agricultured area but a tourist destination, and some 
Nikkei were hired to work in resorts, four of them as 
chefs. Camp Carson, an army facility nearby, also hired 
some skilled technicians. Rocky Ford. Colorado, was the 
site of the most favourable instance of permanent 
relocation, with Nikkei running shipping sheds, farms, a 
restaurant, and a hotel. The San Luis valley had also had 
a vety positive experience. Trinidad had a poor 
experience due to the Shitara family case. 
Generally in southern Colorado community 
sentiment was favourable. By and large, public 
assistance helped persons who had financial need due to 
sudden illness. The evacuees were not discriminated 
against in acquiring housing, but it was often below 
standards they considered acceptable, while wages too 
From Incarceration to Freedom 215 
were not competitive with the West Coast. 
An even more favourable situation prevailed in the 
Greeley. Colorado area. Nearly 800 Nikkei had resided 
there at the outbreak of the war. drawn by the rich 
agricultural land in the Platte River Valley, and others 
from the West Coast had lived there for a time. The area 
became so popular during the war that the Chamber of 
Commerce In Greeley petitioned the WRA to close the 
area to further resettlement because It had reached the 
saturation point. At this time only family members were 
permitted to rejoin relatives already there. However, by 
the end of 1944 some 500 evacuees on indefinite leave 
had moved to the area. The restrictions were lifted early 
in 1945. Most of the new and old setUers farmed the 
North and South Platte river valleys, but a few 
established small businesses in Scottsbluff and North 
Platte. Nebraska. As in Wyoming. Japanese-Americans 
tended to avoid settling in large, underpopulated areas, 
probably through fear of loneliness and. in Wyoming, the 
hostility of the Caucasians. Where the population was 
already acquainted with Japanese-Americans, hostility 
was negligible, with the one exception being Larimer 
County. Colorado. The WRA made the usual public 
relations gestures - speeches, films, contacts with 
community leaders - to mitigate hostility. 
There were even some incidents demonstrating 
sympathy for the evacuees. A man was assaulted In Fort 
Lupton, Colorado, by a US Deputy Marshall, The 
assailant was arrested, fined, and publicly apologised 
and paid hospital expenses for his victim. In Laramie. 
Wyoming, two Japanese-American students were 
assaulted by a teen-age group, but college students took 
the side ofthe two victims. Juvenile vandalism against a 
Japanese boardinghouse brought promises of strong 
police action against further acts of discrimination in the 
town. Even at the Otto Lumber Company working 
conditions were vety favourable and the company stated 
that it was open to hiring more experienced lumbermen 
there. The AFL also had accepted Japanese-American 
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employees EIS members.'® 
The communities in Nebraska where Japanese-
Americans resettled generally accepted them. A laundty 
in Sidney, purchased by a man from the Rohwer camp, 
was established under its new ownership with minimal 
assistance from the relocation officer. The majority ofthe 
financing for the deal was arranged between the 
Caucasian seller and the evacuee buyer. Most of the 
customers were Caucasian, as were more than half the 
employees. They and the Nikkei family members worked 
side by side. Sidney also offered employment to some 
100 persons at the Sioux Ordnance Depot, which 
brought some 200 more residents to the town. Unlike the 
laundty owner, these people left the area rapidly with the 
ending ofthe war. retuming to their former homes on the 
West Coast.'^ 
In northem New Mexico, a region managed out ofthe 
Pueblo office, there were some twenty-five families, but 
purchasing land was made difficult because of the 
persistence of Spanish land grant claims, Northem New 
Mexico generally proved unsuitable for Nikkei setUement 
anyway, since it was a region of ranches, lumbering, and 
mining, work in which they were untrained. The local 
population had no acquaintance with them, and hence 
were hostile, or at best indifferent. New Mexico offered a 
different situation from either the Colorado-Nebraska 
area or the Northem Plains. In the Albuquerque area, 
Spanish-Americans were largely indifferent, but the 
members of the New Mexico National Guard, 
headquartered in the Philippines during the war, was 
actively hostile. Memories ofthe death march on Bataan 
were invoked frequently against the possible presence of 
Japanese-Americans. In 1945 the Deputy US District 
Attomey in Albuquerque refused to issue travel permits 
to alien Japanese wishing to visit the area to explore 
opportunities for resetUement. He was persuaded to 
change his mind after the WRA contacted the US District 
Attomey in Santa Fe. The only favourable sentiment was 
found In Albuquerque and Gallup, New Mexico, and El 
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Paso, Texas. Gallup was very favourably disposed toward 
Nikkei, and the few families there had been well-received. 
About 25 people lived in the town and were well-
accepted. One man had resided there for about 25 years 
and was one ofthe most respected residents. Most ofthe 
other residents had also lived there for many years. 
However, since agriculture in the area was vety limited, 
the relocation officer for the region noted that this was 
not a good area for further resettiement.'^ One can only 
speculate as to the reasons for the favourable conditions 
in Gallup, but one possibility is that it was primarily 
native American, and they were perhaps less hostile than 
Caucasians to another minority group. 
Eastern New Mexico was unsuitable, since like the 
northem part of the state it was a ranching area with 
some dty-land farming. Only Albuquerque and Bernalillo 
County offered any opportunities for Nikkei resettlement 
in terms of possitjie employment.'^ In a supplementary 
report written in August 1945, the author noted that the 
prospects for relocation in the Albuquerque area looked 
much more favourable than previously reported. The 
reason lay in the desire of the County Agent to support 
Japanese-American settlement, based on requests he 
had been getting for people to buy or share-crop land. As 
always, the lack of housing was a major deterrent, but 
they were trying to find temporary housing should people 
be willing to take up these offers. They had already 
contacted the Gila River camp to encourage setUers.^" 
The northem portion of the district, comprising 
portions of Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and 
Wyoming, also reported to Denver. It was never popular 
with resettlers. The climate was too harsh, and they were 
not experienced in raising livestock. The few areas where 
sugar beets could be cultivated, such as the Big Horn 
Valley, attracted a few families, some of whom stayed on 
after the war's end. Most were unwilling to subject their 
families to the hostility and the loneliness of the area. 
The jobs offered around Billings and in the Wyoming 
territoty adjacent to Heart Mountain were either 
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seasonal or menial, and there was lltUe interest. The 
attitude of the Caucasian Wyomingites was hostfie. in 
any case, and the mayor of Billings said that he too did 
not want to "stick his neck out" by participating in a 
resetUement committee. Another reason for the lack of 
interest, aside from the usual racial prejudice, was that 
there was no labour shortage and no job opportunities 
for skilled labour since industiy was highly unionised 
and opposed to Asian membership,^' 
During the war the one experience resetUers in the 
mountain west had with unionised labour was 
unfavourable. Not only were unions strongly opposed to 
their entrance, but the problem of mistreatment of 
workers who were recruited from camp demonstrated the 
prevaifing attitude toward those Japanese-Americans 
bold enough to leave camp. A number of workers from 
Amache were recruited to work at the Otto Lumber 
Company in Worland. Wyoming. They found the work 
excessive, the conditions terrible, and the cold extieme. 
Jack M. Hayashi petitioned the director of the US 
Employment Service to secure the workers, who had 
retumed to Amache. some compensation, and to ask 
that such misrepresentation of jobs be stopped." Little 
could be done, however, for those who had already been 
victimised. 
The situation of an ill Japanese-American living in 
the area also demonstrated the hostility. S. Yoshioka. an 
Issel cook from Tule Lake, fell ill from tuberculosis in 
Bismarck. North Dakota and after resting for some time 
moved to a new job in Billings. He rapidly became sick 
again. When he was diagnosed as having advanced 
tuberculosis, the county health authorities refused to 
take responsibility, since he was not a resident of the 
State. The case was passed from one official to another, 
and the man was finally hospitalised in Billings, where 
he died in about a week. Since no relative could be 
located, he was buried in the potter's field in Billings.^* 
The most interesting feature of this otherwise dismal 
report is contained in its conclusions. The anonymous 
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author concluded that evacuation was conducted on 
racial grounds, since its militaty necessity was 
debatable, and the constitutionality of the action was 
also dubious. The WRA program of relocation was 
basically one of dispersal, but this was not resulting in 
any greater acceptance of Japanese-Americans. Most 
Issei insisted on retuming to the West Coast, at the 
expense of the Nisei, who often desired to remain in the 
Midwest or East. The author concluded that the 
experience had highlighted the problems of minority 
groups in the United States, which had to be resolved if 
a permanent basis for peace were to be found.^'' He was 
not optimistic, based on this experience. 
The relationship between the relocation centres and 
the district offices in the matter of arranging relocation 
was awkward at first, since camp personnel feared losing 
their skified Nisei workers to the district offices and their 
own administrative positions, but it was resolved over 
fime. Since the Pueblo office was close to the Amache 
camp, it gave its residents first priority in job 
placements. By late 1943 the centre relocation ofiices 
and the district offices in charge of resetUement had 
worked out a good cooperative arrangement. 
What can be concluded about the resettlement efforts 
ofthe War Relocation Authority? As an ongoing program 
to move people out of the camps during war-time It was 
generally unsuccessful. Most residents left camp, if at 
all. on seasonal leaves, retuming to the security of 
govemment confinement after the harvest. Those who 
did leave for employment outside found mixed 
conditions. Where there was a need for their labour, 
economic necessity seemed to override local prejudices. 
Housing was usually difficult to obtain, but community 
acceptance was facilitated by the WRA's program of 
public relations, activities of the churches, as well 
activities In the schools. The major hindrance, in the 
case of Denver, was the opposition of The Denver Post to 
Japanese-Americans generally, which exacerbated local 
prejudices. Even that was gradually wom away as the 
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war came to an end and the Nikkei proved themselves to 
be good neighbours. There were a few outstanding 
examples of cooperation, a few of discrimination, and the 
exceptional case of the sisters who aided German POWs 
attempting to escape a farm labour camp. However, that 
stoty appeared to have had minimal pubficity. There 
were no cases of burning of homes or the other kinds of 
vigilante harassment as occurred in Calffomia. Part of 
the reason, no doubt, lay in the fact that much smaller 
numbers of people were involved. Most camp residents 
wanted to retum to their old homes, and ultimately did 
so. Most, in fact, did not leave the camps until they 
closed, and at that point they retumed to their former 
homes. Even on the West Coast hostility gradually gave 
way to acceptance. 
Parallels can be drawn with the experience in the 
mountain west. Japanese-American labour was needed 
in postwar America, especially after the general 
dislocation brought about by the retum of servicemen 
had passed. The media was persuaded to drop its old 
hostility. Nikkei found employment in civil service and 
their success paved the way for their entty Into the 
middle class. As the memoty of Pearl Harbor faded and 
the Cold War began. Japanese-Americans no longer had 
the faces of the enemy. 
Chapter 13 
Justice Delayed But Not Denied? 
Donald Teruo Hata. Jr. and Nadine Ishitani Hata 
California State University 
Dominguez Hills EI Camino College 
On 10 August 1988. President Ronald Reagan signed the 
Cu)il Liberties Act of 1988. which provided for a one-time, 
non-taxable payment of $20,000 and an official apology 
to each survivor of America's World War II concentration 
camps for Nikkei (Japanese-Americans).' On 21 
November 1989. Congress approved an annual 
appropriation of $500 million, until all eligible persons 
were compensated. The first cheques were finally issued 
on 9 October 1990. beginning with the oldest survivors, 
along with an apology signed by President George Bush: 
A monetary sum and words alone cannot restore lost years 
or erase painftil memories; neither can they fully convey our 
Nation's resolve to rectily injustice and to uphold the rights 
of individuals. We can never fully right the wrongs of the 
past But we can take a clear stand for justice and 
recognise that serious injustices were done to Japanese-
Americans during World War II. 
In enacting a law calling for restitution and offering a 
sincere apology, your fellow Americans have. In a very real 
sense, renewed their traditional commitment to the ideals 
of freedom, equality, and justice. You and your family have 
our best wishes for the future. 
Presidents Reagan and Bush were responding to the 
findings of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and 
Intemment of Civilians (CWRIC) which had been created 
by Congress and approved by President Jinmiy Carter in 
1980. The Commission's public hearings in major cities 
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across the nation had a profound Impact on Nikkei. Aged 
survivors were among the most poignant of 750 
witnesses, and Nikkei as community finally ended 
decades of silence about their war-time experience. After 
nationwide public hearings and extensive research in 
records of various federal agency files, the CWRIC 
unanimously concluded that: 
The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 was notjustlfied 
by military necessity, and the decisions which followed from 
it - detention, ending detention and ending exclusion - were 
not driven by analysis of military conditions. The broad 
historical causes which shaped these decisions were race 
prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership. 
Widespread ignorance of Japanese-Americans contributed 
to a policy conceived In haste and executed In an 
atmosphere of fear and anger at Japan. A grave Injustice 
was done to American citizens and resident aliens of 
Japanese ancestry who, without any individual review or 
any probative evidence against them, were excluded, 
removed and detained by the United States during World 
War II.2 
The Commission's unanimous findings, contained in 
a 467-page report, entiUed Personal Justice Denied 
issued in 1983, served to educate the general public and 
the Congress, and laid a foundation for popular support 
of the Commission's five specffic recommendations for 
further action - two of which were implemented in the 
presidential apology and $20,000 cash pajnnents.^ 
Redress arrived too late for almost half of the 120,000 
prisoners. Most of the immigrant pioneer Issei (first 
generation) are dead, and only some 60,000 of their Nisei 
(second generation) children are still alive. Among the 
survivors, feelings of celebration have been mixed with a 
sense of amazement that justice so long delayed had not 
been denied.* 
What had happened to cause such a seminal shift In 
attitudes within the Nikkei community and the nation at 
large? This requires a review of evolving efforts that are 
now known as the movement for Japanese-American 
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redress. 
The War-time Japanese-American Cases 
In early 1942, Lieut. General John L. DeWitt, commander 
of the Westem Defense Command, concluded that 
"militaty necessity" required special policies for Nikkei, 
including curfew, exclusion from the West Coast, and 
confinement outside the restricted zone. He had no 
evidence of their disloyalty except his personal opinion 
that "a Jap's a J ap .... It makes no difference whether he 
is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese".^ 
In 1942, four young West Coast Nisei who had never 
met each other, challenged the govemment's policies and 
pressed their cases to the US Supreme Court. For forty 
years, the Court's rulings in the "Japanese-American 
cases" sanctioned the denial of basic civil rights of US 
citizens by reason of their race. On 16May 1942, Gordon 
Kiyoshi Hirabayashi presented "a neatly typed four-page 
statement" to FBI agents in Seattle: 
I must maintain my Christian principles. I consider It my 
duty to maintain the democratic standards for which this 
nation lives. Therefore, I must refuse this order for 
evacuation.^ 
Hirabayashi was twenty-four years old, a senior at the 
University of Washington in SeatUe, and a volunteer with 
a Quaker group who assisted Nikkei caught up in the 
evacuation. Increasingly frustrated by the military curfew 
placed solely on Nikkei, he decided to offer himseff up as 
a test case. He was arrested, sent to King County Jail for 
five months, and convicted for refusing to obey the 
Army's curfew order and for failing to report for 
evacuation. A closely related curfew case involved 
Mlnoru Yasui, bom in 1916 to Issel apple growers in 
Hood River who raised their seven "children as 
Methodists, sent them to public schools, and put them 
all through college". After Pearl Harbor, the graduate of 
the University of Oregon law school Immediately resigned 
from the Japanese consulate in Chicago, retumed to 
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Oregon, and reported for duty as a commissioned officer 
in the US Army Reserve. But when he reported to Fort 
Vancouver, he was found unacceptable for militaty 
service and ordered off the base no less than eight 
times. ^ ShorUy thereafter his father, an Issei community 
leader, was arrested and sent to the Justice Department 
intemment camp in Missoula. Montana. On Saturday 
night 28 March 1942. an angry Mlnoru Yasui walked 
into a Portland police station, demanded to be arrested 
for violating the military curfew, and spent the rest ofthe 
weekend in the drunk tank. He later served 12 months 
in sofitary corffinement.^ 
On J u n e 21 1943. in Hirabayashi v. US, the Supreme 
Court unanimously upheld the racist curfew policy while 
refusing to deal with the constitutionality of the 
evacuation. Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone reasoned 
that, "in time of war residents having ethnic afilllations 
with an invading enemy may be a greater source of 
danger than those of a different ancestty".^ When Yasul's 
case reached the Supreme Court, it was treated as a 
companion case to Hirabayashi and sent back to 
Portland where the original ruling was set aside to 
conform to the Court's decision in Htrabayashl^° 
Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu was a twenty-three year 
old welder In 1942. Unlike the Idealistic and indignant 
Hirabayashi and Yasui. Korematsu did not plan from the 
outset to test the legality of the govemment's policies. 
Instead, he underwent minor plastic surgety In an effort 
to evade the evacuation order and stay with a Caucasian 
girl friend. He posed as a Spanish-Hawaiian with a 
clumsily-forged draft registration card In the name of 
"Clyde Sarah". It was after he was arrested Uiat 
Korematsu was approached by an American Civil 
Liberties Union lawyer. A written statement later 
explained his decision to become a test case: 
In order to be imprisoned, these people should have been 
given a fair trial In order that they may defend their loyalty 
at court in a democratic way. but they were placed in 
imprisonment without any fair trial! 
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His concluding sentence was prophetic in light of events 
forty years later: "Fred Korematsu's Test Case may 
help"." 
The Supreme Court's decision in Hirabayashi had 
focused narrowly on the Army's curfew in the early 
months of the war. The broader issue of the entire 
program of mass curfew, exclusion and incarceration 
was up for review when the Court issued its ruling in 
Korematsu v. US, on 18 December 1944. With three 
justices dissenting, the majority upheld Korematsu's 
conviction solely on the govemment's claim of "militEuy 
necessity". In Justice Hugo Black's majority opinion: 
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area 
because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded 
because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because 
the properly constituted military authorities feared an 
invasion of our West Coast.... 
In his scathing dissent "from this legalisation of racism 
...", Justice Frank Murphy excoriated DeWitt for 
perpetuating racist stereotypes and challenged the 
validity of the govemment's reliance on "military 
necessity" as its rationale for the entire evacuation and 
intemment program: 
This forced exclusion was the result in good measure of this 
erroneous assumption of racial guilt rather than bona fide 
military necessity ... he refers to all Individuals of Japanese 
descent as 'subversive', as belonging to 'an enemy race' 
whose 'racial strains are undiluted'...".'^ 
The highest court released its ruling on the fourth 
case. Ex parte Endo, on the same day as Korematsu. 
Instead of challenging the curfew and exclusion orders, 
Mitsuye Endo waited until she was incarcerated at the 
War Relocation Authority (WRA) camp at Topaz, Utah, to 
apply for a writ of habeus corpus. When the war began, 
Endo had been a clerical worker in the Calffomia 
Department of Motor Vehicles in Sacramento. The 
twenty-two year old Methodist did not speak or write 
Japanese, had never visited Japan, and had a brother 
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serving overseas in the US Army. Endo rejected a WRA 
offer of immediate freedom ff she abandoned her legal 
challenge, and remained incarcerated for more than two 
years until the Court finally ordered her released.'^ The 
unanimous decision, according to Justice William 0. 
Douglas, was that Endo had been detained not by the 
mfiitary but "by a civilian agency, the War Relocation 
Authority...which [had] no authority to [detain] citizens 
who are concededly loyal...". Justice Murphy added that 
detention in Relocation Centers of persons of Japanese 
ancestry regardless of loyalty is ... another example ofthe 
unconstitutional resort to racism inherent in the entire 
evacuation program.''' 
Legal scholars like Eugene Rostow immediately 
attacked the Supreme Court's "bewildering and 
unimpressive series of opinions" in the Japanese-
American cases. Rostow supported dissenting JusUce 
Murphy's position that the govemment's claim of 
"mfiitaty necessity" was based on DeWitt's racism rather 
than factual evidence, and urged that "the basic issues 
should be presented to the Supreme Court again, in an 
effort to obtain a reversal of these war-time cases".'^ 
Retum and Recovery 
The road back from war-time exile was accomplished 
with little public assistance.'^ While recovety from 
Intemment was difficult for most Nikkei, the end of 
World War II was a turning point in their public image. 
Acceptance and even admiration replaced pre-war 
"Yellow Peril" fears. The highly publicised war-time 
heroism of the racially segregated Nikkei 442nd 
Regimental Combat Team had quieted questions about 
loyalty, and the unconditional surrender and occupaUon 
of Japan led to positive impressions of Japanese culture 
and an influx of war brides. In 1948. President Hany S. 
Tmman signed the Japanese-American Evacuatbn 
Claims Act but it was restricted to losses of real 
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property, and given a mere $38 million appropriation to 
setUe 23.000 claims totalling $131 mifilon. Many Nikkei 
never filed a claim because they could not provide the 
required documentation; others simply did not trust the 
govemment. Senior historian of the subject Roger 
Daniels concluded: "After seventeen years of litigation, 
during which most claims were setUed for a few cents on 
the dofiar ... [noJ one knows the real worth of the 
property lost by the Japanese-Americans".'^ 
Nikkei were part of the postwar exodus of inner city 
residents to suburban communities. Their integration 
into the mainstream by the 1960s was reflected in the 
large numbers of Nikkei who were elected or appointed 
to city councils and school boards up and down the West 
Coast. Unlike Hawaii. Nikkei candidates could not count 
on a large ethnic bloc vote, and depended Instead on 
their appeal to moderate and conservative electorates. As 
the nation became preoccupied with heightening urban 
unrest and a violent t um in the civil rights and anti-
Vietnam War movements. Nikkei did not go unnoticed. 
They were now hailed as Asian counterparts of Horatio 
Algerwho were "outwhiting the whites".'^The new image 
of Nisei and their Sansei chfidren was that of a "model 
minority"'® whose docile and accommodationlst posture 
should be emulated by more aggressive and impatient 
minority gmd feminist groups. In response, many 
conservative Nisei carefully avoided or opposed activities 
which might identify them with "radical" movements. 
Prior to the 1960s, with the exception of a few 
acUvists. most former prisoners had publicly and 
privately suppressed memories of the evacuation and 
incarceration, even to the extent of refusing to discuss 
the subject with their Sansei children.^" On the other 
hand, there were signs of a growing sense of 
psychological security among both Nisei and Sansei 
about their place in American society. Generational rifts 
between Nisei and Sansei began to heal as Nikkei 
became Involved In a variety of activities which saw them 
come to grips with their war-time past. For example, in 
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1969 they organised pilgrimages to former camps such 
as Manzanar. in the Owens River Valley of California. 
The Manzanar Committee also undertook a public 
education role by sponsoring public forums on "Days of 
Remembrance". Manzanar and Tule Lake were declared 
official Callfomla state landmarks in bitter campaigns 
which outraged conservatives by their official description 
as "concentration camps".^' Nikkei teachers and parents 
formed new organisations such as the Japanese-
American Curriculum Project in San Mateo to review and 
produce relevant classroom teaching materials. 
Several controversies caused hitherto apofiUcal 
elements of the Nikkei to became politically active. In 
1969. a hastily organised ad hoc coalition of community 
and cultural groups mounted a surprisingly aggressive 
(and successful) protest movement against the summaty 
firing of Dr Thomas Noguchi. the flamboyant Los Angeles 
County Coroner who became a national celebrity in the 
wake of Robert Kennedy's assassination. On 11 July 
1969. the LA Times printed a full-page "Metro" secUon 
advertisement with the heading: "A PLEA FOR JUSTICE, 
IF THIS CAN HAPPEN TO ONE OF US, IT CAN HAPPEN 
TO YOU ... A nationally known doctor and scientist was 
humiliated, disgraced and fired from a civil service post 
without a hearing ...".^^ The publication of a long-awaited 
JapEmese-American Citizens League (JACL)-sponsored 
histoty of Nikkei by Bill Hosokawa led Nisei and Sansei 
activists to oppose the docfie stereotype perpetuated by 
its tiUe of Niset The Quiet Americans.'^^ 
More important as a turning point in their emerging 
assertiveness was the Involvement of Nikkei in the 
movement to repeal TlUe II - the Emergency Detention or 
"concentration camp" provision of the 1950 Internal 
Security Act - following the revelation that concentraUon 
camps were being held In readiness for pofitical radicals 
and anti-Vietnam war demonstrators. Prior to the repeal 
of TiUe fi (1971), Nikkei pofitical activism had been 
limited to a vocal but peripheral handful of liberal Nisei 
and Sansei college students.^'^ As Nikkei establishment 
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organisations such as JACL resisted an activist role,^^ 
new groups such as the Asian-American Political 
Alliance appealed to a broad cross-section of the 
community. Edison Uno, a pioneer proponent of redress, 
recalled that: 
It sparked the imagination of Japanese-Americans 
throughout the United States who utilised the TiUe II issue 
to enlighten and sensitise politicians, public media, 
educators, and the general public about the gross Injustices 
of mass incarceration ...".^ 
An unexpected sign of the public's acceptance of Nikkei 
was revealed during the 1973 US Senate Watergate 
hearings, when President Richard Nixon's attomey 
publicly slurred Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HA) as "that 
little Jap". The angry outcry was overwhelmingly in 
favour of Inouye.^^ 
The Movement for Redress 
In the early 1970s, increasing unrest within and without 
the JACL prodded the cautious Nisei-dominated 
organisation to adopt an active civil rights role, including 
the need for a fuller govemment accounting of its war-
fime tieatment of Nikkei.^® Early terms such as 
"reparations" and "compensation" were eventually 
replaced by the less strident term "redress". But most 
estabfished Nikkei leaders were ambivalent or hostile to 
any active support until 19 February 1976 when, as part 
of the bicentennial celebrations of the American 
Revolution, President Gerald R. Ford revoked Executive 
Order 9066, and observed that "an honest reckoning" 
had to acknowledge "our national mistakes" as wefi as 
"our national achievements .... We all know now what we 
should have known then - not only was that evacuation 
wrong, but JapEmese-Americans were and are loyal 
Americans".^® 
Some Nikkei were satisfied with Ford's statement 
praising their war-time loyalty, and considered the 
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redress issue closed; but others demanded additional 
action. Ford contributed to the growing momentum of 
the redress movement when, on his last day In office, he 
issued a full and unconditional pardon for Iva I. Toguri 
d'Aquino, the Nisei woman known as Tokyo Rose.^° The 
pardon was a victoty for Clifford I. Uyeda, who had 
persuaded a reluctant JACL to endorse her cause, and 
then successfully chaired its National Committee for Iva 
Toguri from 1975-1977. When Uno died in 1977, Uyeda 
assumed leadership of the redress stmggle within JACL 
by chairing its National Committee for Redress. At the 
1978 JACL convention, the committee circulated a 
pamphlet comparing the Nikkei war-time experience to 
that of Jews in Nazi Germany,^' and secured a 
unanimous JACL endorsement to seek both an official 
apology and a cash payment of $25,000 to each war-time 
prisoner.^^ 
Any semblance of Nikkei community consensus 
disintegrated with the announcement of JACL's addition 
of monetary compensation to an official apology. 
Conservatives were shocked, and California's US Senator 
S.I. Hayakawa immediately dismissed any notion of 
monetaty redress as "absurd and ridiculous".^^ In the 
meantime, bitter differences divided the proponents of 
monetary redress, and two vety different strategies 
emerged: an activist frontal assault to initiate a $25.2 
bfilion class action lawsuit in the federal courts^'* by a 
new coalition called the National Council for Japanese-
American Redress (NCJAR) led by Wfillam Hohri;^^ 
versus the less corffrontational approach which led to 
Congress' creation of the CWRIC. The commission 
strategy avoided seeking direct redress in the courts, and 
evolved through consultations between the small but 
symbofically critical Nikkei congressional delegation,'* 
and the JACL National Committee for Redress. It first 
called for legislation to appoint a commission 
to determine whether a wrong was committed against those 
American citizens and permanent residents relocated 
and /or intemed as a result of Executive Order Numbered 
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9066 and other associated acts ofthe Federal Govemment, 
and to recommend appropriate remedles.^ ^ 
When the JACL-endorsed "commission bill" was 
introduced on 2 August 1979, the NCJAR and other 
proponents of class action lawsuits angrily dismissed it 
as another JACL "sellout".^ ® But the Indirect commission 
strategy prevailed, and in 1980 Congress passed the bfil, 
creating the CWRIC.^ ^ 
The Coram Nobis Cases 
In 1981, legal historian Peter Irons began research on 
the landmark "Japanese-American cases" for a book on 
"the process of justice at war". His unexpected discovety 
that War and Justice Department officials had deceived 
the Supreme Court in 1943 and 1944 by deliberately 
altering, suppressing, and destroying criUcal evidence 
allowed Irons and a team of largely Asian-American 
lawyers to use an obscure legal proceeding, a petition for 
writ of error coram nobis, to reopen three ofthe cases in 
the courts of their origin."*" 
Korematsu's petition was filed and decided first. In 
granting Korematsu's request to vacate his conviction in 
October 1983, US District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel mled 
the evidence presented by the govemment to the 
Supreme Court was based on "unsubstantiated facts, 
distortions and representations of at least one militaty 
commander, whose views were seriously affected by 
racism". She concluded "that the govemment knowingly 
withheld irfformation from the courts when they were 
considering the critical question of military necessity in 
this case"."*' Yasui, who died in November 1986, saw his 
conviction vacated in 1984 at the govemment's request. 
When the Hirabayashi hearing began in June 1985, 
the govemment was determined to take the offensive. 
Govemment lawyer Victor Stone pugnaciously argued 
that the evacuation and intemment were justified for 
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reasons of "military necessity" although none of tiie 
govemment's witnesses could prove that a single Nikkei 
had been gufity of espionage. Moreover, claimed Stone, 
Hlrabayashi's appeal to the Supreme Court in 1943 had 
not been prejudiced by the suppression of evidence. US 
District Judge Donald Voorhees was not persuaded and 
In February 1986, he found the govemment had 
withheld evidence that DeWitt's actions were based 
solely on racism and not on "military necessity".'*^ In 
September 1987, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
vacated Hlrabayashi's curfew conviction. Judge Mary 
Schroeder concluded that: 
there could have been no reasonable military assessment of 
an emergency at the time, that the orders were based upon 
racial stereotypes and that the orders caused needless 
suffering and shame for thousands of American cltlzens.^^ 
When the Reagan Administration elected not to appeal 
these decisions, hopes disappeared for a Supreme Court 
re-examination of the validity of Imprisoning persons 
solely on assumptions of racial disloyalty. 
Epilogue 
Among the most enduring legacies of the Nikkei redress 
movement was the revelation of hitherto unknown 
infortnation and its incorporation into a much revised 
and expanded official record. Another important 
development was the emergence of institutions and 
organisations dedicated to preserving and perpetuating 
the war-time Nikkei Diaspora as a lesson for all 
Americans. These include the permanent Nikkei 
evacuation exhibit in the National Museum of American 
History of the Smithsoniem Institution, and the 
Japanese-American National Museum in Los Angeles' 
LitUe Tokyo. But will the past serve as prologue? A 
sustained "Japan-bashing" reflects a resurgence of 
nativism and xenophobia which targets the "model 
minority" as an "indispensable scapegoat" in an ominous 
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pattem of violent "hate crimes".""* An ominous pattem of 
violent "hate crimes" includes the 1982 case of Vincent 
Chin, a Chinese-American beaten to death in Detroit by 
two unemployed auto workers who mistook him for a 
Japanese."*^ 
Nikkei were once deeply divided over monetary 
compensation, but there has been a conspicuous 
absence of community protests against the arrival of tax-
exempt $20,000 checks in the mail. In the meantime, 
with few exceptions, the general public's response to 
monetaty compensation has been ambivalent. Some 
claim that redress has been accomplished, that justice 
was long delayed but ultimately not denied. On the other 
hand, cash payments of $20,000 so long after the crime 
occurred that fewer than haff of the victims remain alive, 
is of dubious value as a deterrent to future abuses of 
power. Moreover, although the war-time convictions in 
the Japanese-American cases were overturned in the 
lower courts, the right of citizens to due process remains 
unprotected - hostage to any govemment claim of 
"militaty necessity". A constitutioned final accounting 
remains unfinished, and awaits some future case to be 
placed before nine political appointees to the Supreme 
Court. And the question still fingers: Can another group 
of Americans be targeted for mass uprooting, forced 
migration, and incarceration in concentration camps? 
Chapter 14 
American Museums and Executive 
Order 9066: 
Who Has Told the Story, 
The Story That Was Told 
Deborah A. Overmyer and Geoffrey J. Giglierano 
Cincinnati Historical Society 
As a general rule, American museums have only recenUy 
shown a AAdllingness to address controversial or 
unpleasant topics, especially issues that cast a negaUve 
light on American society or govemment. This reluctance 
has characterised museums' examination of the 
evacuation and incarceration of West Coast Japanese-
Americans during World War II. Though a few exhibits 
were mounted during or near the time the camps were 
operating, most appeared in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. By then, the US govemment had acknowledged 
the injustice of its actions and was seeking to make to 
make redress, a factor that permitted museums to put a 
more positive spin on the stoty's later chapters. But the 
ways that museums have looked at the topic and the 
goals ofthe exhibits have differed depending on the time, 
place, and Intended audience. 
A notice on page seventeen ofthe 10 November 1944, 
New York Times announced the opening of the first 
signfficant exhibit on the evacuation and incarceraUon 
of West Coast Japanese-Americans: 
The Museum of Modern Art ... opened to the public 
yesterday an exhibition of photographs showing the life and 
activities at Manzanar relocation center in California for 
loyal Japanese-Americans. The sLxty-one documentary 
photographs taken by Ansel Adams Include portrait studies 
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of individuals, as well as photographs of farming, religious 
activities, games, home life, and other aspects ofthe center. 
Ralph Palmer Merritt, Manzanar's director and a long-time 
friend, had suggested that the project might satisfy Adams* 
desire to help the war effort The photographer visited 
Manzanar in 1943, and later wrote to Nancy Newhall, acting 
director of the Photography Department of the Museum of 
Modem Art, about "the most Important job I have done this 
year": 
... I was asked to do some pictures at the Manzanar 
Relocation Center ... to clarify the distinction of [between] 
the loyal citizens of Japanese ancestry, and the disloyal 
Japanese citizens and aliens (1 might say Japanese-loyal 
aliens) thatare stationed mosUy in intemment camps... . To 
me, the job is about as constructive a thing as anyone could 
do - and strtctly American .... Through the pictures the 
reader will be Introduced to perhaps twenty Individuals ... 
loyal American citizens who are anxious to get back Into the 
stream of life and contribute to our victory .... Hence, the 
distinction between the loyal and disloyal elements must be 
made crystal-clear, and the emphasis on the Constitutional 
right of loyal minorities placed thereon to support one ofthe 
things ... which this war is all about The War Relocation 
Authority is doing a magnificent job, and Is firm and 
ruthless In ... definitions of true loyalty.' 
The first panel of the exhibit included tiUe, 
"Manzanar: Photographs by Ansel Adams of Loyal 
Japanese-American Relocation Center", Adams' text on 
himself, the project, the evacuation, and the distinction 
to be made between disloyal "intemees and segragees" in 
other centres and the "loyal American citizens of 
Japanese ancestty" in the photographs, 
normal and intelligent citizens of our country ... [whose] 
loyalty has been proved. With their white brothers they are 
united against the common enemy. Thousands are in our 
armed forces .... But growing racial antagonisms threaten 
to Inhibit their assimilation in many parts ofthe land. This 
series of photographs ... attempts to ... present them as the 
Americans they are.^ 
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This expression of sympathy for Japanese-Americans -
or at least those who were "loyal American citizens" - was 
a courageous act on the part of the museum and the 
photographer. The exhibit ran through 3 December and 
stirred "much attention and varying comment".^ 
The exhibit of twenty-she panels, two with text only 
and the others with three or four briefly captioned 
photos, offered "The Land" and "Here Are the People of 
Manzanar". The first included three ofthe landscapes for 
which Adams became renowned, one portrait, a photo of 
the camp from a guard tower, £md four images of people 
in the camp setting. The second section was comprised 
of a mix of landscapes, photos of recreational and 
occupational activities, examples of dally life, but 
primarily tight portrait shots. In 1944, Adams published 
most of these photographs in a 112-page book, BomFree 
and Equal: Photographs ofthe Loyal Japanese-Americans 
at Manzanar Relocation Center, Inyo County, California 
(New York: US Camera, 1944) that put before a national 
audience sixty-four black-and-white photographs. Most 
were the images and the captions from the MoMA 
exhibit, though the arrangement varied slightly. In 
addition, substantial essays allowed Adams to offer 
refiections on "The Land" and "The Place", biographies of 
many ofthe subjects photographed in "The People", and 
a warning about racism's threat to American democracy, 
"The Problem". Ralph Merritt approved both photo 
selection and text. Adams' autobiography recalls attacks 
In the press and bitter letters from famifies who had lost 
men In combat. Copies ofthe book were publicly burned 
in protest.'* 
To the social historian of fifty years later, however, the 
book - which cEui serve as an exhibit catalogue to 
recreate the exhibit - seems far from incendiary. The 
thirty simple, straight-forward portraits - "The People" -
that Adams valued for "Introducing" the young Nikkei to 
white Americans seem, because the subjects were rarely 
shown in any context, less evocative than formal studies 
of corporate CEOs. The portrait captions - "An American 
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School Girl", "Here Is an Accountant and Businessman", 
"AWAC Private", and "Private Kato, United States Army" 
- offered fitUe specffic irfformation, but perhaps aimed 
rather to convey the 'everyday-American' character of 
Adams' subjects. 
Twenty-three photos of dally life at Manzanar depicted 
scenes familiar to white Americans outside the barbed 
wire. A family (of photographer Toyo Miyatake) posed 
around a young daughter doing homework in "A 
Manzanar Household". High school students walking 
down a dirt road lined with rows of identical barracks; for 
them "Manzanar Is Only a Detour on the Road of 
American Citizenship". Tellingly, there were no portraits 
of older or foreign-bom Japanese-Americans (the 
exception being a hospitalised Spanish-American War 
veteran) about whose loysdty and future the 
photographer seemed uncertain and uneasy. The six 
panoramic landscape photographs captured the 
topography's dramatic contrasts but not the daily 
realities of heat, cold, and omnipresent dust. Only one of 
the six camp photographs (at the start of the book but 
not in the exhibit) hinted at the military presence: A tiny 
sign warned "Stop. Mfiitary Police", but the guard house 
and car stopped there were cropped out ofthe published 
version.^ 
Preceding the book's Conclusion were a govemment 
photograph of Nikkei soldiers in action and Adams' 
portraits of men and women in military uniform; the 
latterwere interspersed throughout the exhibit and fewer 
in number. The former arrangement was typical of later 
museum exhibits that held up militaty service as proof 
of the loyalty of the Nikkei and by extension, their 
parents. 
While Bom Free and Equal ended with a warning that 
assuring the nation's democratic future meant defusing 
racial antagonisms, Adams was finally em apologist for 
the govemment. Early in the book he approvingly quoted 
Merritt's conclusion that "The evacuation of 1942 has 
been, and always will be, justified on the ground of 
238 Allen Justice 
mfiitary necessity. I have not said that the evacuation 
was JUST, but that it was JUSTIFIED'".^ Adams also 
asked tf the losses and dismptions that Japanese-
Americans had suffered weren't really much like to those 
other Americans had endured because of the war. The 
exhibit and photo essay published as Bom Free and 
Equal looked firmly to the future, resolutely beyond - or 
perhaps past - the injustice and destmctiveness of 
Executive Order 9066. The book ended with War 
Relocation Authority director Dillon Myer's declaration 
that democracy would be lost ff a victorious America 
succumbed to race hatred ("The Problem" that 
threatened America) and a portrait captioned with fines 
from Walt Whitman on the great fight for democracy. 
Adams and MoMA took an unpopular, though largely 
uncritical, stand and were essentially optimistic about 
the inmates' future, and even their present situation. But 
it must be noted that the exhibit, in addition to 
differences In the amount of text and arrangement, 
included several elements that seem to express more 
critical feelings. The exhibit acknowledged physical 
hardships with photographs of a dust storm, the stieets 
in winter: "Winter comes severely to Manzauiar", and 
residents battling through a snow-storm: "In storm and 
cold, life continues". Two photos captioned "The 
Children", were described in the exhibit's list of photos 
and panel sequence as "Little Girl - Occidental type" and 
"LitUe Girl - Oriental type". Might these have touched 
upon the national phobia about inter-racial marriages? 
Finally, the exhibit ended with two portraits captioned 
with President Roosevelt's 3 February 1944, declaration 
that "Loyalty is a matter of the mind and heart .... 
Americanism is a matter ofthe mind and heart". In Bom 
Free and Equal Adams seems to have presented a less 
critical glimpse ofthe evacuation problem, one to which 
a wider audience might, he perhaps hoped, respond 
more positively and constructively. 
A more complex and critical view was offered at nearly 
the same time in a Rockefeller Center exhibit of the 
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works of Mine Okubo, a Nisei recentiy released from the 
camp at Topaz, Utah.^ Okubo's black-and-white 
drawings depicted the evacuees' shock and confusion on 
arrival, and the discorrfforts and adjustments of daily Iffe. 
These pieces were included in a 1945 nationwide 
travelling show of camp art work, and in 1946, Okubo 
gained a national audience when Columbia University 
Press published Citizen 13660, an account of her 
incarceration. 
In the post-war decades, Americans and American 
museums were not inclined to criticise the US 
govemment's past actions or to explore uncomfortable 
issues such as racism. Most Japanese-Americans, as 
Edison Tomimaro Uno wrote later, were "... too busy 
repairing our lives, too busy trying to catch up with 
careers cut short, too busy ttying to make up for years 
snatched out of lives ...".^The Civil Rights, Black Power, 
and ethnic pride movements ofthe 1960s brought racist 
practices under critical attack, and the coming-of-age of 
the Sansei, the third generation, fuelled a re-evaluation 
of war-time events. The pre-eminent exhibit to come out 
of this ferment was one of photographs taken primarily 
by men and women that the WRA and the FSA (Farm 
Security Administration) had hired to document 
evacuation and camp Iffe. 
Dorothea Lange, the best-known ofthe govemment's 
photographers to record the tragedy, had not accepted 
the govemment's rationale for evacuation.^ In 1965, an 
assistant, Richard Conrat, became interested in her 
photos of the period and, with his wife, located some 
25,000 such photos In govemment repositories and 
other cofiections. In 1972, the thirtieth anniversary of 
evacuation, the California Historical Society opened 
"Executive Order 9066: The Intemment of 110,000 
Japanese-Americems", featuring the works of Lange and 
other govemment photographers and photo journalists. 
The sixty-two emotionally powerful, black-and-white 
photos told a stoty far different from the "official line" or 
Adams' work, recording bewilderment, despair, stoic 
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dignity, fear, resignation, corffusion, and shock. Quotes 
from contemporary sources, juxtaposed as commentaty. 
put that tragedy in the context of anti-Japanese racism 
and war-time hysteria. 
The creed ofthe Japanese-American Citizens' League, 
1940, declaring pride In American citizenship and faith 
in the American spirit of fair play, preceded and 
concluded the first group of photos, among them a 
woman stopping work in a strawberry field to pose with 
her son in his army uniform, and two Japanese-
American gfi-ls at the front of a group of school children, 
hands over their hearts and gazing at an unseen 
American flag. Images of evacuation included Lange's 
photo of an elderly man seated beside two chfidren, 
probably his grandsons - all three "enemies" wearing 
cardboard tags for evacuation; General John DeWitt's 
judgement that "The Japanese race is an enemy race" 
served as the caption. There were photos of signs: signs 
nafied to a mailbox announcing "Evacuation Sale. 
Furniture. All Must Be Sold; signs on the Wanto grocety: 
"I Am An American" and "Sold". 
Numerous photographs documented the monotony 
and menace of camp life: a guard tower and rows of tar 
paper-covered barracks. Other photos recorded Niseis' 
willingness to prove their loyalty by serving in the 
military while their families remained under armed guard 
behind barbed wire: in a WRA photo, a young man in 
unfform talks with his parents in their crowded barracks 
room where a gold star flag and a flag with three blue 
stars hung on the wall. There was one mention of those 
who retumed to Japan, but the exhibit concluded with 
a photo of families gathered at a memorial service, and of 
the American flag flying in a breeze that stirred a cloud 
of dust over rows of barracks. 
The Callfomla Historical Society exhibit reflected the 
Increased willingness of some American museums to 
deal with controversial or disturbing topics. Coupled 
with a growing awareness of EO 9066 and the feeling 
that America must confront this period in its histoty 
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came the movement for national pofitical and economic 
redress. In this climate, it was not unreasonable that 
when the National Museum of American Histoty ofthe 
Smithsonian Institution began planning an exhibit to 
mark the 1987 bicentennial of the United States 
Constitution, curators and historians rejected a 
conventional approach detailing the Founding Fathers' 
creation of the document. Instead, as Tom Crouch, 
Chadrman of the Department of Social and Cultural 
Histoty later explained, the staff sought to create an 
exhibit that would 
... explore the way in which the Constitution balances the 
enormous power ofthe State against the rights of Individual 
citizens and minorities. In order to ... impress the visitors 
with the Impact of constitutional Issues on the everyday 
lives of real human beings, the ... exhibition team decided 
to present a case study ...'° 
The NMAH exhibit does not simply retell the war-time 
stoty but makes it immediate and relevant to all 
Americans by explaining how constitutional guarantees 
had once been - and might again be - denied a group of 
citizens on the basis of the day's fears, that Americans 
must be vigilant in the defense of civil liberties, and how 
the Constitution encourages Americans to admit and 
correct past errors. 
Entitled "A More Perfect Union: Japanese-Americans 
and the United States Constitution", this major 
permanent exhibit combines over 1000 documents and 
artifacts, extensive label copy, photograph panels, audio-
visual units, and full-scale dioramas: a street scene 
based on photos of the "LitUe Tokyo" district of Los 
Angeles and a Topaz barracks room. An Interactive video-
tape of oral histories allows visitors to "ask" former 
Irmiates about their experiences. Elsewhere, in a rear-
projection film presentation, a Japanese-American male 
character and his daughter stand in the doorway of the 
recreated barracks room, much like the one he knew as 
a youth. Looking through this portal to the past, he 
explains war-time events, their impact upon people's 
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lives, and the stories ofthe artifacts with which the room 
has been furnished. 
Like other exhibits, "A More Perfect Union" ends wiUi 
a large section about the Nisei who fought in World War 
II; the need for "proof of loyalty remained. Here are a 
full-scale diorama with an artillety piece and life-cast 
figures representing its crew, another interactive audio 
visual unit presenting oral histories, and a vignette that 
includes a jeep, weapons, rations, and tools that the 
soldiers used, as well as photographs of the 442nd 
Regimental Combat Team in action. This section also 
introduces visitors to the war-time loyalty questionnaire 
that divided and stfil troubles the Japanese-American 
community. The strengths of the Constitution and 
America's ability for self-correction is realised In a final 
section, added later, tha t contains material about the 
govemment's formal apology and compensation 
payments. 
ShorUy afterwards, in April 1990, the National 
Japanese-American Historical Society premiered a 
ninety-panel travelling photograph exhibit "US Detention 
Camps, 1942-1946" that was stfil moving throughout Uie 
countty during the fiftieth anniversaty years. Among the 
sites that have hosted it are museums and other 
institutions in AUanta, Detroit, San Francisco, and 
Cincinnati. The exhibit's curators selected images that 
were stark and direct, not posed or artistic. The work of 
Dorothea Lange was again prominenUy featured, but 
other images came from new sources, including army 
personnel who were not under same restrictions as the 
WRA photographers. These photos show that the 
relocation camps were indeed concentration camps with 
tangles of barbed wire, watch towers, and armed guards. 
Project director and NJAHS president Clifford Uyeda 
explained that the institution's goal was to be as 
"complete as possible" in addressing the Incarceration 
'Trom the beginning of the experience to the end", 
starting with anti-Asian hostility that existed before Pearl 
Harbor and concluding with redress and compensation. 
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Confronting subjects that other camp exhibits ignored or 
avoided - including the filthy conditions ofthe "assembly 
centers", protest and punishment, camp Iffe for the 
admhiistrative personnel, isolation centres. Inmate 
suicides, and the few whites who opposed evacuation -
the exhibit vividly presented incarceration's cruel 
realities." 
NJAHS received criticism for its approach to the topic, 
particularly for including images dealing with the 
suicides. But the exhibit's organisers felt that it was 
important to tell the story "from evety angle ... good and 
bad". According to Uyeda, 
The camp experience for the internees was a spiritual death 
sentence .... It was a time of ambivalence concerning their 
devotion to their country and to Its constitution. Upholding 
one was to reject the other. Trapped, confined, and 
humiliated, there was no one correct choice to make. 
The idea ofthe exhibit Is to tell It like It was ... to look back 
to this experience In order to more Intelligently look forward 
12 
The fiftieth anniversaty of the Worid War II and FDR's 
signing of EO 9066 prompted most of the exhibits on 
evacuation in state and community museums that, with 
some exceptions, presented the events surrounding EO 
9066 as part of communities' different stories with both 
human impact and present-day relevance. The war-time 
episode was used to filustrate ideas that were meaningful 
for the constituency that each museum served. 
Among major exhibits to include EO 9066 and 
examine the subject in a different context was 
"Cincinnati Goes to War: A Community Responds to 
World War IF, a 9,000-square-foot exhibit (1991 to 1995) 
that was perhaps the single largest exhibit on the World 
War II homefront. Cincinnati was one ofthe Midwestem 
clUes where the WRA, aided in this instance by local 
Quakers and the Episcopal Diocese, resettied Japanese-
Americans. Of the 2,584 Nikkei who had resettled in 
Ohio by 1945. some 600 came to the Queen City.'^ 
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ResetUement was a part of the local stoty of "Aiding 
War's Victims": how Cincinnatians had sought to 
mitigate the tragic cost of the war beyond widely-
promoted and well-remembered activities such as Red 
Cross blood and clothing drives. 
IHinois received a greater number of released former 
inmates than any other non-western state, and 
resetUement figured fairly prominenUy (some twelve per 
cent) in the Chicago Historical Society's 6,3000-square-
foot exhibit, "Chicago Goes to War, 1941-1945", (1991-
1993)."^ To make it relevant to the city's many ethnic 
communities, the story - told with photo and text panels 
and some artifacts - was placed in the context of war-
time racial discrimination and the struggle for human 
rights. One of the exhibit's seven audio-visual 
presentations, "Two Wars to Win", explored war-time civil 
rights Issues through segments of interviews with both 
African and Japanese-American Chlcagoans. The 
project's Japanese-American steering committee, 
wanting a positive note, had a section on militaty service 
added. This portion ofthe Chicago exhibit on racial and 
ethnic prejudice also examined anti-German and anU-
Serrfitic prejudices. 
Historical societies and museums in westem states 
also Interpreted those events in various contexts 
determined by local connections to the stoty of the 
incarceration. The Utah State Historical Society's 
permanent exhibit, "Utah at the Crossroads", include the 
stoty with signs and furniture from Topaz.'^ The Arizona 
Historical Society plans to include the camps at Poston 
and Gila River in twentieth-century histOty exhibits at a 
new facility being completed in Tempe. The Gallety of 
Military Communities will feature the two camps along 
with other war-time "communities": German and Italian 
POW camps, flight training centres, and war-related 
production and relief centres. Editorial cartoons and the 
like from Arizona newspapers will illustrate the racial 
animosity that Japanese-Americans faced before and 
after Pearl Harbor; later public reaction to and treatment 
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ofthe Inmates will be compared to the reaction towards 
the prisoners of war held in Arizona. 
The depiction of camp life in the Arizona exhibit 
featured camp newspapers, photos, and oral interviews 
gathered at the fiftieth reunions of the two camps in 
October 1992. Particularly exciting were artifacts 
donated by an archaeological service working In 1986 at 
the request of the Gfia River Indian community which 
was considering the camp site for agricultural use and 
wanted to know what camp-related materials remained. 
There are cafeteria dishes and Japanese porcelains, 
remnants of buildings, metal cot pieces and wall hooks, 
suitcases and grooming articles.'^ The exhibit also had 
a section on the men from Gila River and Poston who 
served in the 442nd. 
The Wyoming State Museum in Cheyenne produced 
"World War II In Wyormng", three year-long exhibits 
(1993-1995), as well as annual travelling exhibits and 
public programs. "Wyoming in the Military - The Militaty 
in Wyoming", (Februaty through November 1993) 
Included the camp at Heart Mountain, established under 
militaty auspices.'^ Other elements in this section were 
the militaty bases and prisoner of war camps in 
Wyoming and the military experiences of men and 
women from the state. The exhibit also Included a group 
photograph of sixty-three Nisei (of a total of eighty-five) 
from Heart Mountain who refused to obey draft notices, 
were tried in Cheyenne, convicted, and sent to prison. 
The camp will likely be a part of the second exhibit on 
the homefront, as area ranchers and farmers often hired 
the Japanese-Americans as day labourers, and the town 
councils of nearby Powell and Cody passed ordinances 
barring the Inmates - which business associations 
quickly had overturned, unwilling to sacrifice profits to 
prejudice. 
Not surprisingly. West Coast museums produced the 
greatest number of exhibits; some focused on EO 9066. 
others included it as a part of larger stories. Many found 
that white adult visitors who had been children during 
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the war knew littie about the evacuation or insisted 
mcarceration could not have been as bad as the exhibits 
depicted. 
Washington State Historical Society's permanent 
histoty exhibits include evacuation, but the most 
signfficant exhibition in that state was done by SeatUe's 
Wing Luke Asian Museum. "Executive Order 9066: Fifty 
Years Before and Fifty Years After. A Histoty of Japanese-
Americans in SeatUe" (19 Februaty-31 August 1992) 
explored one hundred years of histoty in which 
evacuation was not an isolated episode but a tuming 
point, and filled the museum's 3000 square feet of gallety 
space.'* 
This examination ofthe long and multi-faceted histoty 
of Japanese-Americans in Seattle and King County 
began with immigration in the 1890s. Next, the 
occupations that the new arrivals found: agriculture or 
truck farming, dairy work, logging, fisheries and 
canneries. This section also featured photographs of and 
artffacts from Japanese-owned hotels, groceries, fiorists, 
restaurants, and other urban businesses, including a 
Iffe-size recreation of the Japanese-owned Main Drug 
Store storefront furnished with artifacts donated by a 
family member. A map of SeatUe's pre-war Japantown 
recorded the community's growth and suggested its war-
time transformation to present-day Chinatown. 
Community life in "Main Street (Nlhonmachi). USA" was 
vibrant and diverse, represented by artifacts from 
Japanese-American sports teams and theatres, and a 
recreated Japanese-language schoolroom vignette. 
The historical tuming point - literally around the 
comer in the gallety - was World War II. Blown-up copies 
of posters and articles from local newspapers - and a 
copy of Executive Order 9066 - conveyed the war-time 
anti-Japanese hysteria. Enlargements of evacuation 
notices, photos, a model of the Camp Harmony barracks 
built at the Puyallup County fairgrounds, luggage wlUi 
original tags preceded a life-size, walk-through recreation 
of a typical barracks room at Minidoka (where the 
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government Incarcerated most of SeatUe's Nikkei) 
furnished with two cots, a pot-bellied stove, blankets, 
and personal artifacts: a shaving kit, geta, clothing, and 
a camp-made dresser. An audio tape of oral interviews 
"interpreted" the setting. 
Leaving "Minidoka", visitors passed a panel with 
Questions 27 and 28, and continued on to an 
interpretation of mifitary experience (442nd, WACs, and 
Military Intelfigence Service), that included a photo of 
Dachau because the 442nd was one of the units that 
liberated the death camp and because racism lay behind 
the creation of the two vety different kinds of camps. 
Finally, the exhibit looked at resetUement - including the 
antagonism and adjustments that those being resettled 
faced - and redress. The conclusion featured a reading 
room that offered further information and a panel asking 
"Could It Happen Again?" as economic troubles, 
international tensions, and domestic prejudices stir 
feelings against "dffferent" people. 
The Wing Luke Museum also presented the first 
pubfic exhibition of SeatUe painter, represented in the 
Museum of Modem Art by the 1930s and then evacuated 
to Minidoka: "Kenjiro Nomura: An Artist's View of the 
Japanese-American Intemment". June Mukai McKlvor, 
Nomura's niece, created an excellent black-and-white 
and colour exhibit catalogue that included an illustrated 
biography of Nomura, and offered Nomura's watercolours 
and ofis in the context of histories of Camp Harmony and 
Minidoka. McKlvor also developed the exhibit after 
Nomura's war-time paintings were found bundled in a 
family member's garage, and she succeeded In having the 
exhibit travel throughout the countty. Nomura's Camp 
Harmony and Minidoka were dark skies, guard towers 
and barbed wire fence, stark barracks and camp 
buildings fining dirt roads, and an solitaty figure or two. 
each going about his or her own routine. 
The Oregon Historical Society In PorUand mounted "In 
This Great Land of Freedom: The Japanese Pioneers of 
Oregon" (7 August 1993-16 Januaty 1994). in 
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collaboration with the Japanese-American National 
Museum In Los Angeles. Opened during the time 
Oregonians were celebrating the 150th anniversaty of 
the Oregon Trail, this exhibit, too. put EO 9066 in a 
larger context. '^ Many associated with the exhibit echoed 
the president ofthe PorUand JACL who explained: ""What 
it is important for afi of u s to understand is the Oregon 
Trail came in [from] two directions and evetyone 
contributed to the histoty of Oregon. It [the exhibit] is 
not a stoty of Japanese. It Is a piece of the story of 
Oregon. We are a piece of the patchwork'".^" 
Chronicling the history ofthe Issel from 1880. when 
the first known Japanese pioneer arrived in Oregon, 
until citizenship became possible in 1952. the exhibit 
suggested that Japanese and white pioneers had many 
experiences in common, and paid tribute to the Issel's 
contributions to the bufiding ofthe state's multicultural 
society. The early pioneers, most of them men. found 
emplojmient in agriculture (though anti-Japanese 
sentiment kept restrictive land laws in force until 1949), 
logging, and the railroads, and as labour contractors and 
small businessmen. The bachelor society was 
transformed into a community of families, and 
community life burgeoned, as sports equipment and 
photos of family, professional, social, musical, and civic 
activities attested. From the announcement of 
incarceration, visitors passed through a black tunnel to 
the section on camp life, where a configuration of boards 
and wire symbolised the frightening uncertainty of 
assembly center and camp life, setting the mood for that 
portion of the stoty. Again. Issei were "community 
builders", participating in Minidoka's softball team and 
embroidety class, and sending sons off to fight.^' 
"Japanese Pioneers of Oregon" also recorded the intense 
post-war anti-Japanese antagonism, but ended with final 
victoty: citizenship and dedication ofthe Nisei Memorial 
in a PorUand cemetety. 
Examination of EO 9066 came full circle during the 
1992-1993 commemoration of the order's fiftieth 
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armiversary instituted by the Asian-American Studies 
Center at the University of California. Los Angeles. 
UCLA's Frederick S. Wight Gallery remounted 
simultaneously the Callfomla Historical Society's "EO 
9066" (with a reprint ofthe revised catalogue) and some 
of Ansel Adams' works in "Manzanar: A Selection of 
Photographs" (15 Febmary-1 March 1992). Later, in 
cooperation with the Japanese-American National 
Museum, the gallety mounted "The View from Within: 
Japanese American Art from the Intemment Camps, 
1942-1945" (13 October-6 December 1992), one hundred 
thirty paintings, drawings, sculptures, and prints - by 
professional and avocational artists.^^ The exhibit 
catalogue provided a fascinating illustrated overview of 
artists and art programs in the camps that places the 
exhibit in historical context, a brief histoty of Japanese 
in America, an incarceration chronology, a memoir of 
Poston, as wefi as black-and-white and colour plates of 
art works that Include portraits, routine and 
corffrontational camp scenes, landscapes, and stifi fifes.^^ 
While the photographic exhibit added nothing new to 
the stoty, the critical response is interesting. By the later 
twentieth-century, Adams' stature had apparently 
combined with an unawareness of the 1944 book and a 
desire to prove the evacuees were not passive victims but 
resilient victors, to produce a significant re-evaluation, 
even rehabilitation, of Adams and his work. 
This positive assessment of Adams and his work and 
Manzanar began to surface as early as 1978, when a 
group of UCLA photography students organised a show 
of sixty-four Images by Adams and Toyo Miyatake, 
entiUed "Two Views ofManzanar". The Introduction in 
the exhibit catalogue praised this "most compassionate 
body of work" that "stress[esl the restoration and 
maturation of normal and productive living", and the 
"singularly impressive ... close view portraits .... [of] 
heroic faces ... [that] serve as an idealisation of both the 
individual and the people, ...".^ '^  Whfie the essay noted 
that Adams and Miyatake both admired the "pride and 
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resourcefulness of the community", it did not see 
differences in the two men's visions. However, Miyatake's 
photos recorded daily Iffe up close, usually Irfformally. 
and without Idealising the people, thus capturing the 
cruel absurdity of "normal" life in abnormal, 
dehumanising, dangerous conditions. For example, 
Miyatake photographed untformed majorettes posed with 
mountains, not high school grandstands, in the 
background. 
The 1978 essay deprecated Lange and her work: her 
anger and the same "pathos pervading [her] Dustbowl 
[sic] subjects" were "aroused by her particular idea of 
Manzanar's implications", rather than outrage at the 
tragedy. Further, "the misety exponent" was the only side 
of the relocated life that Lange revealed" during her 
week-long assignment. 
The 1993 exhibit of Adams' and the WRA/Lange 
photos drew a similar critical response. One review, 
which sought some element to help younger Nikkei and 
other minorities connect the war-time stOty with their 
own concems. declared that the "EO 9066" photos, while 
powerful, treated evacuation "episodically", while Adams' 
photos 
... transcend the severity of Lange's photographs and attest 
to the capability of a people in reduced circumstances to 
adapt and refashion their lives with dignity ... each of his 
photographs shows intemees settied and comfortable In 
their new community and evokes a living situation that 
consulting historian Yujl Ichloka has described as being no 
different from "small-town America of that period".^ 
Such a response demonstrates the limits and flaw in 
Adams' work: viewed uncritically by those aiming, as he 
was, to emphasise the Nikkeis' triumph, the photos can 
support a contention that evacuation and IncarceraUon 
were more summer camp than concentration camp. 
Down-plajdng victimisation, loss, and hardship, however, 
reduces the significance of what the evacuees achieved 
In sustaining normal life in the camps and in rebuilding 
afterwards. 
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Other views and different approaches to the subject of 
Uie incarceration were still being explored. In Febmary 
1992, the National Japanese-American Historical Society 
debuted a second travelling exhibit, "Children of 
Detention Camps", at the San Francisco City Hall. This 
60-paneI exhibition of photographs - which has appeared 
throughout the country, from the Japanese Community 
Cultural Center of San Francisco to the Indianapolis 
Chfidrens' Museum - studied incarceration from the 
perspective of its impact on children. 
The NJAHS exhibit pointed out that over 40,000 ofthe 
more that 120,000 Japanese-Americans placed in the 
war-time detention camps were young adults, teenagers, 
and children, and that their experience in those camps 
was not as benign as Adams and other apologists for the 
govemment have suggested. As the press release for the 
exhibit explains: 
Younger children were often shielded from the harsh reality 
of their situation by protective parents. Even now, many 
recall happy moments of their childhood with friends 
However, at a Ume in their lives when Identities were still 
forming, these young adults, teenagers, and children had 
to contend with the realities of racism, war-time hysteria, 
and the denial ofthelr civil rights ... 
The hicarceration experience exacted its toll on the entire 
Japeuiese-American community; for the chfidren, the 
emotional and psychological burden was a heavy one. 
The incarceration seemed to impede the education and 
projected careers of many.^ ® 
This exhibit also sought to place what happened to 
Japanese-American chfidren within the context of the 
experience of young people from other groups that were 
placed In camps: Aleuts from the war zone in Alaska and 
South Americans of Japanese descent who were brought 
to detention camps In the United States as potential 
hostages to be exchanged for Americans intemed by the 
Japanese govemment in Asia. 
A unique and permanent commemoration ofthe 
evacuation and incarceration came on 2 March 1992, 
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two weeks after the fifiJeth anniversary of President 
Franklin Roosevelt's signing of EO 9066, when Congress 
passed Pubfic Law 102-248 designating the Manzanar 
National Historic Site a part ofthe National Park System, 
representative of the ten war-time camps. Acquiring 
State Landmark s tatus in 1972, the 640-acre former 
camp site plus the adjacent cemetety and monument, 
became a National Historic Landmark in 1985 as the 
cubnination of the "World War H in the Pacfilc: National 
Historic Landmark Theme Study" authorised by 
Congress and undertaken by the National Park Service 
in 1978. The study recommended National Historic 
Landmark designation for twenty objects or sites; 
Manzaneu" was one.^^ (One ofthe two camps in Arkansas, 
Rohwer, which has a monument to the soldiers of the 
100th Battalion, became a National Historic Landmark 
in 1993.) 
The Meurzanar site was cleared in 1945 and retumed 
to the administration of the City of Los Angeles; the 
hospital footings, traces of several rock gardens, a sentty 
post, and auditorium-gymnasium building remained.^* 
By the 1980s, hundreds of former evacuees and others 
had been making emnual pilgrimages to the site, and 
thousands visited a spot that no guidebook listed. As the 
Park Service began planning to develop the site, 
rebuilding the camp was considered unlikely, but if 
existing buildings are maintained and a new structure 
for interpretation created, this will be the only museum 
devoted solely to the evacuation stoty.^^ 
The variety of exhibits in American museums and 
galleries that have dealt with Executive Order 9066 have 
gone beyond the preserving and presenting of histoty, 
achieving more than most exhibits accomplish by 
conve3dng the humanity of histoty, as well as the causes, 
context, continuing impact, and broad present-day 
slgntficance of the federal govemment's war-time 
decision to incarcerate West Coast Japanese-Americans. 
If, to many people, histoty is little more than a series of 
dates of battles that happened "back then sometime". EO 
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9066 exhibits have brought the particular stoty into the 
fabric of many communities' histories and. rich In 
photographs, have proven that at least that piece of 
histoty meant people, most of them residents of the areas 
that the museums served. Further, no visitor could come 
away believing that evacuation had "just happened" as 
the exhibits (those of Adams' photos being the exception) 
identffied long-standing racism, economic jealousy, and 
war-time hysteria as the causes of and context in which 
militaty and political leaders made the decision that 
abrogated the Constitutional rights of tens of thousands 
of American citizens. While the govemment's ability to 
deny Constitutional guarantees - or make other mistakes 
- remains a possibility, EO 9066 exhibits provided 
counterbalance in the successful redress movement, 
empowering visitors with the proof that Individuals can 
strive against the "forces of histoty" or popular opinion 
in defense of their own and others' rights. 
EO 9066 exhibits and accompanying programs, while 
telling a story with which white museum visitors and 
many younger Nikkei might be unfamiliar, also involved 
hundreds of Nisei for many of whom the experience 
proved an chance to ensure their stories were not 
forgotten by the younger generations or American 
society; a cathartic opportunity to break long silences 
thus helping heal persisting feelings of guilt, anger, grief, 
and shame; and the chance to talk and share with 
younger Nikkei, enabling them to take hold of their 
hlstoty. (Though some younger Japanese-Americans' 
"interpretation" of the camp experience threatens 
accurate understanding as previous neglect had.) Few 
exhibits have so deeply affected individuals or groups. 
And by making EO 9066 a meaningful part of all 
Americans' history, many exhibits made Japanese-
Americans, their histoty, and their contributions to 
America's multi-cultural society a definite, vivid reality 
for m u s e u m v i s i to r s . Deepen ing h i s tor ica l 
understanding. Inseparable from human understanding, 
are goals that most of the EO 9066 exhibits have aimed 
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for and which a remarkable number of them have, to one 
degree or another, achieved. 
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I ne past, violent century has visited widespread 
suffering upon non-combatants. Australia, the US 
and Canada — among many others — interned thei 
wartime "enemy aliens" behind barbed wire in • 
crowded concentration camps. ^ 
Those targeted were primarily German, Italian and 
Japanese civilians, including many women and 
•children. They faced summary arrest, their livelihoods 
and reputations were destroyed, and they were | H 
separated from family and friends for lengthy periods. 
' Representing the work of l(ey international scholars 
in the field, this important volume chronicles the 
suffering of these unexpected casualties of war in 
three Allied countries across two world wars. ~ 
On the threshold of the twenty-first century, the world 
once more has witnessed the large-scale horror of 
"ethnic cleansing". Understanding earlier government-
sanctioned campaigns of racial persecution — in so-
^eii Western democracies — may help avert future 
iisasters. 
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